The Project Gutenberg eBook of The story of the Ukraine

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

Title: The story of the Ukraine

Author: Clarence Augustus Manning

Release date: March 10, 2026 [eBook #78161]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: Philosophical Library, 1947

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78161

Credits: Tim Lindell, Karin Spence and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STORY OF THE UKRAINE ***

The Story of the Ukraine

MAP OF UKRAINE

The Story of

The Ukraine

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Assistant Professor of

East European Languages

Columbia University

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY

NEW YORK

Copyright 1947

By PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY, INC.

15 EAST 40TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction

9

Chapter I

UKRAINE

19

Chapter II

RUS’ AND UKRAINE

24

Chapter III

KIEVAN RUS’

31

Chapter IV

THE CULTURAL REVIVAL

45

Chapter V

THE KOZAKS

59

Chapter VI

BOHDAN KHMELNITSKY

73

Chapter VII

THE REVOLT OF MAZEPA

87

Chapter VIII

THE SPREAD OF KIEVAN CULTURE IN MOSCOW

106

Chapter IX

THE LAST ACTS IN POLAND

121

Chapter X

THE END OF KOZAK LIBERTIES

131

Chapter XI

UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

145

Chapter XII

THE AWAKENING IN EASTERN UKRAINE

155

Chapter XIII

THE SOCIETY OF SAINTS CYRIL AND METHODIUS

164

Chapter XIV

THE REVIVAL IN GALICIA

172

Chapter XV

PROGRESS IN RUSSIA

184

Chapter XVI

DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

195

Chapter XVII

BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND WAR

203

Chapter XVIII

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

210

Chapter XIX

UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

216

Chapter XX

FOREIGN RELATIONS

227

Chapter XXI

THE REPUBLIC OF WESTERN UKRAINE

238

Chapter XXII

THE FALL OF UKRAINE

244

Chapter XXIII

WESTERN UKRAINE

255

Chapter XXIV

CARPATHO-UKRAINE

265

Chapter XXV

THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

273

Chapter XXVI

UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR  II

288

Chapter XXVII

THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE

301

The Story of the Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1945, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was formally accepted at the Conference in San Francisco as a member of the United Nations Organization. This could not satisfy the aspirations of the forty million Ukrainians who were suffering under Communist yoke and were witnessing the attempt to eradicate from their country all those principles of freedom and democracy for which they had so long been struggling, but it did bring prominently before the public opinion of the world that Ukraine was not the creation of a series of propagandists but a nation with its own geographical area, its own population, and its own history. The rulers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had thought fit to bring before the representatives of the United Nations a situation that had been denied for centuries by Russian officials and scholars. After long denying its existence, the world was forced to acknowledge that Ukraine really did exist and it will be impossible for students in the future to take again the old widespread attitude that Ukraine is only a figment of the imagination. It will be impossible in the future to write European and world history, without taking account of this people which for good or ill have inhabited their homeland for over one thousand years and have taken part in nearly all the great movements of thought and action that have swept over Europe.

There is no need to delve into prehistoric times and to endeavor to identify the various tribes and cultures that have passed forgotten into the composition of Ukraine. It is over one thousand years since the first known dynasty was established at Kiev on the Dnyeper River and the country was launched upon its historic course. It is nearly one thousand years since monks from Constantinople, the imperial city on the Bosphorus, were invited to Kiev and baptized the sovereign, Saint Volodymyr, and his court and made Kiev one of the civilized capitals of Christendom.

For two centuries the Grand Prince of Kiev was known and respected throughout Europe, even though that Europe was very different politically from what it is to-day. Constantinople which had given richly of its culture to the new state in the east of Europe was then the great centre of Christian civilization. All nations in the West were looking at its wealth and power with admiration and with envy, for there was none that could compare with it. The Western Holy Roman Empire had just struggled to its feet under the rule of the Emperor Otto I. Hugh Capet had just been crowned King of France and was struggling to make his title valuable. The Norman conquest of England had not yet taken place and the last Saxon rulers were trying to hold their crown and to unify the country. Paganism still was rife in large sections of Germany. The reforms of Pope Gregory VII in the Roman Catholic Church were still in the future. All of western Europe was slowly recovering from the Dark Ages which had prevailed since the barbarian invasions of the fifth century.

Against this background Kiev shines as a great and progressive state. Its early rulers represented culture and civilization. It is small wonder that Princesses of Kiev married into all the royal houses of Europe, that the struggling princes and kings and emperors of the West were only too proud and happy to be connected by ties of marriage and of blood to the Grand Princes of Kiev, their superiors in wealth and culture and enlightenment. Unless we realize this fact, we cannot hope to understand the tragedy that swept over Ukraine when internal dissension and the overwhelming attacks of the nomads of the steppes and then of the Mongols weakened and destroyed a state that had seemed secure and permanent but a short time before. We cannot understand otherwise the political vacuum that developed in eastern Europe, when early in the thirteenth century Rus’-Ukraine ceased to be the dominant force along the great river valleys of the east and left its lands and people to be the prey of one nation after another which for centuries had not dared to question their will.

It was the tragedy of Ukraine that this collapse came at the very period when the countries of the Roman Catholic West were struggling to their feet. Those years when the Middle Ages were at their height formed the darkest and most hopeless years in Ukrainian history. It was the time when the old nobility were largely lost to the life of the people and when in large numbers they accepted the Polish language and Polish customs. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 deprived the people and their Orthodox Church of all contact with Eastern Christian culture and left them helpless, with their educational system in ruins, their political organization shattered, and their economic life in chaos. Then, if ever, it seemed likely that the country would be reduced to ignorant peasants destined to be absorbed by their conquerors and to pass away among the forgotten peoples of the world. The great movements of chivalry and the Renaissance which prepared the way for modern Europe could have no meaning for the helpless serfs and uneducated city people who formed almost all that was left of the once proud state of Kiev.

It was then that out of these masses and the few nobles who still retained the national spirit and tradition there grew the surprising movement which revived the spirit of Ukrainian culture. It was then that the unsettled conditions on the frontier, the bold and hazardous life of opposition to the Asiatic invaders developed the Kozaks. On land and sea they fought and the exploits of the heroes of the Zaporozhian Sich with their wild and untamed democracy in the sixteenth century fitted in well with the sturdy sea-dogs of England who were proud to singe the beard of the King of Spain on all of the seven seas. The era of Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh, of the English fight against the Spanish Armada in the reign of Queen Elizabeth coincided exactly with the years when the Kozaks made their raids against the Turks and the Tatars, when they dared to burn and plunder the suburbs of Constantinople itself, and when the cry that the Kozaks were coming was enough to spread the alarm through all eastern Europe, wherever there was oppression and evil.

The sixteenth century was an era all over Europe when men dared to fight and risk their lives for the religious and political ideas which they respected and in which they believed. It was an era of religious confusion and of change and although the problem in Ukraine was different, the same spirit that a little earlier had sent Christopher Columbus across the ocean, that inspired Cortez and Pizarro to conquer the Aztecs and the Incas, that explored the New World under terrific odds, saw the development of the democratic Kozak Host.

It was a glorious and a heroic period but it was costly in the blood of Ukraine’s sons. They had no base of supplies, no formal government on which they could lean, no resources behind them. They followed their love of liberty, their disregard for death, their own elected leaders and made their names forever memorable in the books of heroes and of men of action. It was a true revolt of the human spirit against oppression and tyranny. It was a time when men were so busy acting that they had no inclination to think and to reflect. They were so conscious of the need of winning freedom and of gaining wealth and power by their heroism that they neglected much that would have helped them later.

So the struggle continued until in the seventeenth century Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the greatest of the hetmans, endeavored to organize the Host and Ukraine on a national basis. He exchanged letters with Oliver Cromwell. He lived and worked at the time when the Puritans were mastering the New England wilderness, when the Thirty Years War was decimating Germany, when the first seeds of modern thought were sprouting all over Europe.

Had he won his fight, had he lived a little longer to make Ukraine really free, a restored Ukraine and the Thirteen American Colonies would have appeared in history at one and the same time. The ideals of popular rule would have taken root in two widely scattered parts of the world. There would have been in Europe a free republic set up in a strategic part of the continent, and the history of Europe would have been changed.

It was not to be. In an evil moment, Khmelnitsky put the Kozak Host under the jurisdiction of the Tsar of Moscow and from that moment on, it was torn to pieces by the mutual efforts of Moscow and Poland. Step by step, as the New World went on to increasing power and unanimity, as the American colonies became conscious of their mutual interests and of their growing strength, Ukraine fell into greater and greater chaos. Hetman fought against hetman, instigated by foreign rulers, and the great masses of the Kozaks, losing their own ideals, again reverted to dissatisfied and impoverished peasants while their officers tried to become aristocrats like the nobles around them. It was in vain that Mazepa tried to rouse the Kozaks to revolt for Ukrainian independence. It was in vain that one leader after another endeavored to bring back the old spirit of unity and of cooperation. The power of Moscow increased over the Kozak Host. More of the leaders were lost to the popular cause and despair reigned throughout the land as Peter the Great and Catherine tore away and abrogated the last of the Kozak rights.

It is striking and significant that it was in 1775, the very year when the Americans rose in revolt against the British Crown in defence of their liberties, that the armed forces of Catherine the Great destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich and ended once and for all the old institution that had carried Ukraine in the preceding century to a height unparalleled since the early days of Kiev. When we compare the power and population of the American colonies and of the Kozak Host in the days of Khmelnitsky and then again in 1775, we shall see how the ideas of liberty brought rich dividends to America and how the obscuring of them by the actions of foreign rulers and internal discord wrought havoc in Ukraine.

The old system perished just at the very moment when in the New World those principles of individual initiative and of political liberty for which the Sich and the Kozak Host had always stood were winning their great triumph. It came to its end just as the American Revolution was breaking out, just when the “shot heard round the world” at Concord Bridge was ringing out a new appeal to mankind to fight and die for liberty and for freedom. It came to its end just as the thinkers of Western Europe dared to proclaim again the rights of man and the eternal principles of justice and of law.

The old Ukraine disappeared just at the moment when conditions were becoming favorable for its continuation, when the power of public opinion was again being invoked to justify a struggle against tyranny and oppression. It was only fourteen years before the French Revolution was to carry into Europe itself those ideals and principles that men had fought to win in the New World. It was by such a narrow margin that Ukraine failed to be one of the states which could aspire to political continuity, to the passing from autocratic domination to liberty with its old forms preserved, with old traditions living in written statute as well as in the memory of the people.

Then came the revival, but it was a slow and painful process, for the Ukrainian leaders had to struggle for every concession from the autocratic rulers who held the country. The very existence of the country was denied, the name was abolished, the language was mocked as an uncouth peasant dialect. Such a seer and a prophet as Shevchenko had to pay for his devotion to his country with years of exile and imprisonment in the Russian army. Yet step by step the struggle went on. All through the nineteenth century, the demand for a true Ukrainian solution of the Ukrainian question gained strength in the underground of the consciousness of the people. The sense of unity in all branches of the Ukrainian people, whether in Russia or in Austria-Hungary, grew and spread. It was not spectacular. There could not be any open proclamation of its hopes and its aspirations. There could be no open economic strengthening of the people for their own good. Yet they continued to work, to hope and to pray.

The First World War broke out and it ruined the two empires that controlled Ukraine. The principles of the United States, the Fourteen Points of Wilson, the message of self-determination for all peoples, resounded through Ukraine and once more there was proclaimed in 1919 a united sovereign Ukrainian Republic. The ideals that the Kozaks had had in common with the Americans two and a half centuries earlier once again found their voice on Ukrainian territory and for a while it seemed as if a final solution of the future of Ukraine had been reached.

Again there came disaster. The democratic powers could never make up their minds as to their course of action. A century and a half of absence from the councils of the world, a century and a half of hostile propaganda denying the very existence of Ukraine was too heavy a burden for the restored Ukrainian Republic to carry. Ukraine found an inadequate and a biased hearing abroad. The ghosts of the past were present everywhere. The country had no influential friends. There was no one to supply her with sufficient arms and ammunition. There was no one to extend diplomatic support and Ukraine fell.

Communism backed by Moscow conquered the country and Ukraine became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, included in the Soviet Union and ruled by Russian Communists. The national spirit did not die. Millions of the population perished in famines artificially created to break their spirit. Those of the cultural leaders who remained loyal to their belief and their traditions were executed or died by their own hand to escape a worse fate. Millions of people were deported for no other reason than their belief in their rights as human beings. Everything was done to eat out the heart of the Ukrainian spirit and to give it a Russian Communist aspect.

Then came the Second World War and Ukraine became a battleground to be swept over by the German and the Red Armies. Again there came devastation, deportations and executions. Both armies acted to eliminate the native population and to stifle all national life and thought. No one has yet estimated the cost in Ukrainian lives and wealth but enough is known now to show that the old spirit of Ukraine has not been eliminated. There are still people who live and hope that Ukraine can be restored to its people. It makes no difference if all the forces of propaganda are mobilized to call the patriots bandits. Their struggle still goes on and even if it seems hopeless, it can hardly be more so than many times in the past.

It is under such conditions that the world has accepted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic into the United Nations Organization. There may be questions as to the motives that inspired this demand of the Soviet Union. Yet once and for all it has answered the old charge iterated and reiterated so often during the past centuries that there is no Ukraine. Henceforth no historian will be able to accept the old thesis that Ukraine is only a rough name for some Russian or Polish provinces, that Ukraine was invented as a convenient tool for the destruction of two empires and that it has no existence in fact, in history, or in reality.

What of the future? That is dark and uncertain but the trend of humanity toward the winning of freedom can hardly be stopped for long. For a thousand years Ukraine has shared in the vicissitudes of European and Christian civilization. It will continue to do so and if in the future Ukraine does not receive its just dues, if the Ukrainians fail to win the benefits of the Four Freedoms, it will be only because history has reversed itself and mankind in the midst of unparalleled scientific development has lost its hopes, its aspirations, and its power of moral advancement.

To-day the name of Ukraine is once again upon the map of Europe. There it will stay. The Ukrainian spirit is not yet free but it has proved itself imperishable in the past and it will continue to remain so in the future. That is the point of the study of Ukrainian history and of this attempt to picture the past and the present of the country’s life, in the hope that it may throw some light upon the future.

CHAPTER ONE

UKRAINE

Ukraine is often called the granary of Europe and its natural wealth has long made it the object of envy of all of its neighbors and of all aggressive peoples in the eastern part of the continent. At the same time its geographical position has made it of pivotal importance in all of the European combinations, whether for war or peace.

What then is Ukraine and where is it situated? In the simplest definition it is the area which is bounded by the Black Sea on the south, the Carpathian mountains on the west, and the Don River on the east. To the north its boundaries are far less definite, for there is no natural barrier and the northern section merges more or less imperceptibly into the southern part of the area inhabited by the Great Russians. This boundary has changed with the passing of the centuries but it has remained surprisingly constant when we consider the involved political history of eastern Europe.

The country occupies the southernmost of the great belts of land that stretch across Europe and Asia on the great plains of the east. That is the belt of the steppes, wide expanses of level rolling country, with the celebrated and enormously fertile black earth regions which have been cultivated more or less continuously for over three thousand years. To the north in the Great Russian area is found a broad belt of forest land that covers the greater part of the old Russian Empire but Ukraine itself is ideally fitted by soil and climate to be a prosperous agricultural area which will offer an abundant living to hardy and rugged people who are not afraid of physical labor.

The greatest extension of the country is from east to west, for it is far narrower from north to south, but despite all this Ukraine is a large country with an area of some 200,000 square miles and under favorable conditions it could easily support its population of some forty million people, most of whom speak the Ukrainian language, live according to the Ukrainian mode of life and are conscious of their national character.

Across it from north to south flow most of the great rivers that empty into the Black Sea. There are the Dnyester, the Dnyeper and the Don, three great highways between central and northern Europe and the Black Sea. Ukraine lies squarely across their path and hence it comes about that the country controls all the arteries that lead into the Black Sea and from there through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. It gives the land a tremendous economic position which its own people and their conquerors have never undervalued.

That favorable position contains within itself the source of danger. Unfortunately at no time in their history have the Ukrainian people moved sufficiently to the north to occupy the head waters of these streams and to take control of the rivers that flow to the north into the Baltic. The people there have always looked with envy at Ukraine; they have always tried to descend these rivers, usually broad and sluggish, and to take possession of the fertile plains which they saw stretching in all directions.

Ukraine is the natural highway between the east and west. For centuries before recorded history begins, the nomad tribes pushing westward from central Asia found these same plains the most accessible and convenient road to Europe. Long before there came a national consciousness in the area, long before any existing European country even dreamed of coming into being, warriors mounted on small fast horses poured across this region, carrying their culture into Europe and making their way eastward again with the spoils of the west. Likewise invaders from the west sought access to the territory for the purposes of carrying their raids into the east and of returning home with the riches of the Orient.

Trade followed the same general route. No one attempts to estimate when the trading caravans on their way from western China and central Asia to the early trading centers of Europe first passed across the territory for purposes of peace as did the military groups for war and plunder.

Thus, at an early date, Ukraine was at the crossroads of the world. The Scandinavian Vikings were but following in the path of many peoples who sought to emphasize the route from north to south, exactly as others travelled from east to west. Kiev as the central point in these crossroads had a trading importance that was unequalled by any place except perhaps Constantinople, where sea-borne traffic added to the wealth of the population and offered a simpler outlet to the rest of the world.

It is small wonder then that Kiev as a trading center can trace its origin before the dawn of history and that the area around it was inhabited from the earliest days of man in Europe. It is small wonder that Ukraine developed into a powerful and independent state long before the countries to the west and that it was one of the richest daughters of the Byzantine Empire. It is small wonder that for centuries the wishes of the rulers of Kiev were to be considered throughout all of eastern Europe.

Yet the very accessibility of the country and the lack of definite boundaries to the north and to a lesser degree to the east cast upon the rulers of the land gigantic problems of self-defence. They had to be constantly alert, lest armed raiders harry their country and plunder the population and the rich grainfields.

Geographically Ukraine occupies one of the most important portant locations in Europe. It is a position well adapted for the organization of a powerful state which is vitally interested in the development of communications with the outside world. A Ukraine developed for the benefit of her own people and playing her part in world organization would have been a stabilizing factor for much of Europe. It would have ended many of the most violent disputes that arose as one neighbor after another claimed her territory, and sought to build their own greatness and permanence on her ruins.

Besides that, the country is rich. Its fertile soil is an almost inexhaustible resource. For millenia her fields have yielded wheat and the black earth, often several feet in depth, is still not exhausted. There is hardly a staple crop, with the exception of cotton, that is not adapted to the climate. Her soil is richer than that of any of her neighbors. It yields copious returns for the labor of her inhabitants. In the past centuries wheat, sugar beets and many other crops including fruits, have been produced and exported for the welfare of her neighbors and little or no attention has been paid to the welfare of the inhabitants of the country.

As if this were not enough, Ukraine possesses an almost inexhaustible supply of mineral resources. The coal and iron mines which have been exploited during the last century have been among the most important in the Russian Empire. The industries of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union were long dependent upon the raw materials which came from this section of the continent. There is oil in the west. This mineral and that are found in commercial deposits and it is now realized that the mineral resources of the country are fully equal to the wealth that lies buried in the fields.

The land with such natural gifts is inhabited by a thrifty, industrious population who have shown in peace and in war their love of liberty and a proud, stubborn independence which has all too often degenerated into a factionalism that has broken the hearts of many of the wiser leaders. It is one of the paradoxes of human nature that the people of the plains have often found it more difficult to unite for a common cause than have the people of the mountains, who are more or less isolated in their narrow valleys. It has been easier to separate them and to divide their interests; once damage has been done to their organization it has been harder to repair. That is now and has been in the past the great weakness of the population. Once the fabric of the state was shattered in the early days, Ukraine, always aspiring to recover her lost unity, found it very difficult to achieve. The cities were unable to dominate the country. The peasants were interested in their several local problems and the foreign invaders far too often were able to manoeuvre them at will and to block those measures which alone could unify the land and enable the population of the villages to meet them on an equal level.

All this has made Ukraine throughout the ages a land of wealth and of sadness, a land thirsting for liberty but again and again debarred from obtaining it. Here are all the resources, human and physical, that are needed to produce a great state, while untoward factors have worked against it and kept the land in turmoil.

CHAPTER TWO

RUS’ AND UKRAINE

Perhaps no single circumstance has done more to confuse the opinions of the world about Ukraine than the strange confusion that has taken place over the name of the country. The old name definitely and clearly was Rus’ but that name has been preempted by the northern offshoot of Rus’, Russia, and the people have been compelled for the sake of clarity to adopt another local title, Ukraine, which was early applied to a part of the country.

The origin of the word Rus’ is obscure but we can trace it back in history well before the Christianization of the country, for it appears in the records of the Byzantine Empire early in the ninth century A.D., and the treaties made between the Emperors of Constantinople and the Princes of Rus’ show that the name referred to a very definite political entity, but as they do not concern questions of boundaries, we are not able to define accurately the territory to which they refer. Yet it is clear that Rus’ in its essence referred to the valley of the Dnyeper River, the southern part of the Varangian Road by which the Scandinavian Vikings penetrated from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

For centuries scholars have been debating the origin and meaning of the name. Since the earliest passages that are preserved in the Rus’ language are clearly old Scandinavian, there has been a prevailing opinion that Rus’ was the name of one of the Scandinavian tribes that spread over Europe during the eighth and ninth centuries. They appeared along the Dnyeper about the same time that the Normans were settling in France, and like them they adopted the language of the population, which in this case was a race speaking an East Slavonic language. Historians have been inclined to connect this with the old legend of the conquest of Kiev and Novgorod by Rurik and his two brothers, who were invited to rule the country because it was a rich land and there was no order in it. It is an old fable common to many lands and places, but there is no evidence as to its truth and if there were, we would still be far from knowing the actual meaning of the word.

A not less vocal group has felt that this story was not too dignified and has sought some other origin. Many have regarded it as a Slavonic borrowing from Iranian or they have tried to find some place name which could serve as a source. It is all in vain and for all intents and purposes we can only go back to recorded history and accept the fact that when that history first became definite, the word Rus’ was applied to the population of the Dnyeper valley and of the valley of the Volkhov that formed the northern end of the Varangian Road. Kiev on the south and Novgorod on the north were the two fortresses on this line of transport and they formed the two centres of the earliest Rus’.

Yet even then Kiev was the more important of the two, for it lay not only on the north-south route but also on the east-west road from central Asia. It was then called the capital of Rus’ and as we learn more of the settlement of the country, we realize how the area of Rus’ expanded until it covered with rare exactness the territory between the Carpathians and the Don that forms the modern Ukraine.

It is by no means certain that the princes who went to the north and east into the territory of the various Finnic tribes and founded those centres which were later to be the heart of Moscow thought of themselves as forming part of Rus’. They are recorded in the ancient Chronicles as returning to Rus’, and the area to which they return is consistently that of Kiev and of Ukraine. The same is true of the area of Novgorod, which practically broke away from the south and went its own way after the trade between Kiev and the Scandinavians fell into abeyance and the merchants of Novgorod worked with the Baltic area and to the northeast.

Later the region around Kiev came to bear the title of Mala Rus’, Little Russia, but this was clearly not a sign of inferiority. It was a common system of the past. In Poland the area around Krakow was called Little Poland to distinguish it from the Great Poland away from the nation’s capital. Ancient Greece was called Greece to distinguish it from Magna Graecia, that great area of Sicily, south Italy, the shores of Asia Minor and the Black Sea, where Greek colonies had been planted in the barbarian world.

It was not until 1169, when Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky definitely decided to transfer the centre of the state to the northeast, that we have definite proof of the connection of the word Rus’ in any form with the northern principalities that were to form the origin of Moscow. Then he carried away with him the head of the Orthodox Church and attempted to create in another area a state of Rus’. Yet he did not find it too satisfactory and for some centuries the word almost dropped out of use in the north as the Princes of Moscow preferred to name their country after their capital. Russian historians of all ages and of all schools of thought have always spoken of the Grand Principality and Tsardom of Muscovy as the name of the country until the seventeenth century.

Rus’ remained, except for official titles of the Tsars of Moscow in their most formal aspects, as the name of the area around Kiev. The Princes of Galicia who assumed the title of Kings of Rus’ in the thirteenth century used it to assert their lordship over the area that had fallen into the hands of the Tatars. They still continued to call a citizen of their lands a Rusin and the adjective that was used for it was Rus’sky.

On Muscovite territory there came other changes, for during these years Moscow developed a sharp aversion to Kiev and everything for which it stood. The whole tradition of the Third Rome, which was hostile to everything outside the land, taught that Moscow was the centre of Christian civilization and that Kiev, like Constantinople and like the First Rome, had definitely fallen into heresy. Now and then the tsars might employ the word Rusia, but even this was too much of a concession for their stubborn pride and it was not until Tsar Alexis in the seventeenth century began to nourish hopes of recovering the area around Kiev that he gave any significance to the use of the word Rus’.

In fact it was not until the time of Peter the Great that the name Rossiya—Russia—came into common use and even then Peter introduced it with the idea of asserting his power as a European sovereign and he did it against the usage of the European states, which continued to refer to him as Tsar or Emperor of Moscow. Even later the great poets of the eighteenth century continued to use the adjective Rossiysky and the ordinary form that was employed during the nineteenth century, i.e. Russky, was of rare occurrence.

Through the centuries, regardless of the ups and downs of the two states, of the political issues of union and disunion, there remained a sharp differentiation between Moscow and Rus’. It was not until Moscow saw itself in a position to make itself the heir of Kiev in the eyes of the world that it preempted very definitely the name of Rus’, proclaimed that Rus’ was Russia, and dangled it before the eyes of the world to win belief that both Kiev and Moscow belonged together under the aegis of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In earlier ages Moscow had been content to seek the support of Rus’ on the basis of the Orthodox religion, when it desired to secure cooperation. Then it was Orthodox Moscow and Orthodox Rus’ against the Roman Catholic Poles and Lithuanians. That idea could not appeal in the eighteenth century, when Peter was manifesting little interest in the traditional religion of the people and was trying to change all the old established customs. A new basis had to be found and this new equation was the result. The injustice of the action was appreciated even by the Poles, who had maintained to the end of their national existence their control of the province of Rus’. An Encyclopedia put out by the Polish National Committee during the First War (Vol. II, No. 5, p. 867) summed it up well. “In very deed, Russia stripped Ukraine of everything; she even appropriated its very name of ‘Rus’ (Ruthenia), she annexed its history of pre-Tatar times, she declared the language was a Russian dialect.” It is a clear statement of conditions.

Yet even that was not the only cause of confusion, for in the Austro-Hungarian provinces which were stripped away after the division of Poland, the government of the Hapsburgs carefully created for the people the name of Ruthenians. This was but a Latinized form of the name Rus’ and was at first used merely in Latin correspondence. Early travellers spoke of Ruthenia as extending from near the region of Prague in Bohemia to the land of the Tatars. It was not to remain long in that range of activity for with the development of the Union of Brest Litovsk, and the growing loss of the leaders of Rus’, Ruthenia and Ruthenians came to be used as a mark of inferiority and of contempt. It was used to separate these people from the Poles and from their other neighbors in Austria-Hungary.

Throughout the Hapsburg lands, Ruthenia became the common term. There was Ruthenia proper and then there was White Ruthenia, Red Ruthenia, Black Ruthenia, all sections inhabited by various branches of the people that had once dominated in Kiev. In the nineteenth century it was almost the only term allowed in the province of Galicia, as the ancient Halich was now named. It was the term that had to be employed by Franko and the writers around him, if they were to be allowed even moderate relief from the censorship.

Under such circumstances, with the old name Rus’ taken over by the Muscovite Russians and the name Ruthenia forced upon part of the race by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it is small wonder that the people themselves turned to the other title of Ukraine. It was an old word which is first found in literature about the year 1187, to denote that portion of Rus’ on the left bank of the Dnyeper facing the Polovtsy. By 1213, two years before the signing of Magna Charta in England, it was applied to the exposed sections of the country on the right bank of the same river. The word means the “Frontier,” the Borderland, and it originally referred to that section of Rus’ which lay facing the no-man’s land where Slav and Turk and Tatar struggled for mastery. It was the land where the Kozaks developed and it is small wonder that the people, faced with the loss of their traditional name, selected this term which bore witness to the most heroic period of their history.

Its choice is intelligible and it was made certain when the poet Shevchenko in his Kobzar and Haydamaki, and many other poems, emphasized again and again that “Ukraina’s weeping.” The word made its way despite official prohibition, for to the Russians the land was always Little Russia and to the Austro-Hungarians, Ruthenia. Ukraine might occasionally be used to include the two sections but it was always dangerous. There was always the possibility that the censors would object and punish the bold author as an advocate of separatism.

Yet it triumphed. As the First War drew to its close, Ukraine became more and more the common appellation and after the Russian Revolution and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, it became the term that was used to apply to ancient Rus’ almost universally. There was no one now to continue the old nomenclature and it was as Ukraine and under the Ukrainian banner that the Republic fought in 1919 and 1920. It was under this title that the Soviets conquered the young country and deprived it of its independence and it was under this title that they introduced it to the United Nations Organization.

All this may seem a petty linguistic and philological dispute, and it has been presented as such by all the enemies of the Ukrainian people. Yet as is so often the case in such discussion, the mere debate about words has veiled a deeper psychological and social division. It has been used to ignore the fact that the differences between Rus’ and Russia are not passing and superficial, but that they go to the very depths of the psychology and thought of the people, they concern the attitude toward the world, toward civilization and human rights; and to-day with a world in confusion the difference between Russia and Ukraine is summed up in the use of the national names. Ukraine exists to-day on the territory of ancient Rus’, where it has been since the dawn of history and where it will remain.

CHAPTER THREE

KIEVAN RUS’

The actual history of Kievan Rus’ commenced in 862 with the accession to power of Rurik and his brothers. From this time we can trace a consistent history of the realm. Although during the rest of the ninth century there is much that is still obscure, we are on safer ground when we come to his son Oleh. Yet we would be very wrong to think that this was the real beginning of history for even the Chronicles that emphasize the role of Rurik make it abundantly clear that Kiev was already in existence and was a place of prominence both militarily and commercially.

It is tempting to go back and endeavor to trace the earlier inhabitants of Ukraine. It is extremely dangerous, for we lack all written sources and are forced to depend upon the results of archaeological investigation and we can scarcely be sure that the differences in culture did not cloak differences in languages and perhaps considerable changes of population.

We know that there were human inhabitants of Ukraine from the Paleolithic or Old Stone Age on. We can be sure too that the site of Kiev was inhabited during the ages for there has been found a Paleolithic settlement in Kiev itself. Yet only an enthusiast would hold that this settlement was Ukrainian in the sense in which it is used to-day. Scholar after scholar has commented upon the fact that some of the early dwellings of the Neolithic Period bear striking resemblances to the poorer types of Ukrainian peasant homes. They have noted that the figures on the vase of Chertomlyk and on other remains from the Scythian period, approximately the fourth century B.C., show physical types which are still met with in Ukraine. At the same time the accounts of the Greek authors and the names of the Scythian rulers which they have preserved have nothing Slavonic about them.

This is not surprising. It is often forgotten that the ancient conquerors usually formed a relatively small and compact group who extended their control over the native populations. In part they killed or enslaved the people. In part they fell under the influence of the women of the conquered tribe. But there were rarely concerted and consistent attempts to wipe out completely the original population. Undoubtedly through the ages there remained in Ukraine descendants of the earliest inhabitants, but they were completely submerged in the changing culture that developed through the centuries.

Perhaps we are on firmer ground when we come to the periods after the sixth century, when the Slavonic tribes began to appear in the area. The Byzantine historians speak of the Antae and the Veneti and make it clear that they did speak Slavonic. Yet even these names are replaced by many others and we can hardly decide which of them finally attained the mastery. The Chronicles give us many names and allude to various differences in culture and traditions but we know too little about any of them to determine exactly what these differences really meant.

Taras Shevchenko in 1840

(Self portrait)

PROF. MICHAEL HRUSHEVSKY

It was apparently the Rus’ of Kiev who finally were able to extend their control over the other Slavonic tribes and to organize the new state. The moving spirit in this seems to have been a group of Scandinavians but they could not have been numerous enough to displace the Slavonic character of the people. It was not long before the rulers came to have Slavonic names, like Svyatoslav. In the tenth century he sought to extend his control over the northern Balkans and may have dreamed of moving his capital south of the Black Earth region. Yet he was finally killed by the Pechenegs, perhaps at the instigation of the Byzantine emperor, John Tsimiskes. After that, though there might be outbreaks between Constantinople and Kiev, relations were on the whole peaceful.

At almost the same time Christianity made its appearance. It was only natural that the most aggressive missionaries came from Constantinople, for the commercial ambitions of Kiev led it to the Black Sea in which the Byzantine Empire was supreme. Queen Olha, the mother of Svyatoslav, had become an Orthodox Christian in the middle of the tenth century but paganism was still too strong for her to convert the druzhina, the leading warriors and counsellors of the king, and a half century was to pass before the country was definitely converted under Volodymyr, or Vladimir.

In the beginning Volodymyr, as a younger son of Svyatoslav by one of his numerous concubines, had become the ruler of Novgorod. He was thus able to secure new levies of Scandinavian troops from the North and to win the throne of Kiev. In his early life he led a pagan revival but he was apparently much interested in matters of religion and was dissatisfied with the pagan cult. According to the legend of the chroniclers, he sent embassies to investigate the Jewish religion of the Khozars, Mohammedanism, and the Christianity of the Germans and of the Greeks of Constantinople. The envoys were most impressed by the splendor of the services in the great Church of St. Sophia and on their return Volodymyr decided to seek baptism from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

It required some time to bring this about, but in 989 all difficulties were finally removed and the Grand Prince and his druzhina were definitely baptized. Volodymyr at once cast the idols of Perun and the other pagan gods into the Dnyeper and from that time on, he became a zealous Christian. Without delay he built the first of the great Churches of Kiev, the Church of the Tithe (Desyatinnaya) and for this he employed the services of Greek architects.

Kiev became speedily a small scale replica of Constantinople. The Greek monks introduced into the country Byzantine culture, architecture, and methods of thinking. The Metropolitan of Kiev was a Greek. Yet there was no attempt to force the Greek language upon the people. The Church services were held not in Greek but in the Church Slavonic language, which had been developed by Saints Cyril and Methodius a century earlier. His piety and zeal for the spreading of Christianity won Volodymyr the title of saint and hence it came about that his name appears in the religious services and in the Chronicles as Vladimir, the Church Slavonic form of Volodymyr.

From the moment of Volodymyr’s conversion to Christianity and the appearance of the Church Slavonic language, the deep darkness that covers the history of Kiev and Rus’ begins to disappear. The monks engaged in the task of preparing the conventional Chronicles have given us confused views of the earlier history in which truth and romance are strangely mixed, but from this moment we can begin more clearly to trace the history of the country.

At this time Constantinople was the civilized centre of the Christian world and Kiev soon became one of its choicest spiritual and intellectual children. The rulers of Kiev and the upper classes of the population were on a far higher cultural level than were most of the rulers of western Europe. Education flourished. This does not mean that there was anything similar to our modern methods of widespread education and literacy, but larger classes of the population were affected than in the still barbaric countries of the West.

The traditional idea that Kiev and Rus’ were backward for the time can hardly be maintained. Kiev and its rulers held an honored place throughout Europe. The members of the royal family married into the family of the Emperors of Constantinople. Other members made matrimonial alliances with the Saxon royal family of England, with the Kings of France, with Poland and Hungary. In the eleventh century, the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches had not yet taken place, although there were strong signs of its approach and nothing but distance existed to keep Kiev and Rus’ from being swept into the general development of European Christian civilization.

The Grand Princes of Kiev were incomparably richer than many of the rulers of the West. They had direct connection with Constantinople, the greatest of the Christian markets, and they also could trade with the Eastern lands. Wealth flowed in. The Byliny, the folk epics, which preserved traditions of the greatness of Volodymyr and his court, his associates like Ilya of Murom, Dobrynya Nikitich, and the remainder of the heroes, never weary of speaking of golden Kiev and of the wealth and generosity of Kiev’s ruler. There may be exaggeration but there is enough other available material to show that the rulers and the upper classes imitated as best they could the luxury and splendor of Constantinople and the Byzantine Emperors.

The son and successor of Volodymyr, Yaroslav the Wise, (d. 1054) raised the prestige of Kiev and of Rus’ still higher. His lawcode, the Rus’ska Pravda, was excellent for his day. It incorporated what was best of the Slavonic and the Scandinavian traditions. It pictures for us a great state with its urban and rural classes, with trade and commerce, with life good for the nobles but far less so for the lower classes and the indebted peasants, who were burdened with many obligations which they could scarcely meet.

Yet the difficulties which were ultimately to overwhelm the state were already visible upon the horizon. The eleventh century was a period of nation building in Europe. Poland, Hungary, Bohemia were already coming into existence and aiming for expansion. The Holy Roman Empire, revived under Charlemagne, was encouraging them to turn to the east for their further growth. From the east there came a seemingly endless succession of invading nomad tribes, continuing those movements which had been sweeping over the black earth region for centuries and millennia.

The new state had no natural boundaries for defence. Only where the country touched the Carpathian mountains was there any well defined border. In all other directions, south, east and northwest, the land lay open to the invaders. That situation which in times of peace had made Kiev the centre of commerce and had brought it wealth, in time of war was its greatest menace. It was only in the northeast, where the great woods sheltered the primitive Finnic peoples still untouched by culture and Christianity, that there lurked no danger. In all other areas the princes had continually to be on their guard. The danger was greatest to the east, for there they were confronted with the highly mobile nomad troops who could attack with startling suddenness, ravage the country, and if necessary disappear with the same speed.

The heart of the state was the line of the Dnyeper and so long as that was not cut, it was possible for Kiev to exist in relative security. Outside of that, there were scattered throughout the land various lesser cities, such as Chernihiv and others, which served as rallying points for the princes and their forces. If it were possible to coordinate these into an effective system, all would be well.

Yet it was not a time for coordination. Only a leader of superior personality and ability could hold in check the disruptive tendencies which made their appearance in every land. There was the bad tradition of the early feudalism, whereby the various princes and their forces felt themselves practically independent and able to defy the will of the central ruler. There was the equally unfortunate custom whereby that ruler, to satisfy the members of his immediate family, apportioned out the land into various fiefs. Both Volodymyr and Yaroslav obeyed this tradition. Each of them had been compelled to fight against his own brothers and relatives to secure absolute control of the whole of Rus’ and yet each of them had in turn divided his dominions among his own children in such a way that the task of unification had to be recommenced with each succeeding generation. The reason for their actions was clear. It was necessary to have in each strong post a strong ruler. It was impossible for a leader to be everywhere at once and, in the spirit of the day, a strong subordinate felt no scruples about asserting his own independence and seeking to seize the supreme power. The Church was the only force that definitely stood for a national unity. From the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, bishops went out to try to maintain some semblance of unity. The Metropolitan of Kiev had some influence and authority, but he was usually a Greek from Constantinople and he was not always aware of the questions at issue.

When we consider the turbulence of the times and the external menace, we can only wonder at the success achieved by some of the more able rulers. Men like Volodymyr Monomakh, in the twelfth century, could definitely take their stand on relatively high moral principles, and use their influence against internal dissensions and the oppression of their people. Yaroslav could build in Kiev the great Church of St. Sophia, modelled on the New Church of Constantinople. The arts flourished.

It is abundantly clear also that the princes were not absolute sovereigns. They were compelled to pay attention to the wishes of their higher officers and counsellors, the druzhina. They were compelled also to give heed to the will of the people of the various cities expressed through their public assemblies or Veches. In fact in some cities, as in Novgorod, which really became an aristocratic republic, the Veche became the controlling body and was able to oust the prince whenever he displeased it. All of this points to the fact that Rus’ was really a form of aristocratic democracy, a state in which the power of the Grand Prince or of any of the subordinate princes was more or less closely restricted by his ability to hold or alienate the devotion of his people.

The prize for which all the princes contended was Kiev. Every ambitious ruler sought to secure the coveted capital. Their efforts exhausted the country and seriously weakened it against outside aggression. There were too many cases where dissatisfied and struggling princes were only too willing to seek foreign aid and make alliances with one of the western powers or, still worse, with the nomads of the steppes, who always proved themselves unreliable allies and often inflicted upon their friends as much damage as they did upon the enemies against whom their efforts were directed. This was bad in the eleventh century, but in the twelfth there was an almost continuous civil war and within a century more than thirty princes had sat upon the throne at Kiev.

Under such conditions it was only natural that there should be a division of the state. Certain rulers, wearied of the dangerous lures of ambition, set themselves to secure their own territory safely, even if they were forced to act as completely independent rulers and to flout the orders of the central authority. Galicia, the westernmost portion of the state of Rus’, was the first to assume practical independence. After the time of Yaroslav the Wise, the princes of this area set themselves up as provincial rulers and devoted all their energies to strengthening their own positions at home and abroad. They tried to keep out of the tangled intrigues for the possession of Kiev and they worked equally to keep the other princes from interfering with their own area, so that the province enjoyed relative peace for some centuries. It was not until the destruction of Kiev by the Tatars in the thirteenth century that they sought to make their authority paramount over the entire country. The example of Galicia was followed by the princes of Chernihiv and by many others, so that the original unity of Rus’ vanished amid the flames of civil war or in aristocratic anarchy.

The ruin was accelerated by the appearance of the Polovtsy, another Turkic tribe, which was far more military and far more ably led than had been the Pechenegs. During the whole of the twelfth century, they ravaged the country almost at will and they were sure to find as allies some of the warring princes who were willing to enlist their aid for shortsighted personal advantage against other members of their own people. The damage which the Polovtsy did was well pictured in the Song of the Armament of Ihor. This is a unique work of the twelfth century and represents the only surviving specimen of the court poetry of the day. The unknown poet, in picturing the evils that disorder has brought upon the state, looks back to the whole history of Kiev and of Rus’, glorifies the princes of old and mourns the destruction of that splendid state which had been erected by Volodymyr and Yaroslav.

The worst menace came however from the forest lands of the northeast which had formerly been the one safe spot on the boundaries. Various princes, deprived of their lands in Rus’, had gone up to the area around the headwaters of the Don and the Volga. There, amid the Finnic population, they had carved out domains for themselves, but they were not going to be hampered by the constitutional and democratic traditions that had prevailed at Kiev. In their new homes, they were able to create a thoroughly autocratic state and to destroy those rights and privileges which the old druzhinas had been able to maintain against the prince. They were not content with this alone. They also were able to keep from starting in their capitals of Vladimir, of Suzdal and later of Moscow, the various citizens’ councils which had acquired so much power in Novgorod.

With increasing speed the culture of Moscow separated itself from that of Kiev. Connections between Kiev and Moscow were difficult, between Moscow and Constantinople almost impossible. On the other hand the Volga River easily became a route of commerce and of travel to the Caspian Sea and this brought Moscow far closer to Armenia and Georgia, then at their political height, than to Constantinople and the weakening Byzantine Empire. Architecture and art speedily felt the new influences. The types of churches that had been developed at Kiev and Novgorod under Byzantine influence gave way to new patterns borrowed from the east, with low relief for decorations and with simpler architectural forms.

Kiev still remained the dominant factor in Rus’. It was a name to be conjured with, but it did not hold for these northern principalities the sympathetic appeal that it did for all the princes in the older part of the country. For a while they continued to yield to the spell of the older capital and they sought to play their role in the complicated game of politics. Yet only for a while.

In 1169 Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky sacked the city of Kiev. It was the most destructive of any of the attacks that had been made against the southern capital, for this time it was an attempt at ruin and not at control. When Prince Andrey ordered his soldiers to ravage the city, he did it because he had no intention of remaining there and making it his capital. The earlier princes had fought for Kiev; Prince Andrey fought against it. There was no point in plundering ruthlessly a capital which the conquerors desired for themselves. There was no reason for sparing a city which the conquerors desired to ruin. Everything that was of value, whether of ecclesiastical or civil character, was taken and the plunder-laden hosts resumed the march to their northern citadel of Suzdal. Even the Metropolitan of Kiev, the head of the Church, was taken along with them and Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky could look with satisfaction at his conquests. He could be sure that it would be decades, if not longer, before Kiev would rise again from the ruins and dare to threaten his hegemony.

This sack of Kiev was the most important date in the history of the country after the introduction of Christianity, for it marked the separation of Kiev and the northern cities, the line of demarcation between Ukraine-Rus’ and Moscow. It is idle to speculate what was in the minds of conquerors and conquered at the very moment of the battle. There can be no doubt that the princes of Suzdal were the lineal descendants of Volodymyr and Yaroslav. There can be no doubt too that their armies were largely composed of men who had never seen and felt the charm of Kiev, who had no appreciation for the ancient culture of the old metropolis.

Ukrainian thought has been insistent for centuries that this was a foreign conquest. The princes of Galicia with the downfall of Kiev took in a few years the title of Grand Princes of Rus’. They proudly ignored the new principalities and strove to continue the old traditions.

To Moscow and the northern princes, this conquest meant the transfer to them of all the primacy that had clustered around the fallen city. They proudly called themselves and their metropolitans the rulers of Rus’, but even so they much preferred to call themselves the Grand Princes of Moscow. They sneered at their victims and it was many centuries before they sought to value the city from which they secured their power.

Henceforth the two states went on their independent ways and whatever unity still survived was to perish in the new historical developments.

While Kiev was still struggling to repair the damage of the terrible plundering, there appeared a new invader. In 1224 there came the first onslaught of the forces of Genghis Khan, the dread lord of the Mongolian Empire. He defeated the combined princes at a battle on the Kalka River and killed Mstislav of Kiev, but his forces soon withdrew.

They returned in 1240 under the Khan Batu and this time the Mongols and Tatars came to stay. They sacked and burned Chernihiv and on December 6, 1240 they captured Kiev and ended the old mediaeval state. It was a terrible and thorough sacking of Kiev and Rus’. When it was over, the cities were mere shells, the princes annihilated, the land desolate. Apparently in their misery the ordinary people rose against the princes at the same time and sought to take vengeance upon their former lords.

At the same time the princes of Suzdal and Moscow led the procession of nobles who were willing to accept the Mongol Tatar overlordship to maintain their thrones. They willingly submitted and for two centuries Moscow, for good or ill, formed part of the Mongolian Empire and later of its westernmost section, the Golden Horde, with its capital at Saray near Kazan on the Volga River. Moscow rapidly became Asianized, its princes married Mongol girls, and whatever had remained of the old traditions was swallowed up in the new order.

The hope of an independent Rus’ remained only in the West where the princes of Halich endeavored to increase their power. It was a truncated state that they dominated. Without the rich hinterland of the Dnyeper basin and the regions to the east, they were isolated among the western states which had already come into existence and which formed part of the Western Roman Catholic world. The Orthodox state of Rus’ was closely surrounded by Poland and Hungary which had already succeeded in acquiring control of that section of Rus’ which was in the Carpathian Mountains. Separately or together, Poland and Hungary intrigued against or fought with the Princes of Halich and by the middle of the fourteenth century Poland succeeded in acquiring the control of Galicia.

In the meanwhile there had come the rise of Lithuania in the north. A series of able princes pushed their way south through White Ruthenian territory and later acquired control of Volynia and Podolia. The rulers of Lithuania were either pagan or Orthodox. The White Ruthenian Church Slavonic became their court language and the language of official business. All this won for them a sympathetic hearing from the dismembered principalities of Rus’, especially as the rule of the Lithuanians was little harsher than had been the rule of their own princes in the later days.

By the end of the fourteenth century, the old state of Rus’ had lost all its independence. It was formally divided between Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, and the rulers of these countries fought over its possessions. Only in Lithuania was there a semblance of the old rule, for it was only there that any of the princes were able to maintain their prestige and some shreds of their power. Everywhere else, a new order had been introduced and the princes had been compelled to submit or vanish into obscurity.

It was a sad time for the people. The glories of the past were gone and they scarcely lived on, even in the memories of the people. No one could have recognized in the wretched, depopulated country the once proud state of Kievan Rus’, which had been acknowledged two centuries before as an equal of all of the countries of Europe.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CULTURAL REVIVAL

The fifteenth century opened on a ruined state of Rus’-Ukraine. There was nothing left of the old authority of the state. Its independence and its wealth were gone and its people had only to remain quiet and to follow as mute observers the changing pattern of history, for the fifteenth century saw the beginnings of modern Europe; it saw the discovery of America, the enormous expansion of Poland and the independence of Moscow from the Tatar yoke. Mediaeval Europe was passing into the modern era and Rus’-Ukraine, gone from the map, could only look on without comprehension.

Everything seemed against the unfortunate people, for the two great events of the period worked to the disadvantage of the enslaved Ukrainians.

First came the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The collapse of the Byzantine Empire had been gradual. Step by step the Turks had pushed nearer to the great capital. They had conquered one province after another, until only the city itself was left upon the Golden Horn in a splendid isolation. It was in vain that the Emperors had appealed to the West for military assistance to ward off the final doom. They secured no answer. At the Council of Florence in 1439, they had made their submission to the Pope but even this brought them no practical benefit, for the age of the Crusades had passed. No one of the secular rulers who were busy carving out states for themselves was willing to hear the appeal of Rome to divert even a small part of their energies and resources to the saving of what had been the great centre of Christianity.

Almost simultaneously with this, Ivan III of Moscow threw off the yoke of the Golden Horde and Moscow became a free state for the first time in two centuries. By his marriage with a member of the Paleolog dynasty of Constantinople, Ivan secured a shadowy claim to the double headed eagles of Byzantium. He and his followers became enthused with the idea that they were the lineal descendants of the Empire and that Moscow was now the Christian capital of the world, the Third Rome, entitled to recover its ancestral heritage and to shine forth in new glory. It was a proud ambition for the isolated state which had been orientalized by submission to the Mongols and Tatars and had sunk in all cultural matters far below its original source.

In the meanwhile Poland, with its alliance with Lithuania, was rising to new heights. Proud of its western traditions, the reborn state wanted to know nothing of the culture of those peoples who had entered into it. It valued its contacts with Italy and the West. It sought to wipe out every trace of its connections with the east and the nobles and peasants of Rus’-Ukraine, with their Orthodox faith, seemed to them a reflection on the western character of Poland.

Rus’-Ukraine was abandoned by all of its friends at the very moment when the Spanish traders and merchants were seeking a road to the riches of the Orient, when the new spirit and the teachers from the ruined Constantinople were leavening the whole of Europe, when in England the Wars of the Roses were wiping out the old feudal nobility and when everywhere new currents of life and of thought were changing the old system of society. None of these new and healthy currents could exert any appreciable influence upon the unfortunate state which five centuries earlier had been the cultural offshoot of the great Byzantine Empire.

The fall of Constantinople deprived the people of Ukraine of their cultural and religious support. The patriarchs were so occupied with the heavy problems of personal survival that they had little or no time to think of the far distant Ukraine. There were few or no scholars to send there to carry on schools and to defend the faith. The people were left to themselves to supply their own cultural needs as best they could, for Moscow, even though it was the self-styled defender of Orthodoxy and the Third Rome, was not interested in any cultural development outside of its own restricted sphere and could listen gravely to an argument that it was a sin to write or think or add any knowledge to the world after the Seventh Oecumenical Council.

This left Ukraine at the mercy of Poland and Lithuania. Galling as it was to be under the control of Lithuania, which had formerly ranked so low in comparison with Kiev, there were still compensations. Part of Lithuania was pagan but many of the lords were Orthodox, and Church Slavonic, especially in its White Ruthenian form, was really the language of the government records. No matter what was to come, it was possible, especially for the nobles and the educated, to be sure of a hearing and of their position in the ruling circles.

It was far different in Poland. From its very beginning Poland had adopted the Roman Catholic faith and felt itself definitely part of the West. As such it had inherited the contempt for Orthodoxy that had been widely spread since the Fourth Crusade. Its kings and rulers were constantly seeking to eliminate from their body politic and their ruling class all those people who would not conform, and there was a steady pressure on the leading families and the leading ecclesiastics to enter the Roman Catholic Church.

In 1386, Yagello of Lithuania married Queen Jadwiga of Poland and was baptized in the Roman Catholic Church. Almost at once the spirit of Lithuanian rule began to change as men trained in the Roman Catholic faith came to high positions in the state. The result was shown in the lessening of Orthodox influence. As the decades passed, the influence of Poland grew and finally the Ukrainian provinces of Lithuania were definitely brought under Poland and the central Polish system.

This brought with it an increase of Polish and Latin schools. Many of the leading nobles adapted themselves to the new regime, and since religion was the chief distinguishing criterion, most of them definitely became Roman Catholic, and commenced to speak Polish, to live in the Polish way and to adopt the manners of their social equals in Poland. All this could not fail to react badly upon the Ukrainian population, which was still devoutly Orthodox but which was rapidly being stripped of its nobility and its educated class.

Thus the sixteenth century bade fair to see the definite extinction of Ukrainian hopes and aspirations and even existence. The Ukrainian population was rapidly being reduced to an inchoate mass of illiterate peasants and townspeople without an intelligentsia and even without any educated clergy. Yet these expectations were not fulfilled. In the same century there came a revival, at first small in scope and often deficient in method, but yet vitally important to the preservation of the national and cultural identity.

This revival concerned itself with education. There spread through the Ukrainian lands a desire to create schools for the people to counter-balance the Polish schools. Since there was already pressure for a union of the Churches, which had won the support of several of the leading bishops, the new schools adopted a severely Orthodox point of view. Their leaders were convinced that a knowledge of the new learning could not fail to weaken the position of the Church. They did not realize that much of the new learning was itself the result of the contact between the scholars who had fled to the West after the fall of Constantinople and the traditional wisdom of the West. The education became purely religious with very little regard for secular subjects. At the same time, insofar as it was possible, the leaders sought to spread a knowledge of the older forms of the Church Slavonic and gave little heed to the attempts that were being made to adapt this language to the living speech of the people.

Such a reform was naturally successful in reviving the national consciousness of the Ukrainians but it could not check the tendency of many of the more progressive and prominent families to send their children to the more fashionable Polish schools and thus the leakage of part of the educated class continued with little abatement. Its success would have been far greater, had the Patriarch of Constantinople been able to send a considerable number of scholars to assist in the organization of the new Greek-Slavonic schools, but unfortunately there was not the available personnel.

A few outstanding men appeared for a short time. Thus Cyril Loukaris, who was later to be the celebrated Patriarch of Constantinople, taught at Ostrih and Wilno for a few years and he was perhaps the most prominent of the teachers to arrive. Yet even his short stay shows the desperate straits to which Constantinople was reduced at the time, when it seemed as if Greek learning itself might vanish as had the old splendor of Kievan culture.

It is only fair, however, to say that the Polish schools were themselves none too efficient. The ideas of Protestantism had spread widely throughout Poland during this period and at one time a considerable proportion of the great magnates were at least sympathetic to it. The movement was checked by the work of the Order of the Jesuits and especially by its greatest member, Peter Skarga, probably the keenest mind of the day in Poland. He worked vigorously as a propagandist for the unity of the Churches and also as a founder and administrator of the various schools. The curriculum in these, while broader than the average Greek schools, was still not satisfactory from the European standpoint of the day. They were heavily laden with a late form of scholasticism and this in turn exerted a certain influence upon the Orthodox schools which had to prepare their students to live in the Polish atmosphere.

The first of the great Ukrainian schools was that of Ostrih. Here Prince Konstantin Ostrozky, one of the richest nobles who still adhered to the Orthodox faith, set up a school. He invited Greeks to serve on its staff. He bought a printing press. Through his friendship with Prince Andrey Kurbsky, who fled from Moscow, he was fully acquainted with the work that had been done at Novgorod a half century earlier by Archbishop Gennady at the time of the heresy of the Judaizers. Prince Ostrozky’s powerful position enabled him to secure a copy of the Bible prepared by Gennady, parts of which had been translated from the Latin Vulgate. This Bible was again revised at Ostrih and was published in 1580 as the Ostrih Bible, the first Bible published in any East Slavonic land. The school flourished for about twenty years until the death of Konstantin. His sons accepted the Roman Catholic faith and very soon lost all interest in the work that their father had undertaken, with bad results to the school.

At Lviv, the work was under the Lviv Staropegian Brotherhood. This was the most important of the various brotherhoods that had been established years before in the various Ukrainian towns. These were in the nature of the mediaeval guilds but they were also largely concerned with the care of the poor and orphans. Membership in them was restricted to the Orthodox and they represented the more substantial portions of the merchant classes of the various cities. With the increasing realization of the need for education and for the defence of the Orthodox Faith, these brotherhoods voluntarily gave up part of their philanthropic and social activities and devoted themselves to the newer and more pressing needs.

Their school was established in 1586, a few years later than that in Ostrih, but it was really on a firmer foundation because it could not be so severely affected by the defection of a single patron. It maintained high rank in Greek and Church Slavonic. At the various exercises the pupils were able to write and present Greek speeches and translations and some of them went to Mount Athos to continue their studies or to remain there as monks. Yet it was forced also to include a knowledge of Latin and the various writings of the school show that it had come under the influence of the Polish panegyric style of the day.

The third centre of the national revival was Kiev, which had shrunken sadly in importance under the many sacks which it had undergone. The Monastery of the Caves was reorganized to undertake serious educational work and the brotherhood of the city also opened its own school. These were later combined into the Kiev Academy of Peter Mohyla, a talented Moldavian who became the Metropolitan of Kiev in 1632 after having been for five years Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves. The Kiev Academy, which was later able to found branches in various other cities, became the outstanding institution in the Ukraine and the entire Eastern Slav area. The catechism prepared by Mohyla was accepted by a council held under the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1643 as the standard for all the Slav-speaking Orthodox and this proved a great triumph for Ukrainian and Kievan scholarship, since it gave the Academy a standing far outside the area from which it drew its students.

The beneficent results of this system of education would have been far greater, had events not made Ukraine the battleground for the renewal of the struggle between Rome and Constantinople. Although the Greek Church, after the fall of Constantinople, had repudiated the Union of Florence and the various negotiations between the Papacy and the Byzantine Empire, the results were left in Europe. Many of the Greeks who had signed the Union remained in high position in Rome and they left behind them their ideas, their hopes and aspirations.

It was easy to see why advocates of such a policy could hope for success among the Ukrainians in Poland. Over a period of years many of the leading nobles had been Polonized, but they still retained all their former rights in making Church appointments, rights little more extensive than those possessed by the Roman Catholic nobles. Why should they not exercise these rights and place Roman Catholic sympathizers in responsible positions? Similarly the King of Poland assumed the various rights of the older Orthodox princes who had been expelled from their lands at the period of conquest.

In the minds of the thinkers of the sixteenth century, such actions were not only moral and consistent but necessary. It suited the religious and political leaders of the century and it was powerfully reinforced by the efforts of the Jesuits. More and more the Kings and the magnates put pressure upon the Orthodox bishops. They even went so far in the early part of the century as to require heavy payments from the Orthodox before they would consent to the appointment of a new Orthodox bishop even for Lviv.

At the same time every change in the constitution of Poland tended to increase the power of the lords and to decrease those of the peasants and the townspeople. The peasants saw themselves forced to harder and harder conditions of living, until they became practically serfs, living on the land of their masters and liable for more and more unpaid labor. The townspeople gradually lost most of their privileges. They were forbidden to buy land, if they were Ukrainians, outside of certain Ukrainian quarters, and the flourishing trade that had been built up fell to almost nothing. The Polish townspeople were little better off and the general history of the towns during the century was one of uninterrupted decay. Yet for the Poles religion was not impaired, since their clergy were influential in the state. For the Ukrainians, with the loss of their aristocracy, the diminution of their privileges left them without any defenders.

What was needed was a reorganization of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church but this was difficult. Many of the higher ecclesiastics, bishops and heads of monasteries, were hardly willing to give up their own practical independence. At the same time the brotherhoods, who were the best organized and most intelligently conscious members of the Orthodox Church, sought for ways to make their influence felt, and as their school system grew, so did their claims and their potentialities.

To add to the confusion, just at this moment there began to appear in Ukraine various of the Eastern patriarchs. These men, zealously trying to uphold their ancient privileges, were travelling not so much for the sake of supervising the various sees that were nominally under their control as for collecting alms and funds to help the Church in the Ottoman Empire. Yet they could not resist the temptation to act as the former Patriarchs who were something more than beggars and who had at their disposal abundant resources.

Moscow was usually their goal. It was far easier to receive enormous funds there than from the poor peasants of Ukraine. It was not without significance that in 1589 the Patriarch Jeremias on one of these visits was induced by copious gifts for his suffering flock to consecrate a Patriarch for Moscow and to grant to the Church of Moscow the right to choose and consecrate its own Patriarch thereafter. It was the culmination of the dream of Moscow to become the Third Rome.

That same Jeremias, while in Ukraine, and conscious of the sufferings and disorder of the Orthodox Church, carelessly approved an agreement that had been made a few years earlier between the Patriarch Joachim of Antioch and the brotherhood of Lviv. This agreement had conferred upon the brotherhood the right of supervision of the clergy and of reporting delinquent priests to the bishop who was to be himself liable to condemnation, if he refused to remedy the abuse complained of. It was a more than foolish proposal, for it meant a complete reversal of the traditional Orthodox method of church administration and intensified the friction between the higher classes who were usually of the gentry and the townsmen and the peasants who ranked lower in the social scale of the day.

Sooner or later it was certain to promote a clash in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which could be of profit to no one except its foes. Further attempts by the Patriarch to extend his control over the Ukrainian Church were equally resented by both clergy and laity. The fact was that with the state of irritation and frustration that existed in the land almost any action that was designed to tighten up the administration, as had been done by the Jesuits in the Roman Catholic Church, would have aroused anger and increased the confusion. The higher clergy were jealous of the brotherhoods and despised them as plebeian. The brotherhoods were suspicious of the bishops and regarded them as false to their duties.

It is very possible that there was lurking in all this elements of Protestant propaganda from Bohemia. It is certain that the Jesuits were not in the slightest degree averse to fanning hostility among the Orthodox and that the King and the Polish magnates were willing to do anything to break up the solid front that had existed among the Orthodox.

At all events a fight soon broke out between Gedeon Balaban, the Bishop of Lviv, and the brotherhood. As a result of this, Balaban conferred with the other bishops and a decision was made to place themselves under the Pope. The clergy and the nobles who took part in these discussions realized the danger to the nation from the policy of the Poles and the growing power of Moscow and hoped for at least moral support from the Papacy and the West. Negotiations went on rapidly in secret, for the bishops knew that a large part of their congregations would decline to follow them. In 1595, two of them, Terletsky and Poty, went to Rome and formally signed an agreement with the Pope, promising submission.

The next year, 1596, the King of Poland called a public council of the Orthodox Church at Brest to confirm the Union. The result was hardly to his liking, for two of the bishops, Balaban who had initiated the movement and Kopistinsky, Bishop of Peremyshl, declined to ratify it. Despite the efforts of the Polish government, the Patriarchal Vicar Nicephorus appeared at the gathering with other Byzantine officials. More important than that, the remaining Orthodox lords, including Prince Ostrozky, came in protest and there were representatives of the brotherhoods and the lesser Orthodox gentry and townsmen.

Thus the lines of battle were clearly drawn between the King, the Polish magnates, the Roman Catholic clergy and the bishops who had agreed to the Union and all other classes of the population. What had been intended as a peace meeting, as the formal ratification of something that had been decided upon, ended with ill concealed discord. The Orthodox refused to enter the cathedral because the bishop of the diocese had signed the Act of Union. The Uniats and the Roman Catholics declined to attend the Orthodox meeting presided over by the Patriarchal Vicar. A few days were spent in meaningless invitations to the opposing party and finally there were duly formed two councils, one of the Uniats and Roman Catholics, the other of the Orthodox. Each of these duly anathematized and deposed the bishops of the other faction and appealed to the King to carry out their wishes as representatives of the real desires of the Church and people.

It was abundantly evident that in this controversy the actual power lay in the hands of the King and the Uniats. King Sigismund, of the Catholic branch of the Vasa line of Sweden, had no intention of giving any rights to the Orthodox and his followers controlled the organs of the state. The Orthodox could do little but argue, write and talk and that seemed little enough. With the control of the state on their side, the Uniats felt that they could overlook the many polemical pamphlets that were hurled against them, especially by Ivan Vyshensky, the most celebrated of the defenders of Orthodoxy. Vyshensky was a monk who had studied at Mount Athos. He was a conservative in the educational disputes and felt that the modern schools were not severely Orthodox enough, not enough critical of the modern Western learning; but when it came to the dispute over the Union, he stood firmly with the brotherhoods. His pamphlets, written with bitter invective against the Uniats, had a telling effect.

The King and his lords paid no attention. They were sure of an ultimate victory and set about acting accordingly. They commenced to dispossess by force those of the bishops and priests who refused to accept the Union and on the death of the Metropolitan of Kiev, Rohoza, in 1590, they appointed as the new Metropolitan Poty, who was the violent advocate of the Union. Poty kept urging the King and the government to further acts of aggression against the Orthodox and his arguments fell upon willing ears.

Yet it was a long distance between talk and realization. The Orthodox fought zealously in defence of their rights, as they considered them, although it was evident that they were fighting a losing battle. The number of influential lords on their side and in the Polish senate was steadily decreasing as more and more of them became Polonized and joined the Roman Catholic Church. Even a promise of the King in 1597, forced by the foreign situation, that he would appoint only Orthodox to the Orthodox sees and parishes remained a dead letter, for the King did not feel himself bound by any promise to the heretics or the dissidents, as they were now called in Polish official language.

The reaction varied in the different provinces. In Lviv and Peremyshl where there were still Orthodox bishops, even though the influence of Polish landlords was strong, there was some relief. In those dioceses where the Catholic landlords joined with the Uniat bishops the situation was worse. In some others, as Kiev, where there still remained a considerable number of Orthodox landlords, there was a still different situation and in Kiev particularly, Prince Vasil Konstantin Ostrozky as governor of the province openly disobeyed the orders of the king.

Yet all this was temporary. Time was clearly playing on the side of the Catholics and the Uniats. Sooner or later it was certain that there would come a moment when the Orthodox opposition would become negligible, when the Orthodox lords would cease to have the power to defend their coreligionists in the Polish government or on their estates, when the brotherhoods could be broken up or suppressed or won over. Steps were already taken in Wilno to expel the Orthodox from the Churches despite the pleas of the vast majority of the population.

There was only one factor that might interfere. It had already appeared as a dark shadow when the King endeavored to seize the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev. That was the appearance of an armed band of Nalyvaykans, as they were called, within the walls of the monastery, who were ready to fight for the Orthodox Church. It was a grim portent and a warning, had the King and his advisors been prepared to heed it, for these men were a branch of the Kozaks of the Dnyeper valley and the Kozaks were destined to bear in the future the burden of the struggle for Ukrainian freedom.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE KOZAKS

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a brilliant and colorful age, an age of high thinking and of great adventure. Not since the age of the Vikings had men of courage and of determination dared so much upon the high seas. The Spanish conquistadores settled the whole of South America. They laid their hands upon the fabulous wealth of Mexico and Peru. Well armed and fearless, a handful of Europeans dared to face thousands of the Aztecs and the Incas and came off victorious in the name of the Christian religion. The English in still smaller and more manageable boats swarmed across the Atlantic Ocean and attacked the rich and treasure-laden galleons wherever they found them and then, early in the seventeenth century, they laid the foundations of their colonies in America. Europe meanwhile was torn by religious wars, as the new ideas of Protestantism sought to extend their sphere of influence.

That same spirit and that same daring, that same zeal for the Faith which they had received from their fathers, that same longing for a freedom which they no longer had burst out in the east of Europe and started the Kozaks on their historic mission. Where the Atlantic seaboard saw men of courage and of action put out to sea in small and scarcely seaworthy craft, in the east men of similar character swept across the steppes, ready to fight and to sell their lives for liberty. They formed a force that was difficult to control and impossible to check. They revived the courage and the bravery of the early rulers of Kiev and they left an imperishable mark upon their surroundings. The Kozak Host became in a few years an object of terror and concern to all of their neighbors, be they Poles, Muscovites, Turks, Tatars or whoever else attempted to restrain their unbridled energy and to reduce them to the status of serfs. It was an outpouring of the human spirit that has scarcely been equalled at any time or in any region and the Kozaks were praised or hated, according as they met with friend or foe.

The name Kozak is borrowed from the Turkish word meaning “free warrior” and the meaning of the word amply expresses the dominant characteristic of these people. They were in essence the frontiersmen of eastern Europe, living in those areas where there was no law but the sword and where no man could be called to account except by one who was stronger than he. They reacted fiercely against every invasion of their rights and in the beginning co-operated only for defence or attack.

The stories of the first Kozaks have much in common with the legends of some of the American pioneers who crossed into Kentucky, the dark and bloody ground, as it was known in the eighteenth century. There was only the difference that the Kozaks were operating not in mountainous and wooded territory but on the open plains and that their opponents were not small bands of Indians, hardly more numerous than themselves, but large masses of well-mounted troops eager for plunder and for slave collecting.

The weakening of the Golden Horde and conflicts between the Khan and the Sultan of Turkey had relaxed control over the black earth region across the Dnyeper. In that no man’s land and along the Dnyeper itself there was a rich area in which there were few or no permanent residents. It offered an ideal place for men who had no fear of death and who valued their personal liberty above everything else, to live a lawless and carefree life without personal obligations. The prospect appealed to many who were suffering under the oppressive rule of the feudal lords in both Poland and Lithuania. Likewise men streamed out of the Muscovite lands into the lower Don and the lower Volga areas. Out of these groups of men there developed the Don Cossacks, who were nominally subject to Moscow, and the Zaporozhian Kozaks, who were originally required to pay some sort of allegiance to Poland.

We first hear of the Kozaks of the Dnyeper at the end of the fifteenth century, when men from various sections of Rus’ went into the wilderness which had already received the name of Ukraine and passed their time hunting, collecting honey, and fishing. They did not disdain any opportunity of plundering Tatar raiding detachments, caravans crossing the country or messengers passing between the Sultan and the Khan, and the Kings of Poland and of Lithuania. Very often they were able to return to their homes at the approach of winter with rich spoils which far outvalued the natural products even of a fabulously rich land.

From these more or less accidental encounters, it was not long before the little bands gathered together in larger groups and set out deliberately to plunder their enemies. The frontier guards of Poland and Lithuania tried to levy taxes on the booty which they brought back. Then the obvious thing was not to return but to pass the winter in small fortresses built beyond the settled frontier.

In the beginning men of every class who loved adventure joined in these raids. There were gentry who craved adventure and excitement. There were townspeople who were bored by the monotonous hardships of declining trade. There were peasants who had suffered at the hands of their landlords. There were men who innocently or for due cause were sought by the authorities of the law. Yet when they once came into this unsettled country, they realized that they had to work together. Neither birth nor wealth nor training counted for anything except in so far as it assisted a man in asserting his own power and in persuading his comrades to work with him.

It was a free society in a free world. Gradually all the little fortresses and hangouts felt the need for closer cooperation, and step by step there was built up a rough organization which represented in general all the various groups. If this was to be effective, it had to have some sort of permanent headquarters and the ideal place was finally found to be the islands below the rapids of the Dnyeper River. Hence came the name Zaporozhe, the place below the rapids.

About 1552 one Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, a gentleman Kozak, took the initiative in building as this centre a fortress on the island of Khortytsya, in this general region. This was the beginning of the celebrated Sich which was to inspire terror in the hearts of all the surrounding lands. Here the Kozaks could gather in relative security. Here they could store the cannon which they captured on their various raids, the booty which they acquired. Here they could meet for deliberation and decide what enterprise they would next undertake.

The Kozaks of the Sich, eternally ready for battle or for raids, became as it were a replica of the various orders of military knights that had played such a role in the area of the Baltic Sea and in the crusades. Here was a group of men ready to fight the battle for Christianity and the Orthodox faith against the apparently invincible Mohammedans.

Yet it was also a democratic system. In the general gatherings of the Kozaks every man was free to speak his own mind, depending only on the permission of his fellows. There was no set rule of procedure. Human life was cheap and a man might easily pay with his own for an unpremeditated insult. He had only himself to blame and no one else cared a rap, if one Kozak or another perished in a brawl. Any man could rise to prominence if he was able in one way or another to sway the assembly. There was no post barred to him because of age or rank or previous existence. It was a man’s world in the full sense of the world. It was a free world in a way that was not true of life anywhere else in the conquered and subjugated Ukraine.

Yet when we emphasize this side of life at the Sich, we can never forget that the Sich was located in an exposed position subject at any moment to the attack of powerful and unscrupulous enemies. It was absolutely essential that there should be unrelenting vigilance and strict discipline. If the Kozaks were to live at all in the area which they had picked out, they could not engage in meaningless squabbles, in martial disorder, and in perfect anarchy.

They met the situation in a democratic way. The general assembly would meet and formally elect a hetman to whom they gave the horsetail standard and the mace of office. His word was law. He had all the powers of an army commander. He could punish even with death any who disobeyed his orders or showed cowardice in the face of danger. His power was absolute and limited by no constitutional restrictions. Yet at the ending of his term of office, he was liable to be questioned by the assembly and if he had not used his powers for the good of the Sich, he could be tried by the rough justice of his comrades and receive whatever punishment they desired to inflict.

It was a rough system administered by rough, brave men, and while it was not fitted for a normal community of peaceful citizens, it was admirably suited to men living beyond the established frontier, every one of whom had faced death many times both from the enemy and from the storms of nature. It was a new system which had nothing in common with the elaborate system of aristocratic feudalism and the aristocratic republic of the squires of Poland or with the personal autocracy of the Muscovite tsar. The Kozak Host of the Zaporozhian Sich was a law unto itself.

Vyshnevetsky had offered to combine with the Tsar against the Tatars of the Crimea and had taken part in one expedition with the Muscovites but had not received any support and it was a long while before the offer was repeated. His successors as hetmans preferred to go their own ways and build up and strengthen their Kozak system until it could stand alone.

The Kozaks could not escape the attention of the Kings of Poland. They were uncomfortable neighbors but they were also useful. The King and the gentry of Poland had no taste for building up a military establishment strong enough to protect the country. In earlier days the bulk of the army was composed of Lithuanian forces, largely recruited from Ukraine and White Ruthenia. Once the full union of Poland and Lithuania had taken place and the golden liberty of the Polish szlachta had been extended throughout the land, this resource was gone. Between the weak Polish army and the Tatar and Turkish raiders there stood only the Kozaks.

Common sense would have advised the King and the magnates of Poland to come to terms with the organization or to have secured enough forces of their own to render it useless and to destroy it. They did neither. In times of war with Turkey or the Tatars they willingly took the Kozaks into their service and welcomed their assistance. In times of peace they were constantly striving to prevent their growth. They did go so far as to register a few thousand Kozaks and consider them as a separate part of the Polish army but even then they rarely paid them the sums promised, because of the opposition of the gentry and the lack of money in the treasury.

ST. VOLODYMYR

ST. OLHA

(Victor Vasnetsov)

The Zaporozhian Kozaks writing a letter to the Sultan

(Ilya Repin)

Even this slight support, however, gave the Kozaks the idea that they owed only a general loyalty to the King and they were bound only to obey their own elected hetmans. They came to feel that they were free from all taxes levied by the Polish government and they refused to draw a line of demarcation between registered and unregistered Kozaks, for they well knew that at the first sign of trouble on any Polish border, all the Kozaks, registered and unregistered alike, would be called into service on the same footing.

The Polish policy was more than shortsighted but it was in line with the general attitude of the state. As the upper Dnyeper valley was resettled and as agriculture began to revive, the magnates were able to put forth claims for vast estates. They parcelled out among themselves the new lands as they had done the older lands of Rus’ over which they had assumed control centuries before. They shuddered at the idea that the Sich might embrace all the liberty-loving Ukrainians who were dissatisfied with their harsh rule. The Kozaks were furiously Orthodox. They were zealous supporters of the Orthodox Church. Poland prided itself on its Catholicism and particularly after the successful work of the Jesuits and the establishment of the Church Union, the Polish leaders did not want to do anything that would revive the Orthodox Church.

The very existence of the Sich was a direct challenge to all for which the Polish state, with its theories of the equality of the szlachta and its religious interests, stood. The more the Sich became organized and turned from a handful of bold frontiersmen into a definite military force, the more it became the mouthpiece of the Ukrainian population and a refuge for them against oppression. The more it protected the Dnyeper valley and the regions to the east, the more it became a menace and a problem to the Polish rulers. The free republic of the warriors of the Sich was the direct antithesis of the aristocratic life of the great estates which were known throughout Europe for their luxury and their culture.

There was more than this involved. The Kozaks, though nominal subjects of the King of Poland, maintained full freedom to harry the Turks and Tatars at will. Every spring, with almost unfailing regularity, they set out on expeditions down the Dnyeper to attack the Turkish and Tatar settlements on the shores of the Black Sea. They invaded Wallachia and Moldavia and interfered in the civil wars that were raging intermittently in both lands. They constantly attacked Ochakiv and plundered almost at will whatever city they wished to. They rescued thousands of Christian Slavs from the Crimean slave mart of Kaffa.

As they grew more experienced, during the early part of the seventeenth century, they dared to set out on longer expeditions, which carried them into the harbors of Constantinople and Sinope. In their light boats, which were barely a few feet above the water, they defied the storms of the Black Sea, made sudden raids into the great Turkish cities, left a small guard for the boats and plundered for periods as long as three days before they saw fit to gather up the booty which they desired and, having burned the rest, put out to sea. The larger Turkish ships, if they attacked the Kozak boats in the daytime, could deal terrible damage to them; but if the Kozaks could surprise them or come upon them unexpectedly at dawn, their fierce bravery would carry them to the decks of the better armed Turkish ships and in hand to hand fighting, the Turks would be compelled to yield. Then, after plundering at will, the Kozaks would sink them and their crews and return home triumphantly. Of course their losses were terrific but the spoils which were brought back from these raids well paid the survivors for their hardships and their dangers.

It was in vain that the Khan of the Crimea and the Sultan of Turkey remonstrated with the King of Poland and threatened war. The King had no more power to restrain these raids than he had to wipe out the Sich itself. Now and then he could capture some of the leaders and execute them to satisfy the threats of the Turkish ambassador but this only fanned the ill feelings between the Kozaks and the Poles. The next spring the Kozaks would start again on their raids and the process would be repeated.

On the other hand, in time of war, the Poles were only too glad of their assistance. During the Troublous Times of Moscow, after the death of Boris Godunov, the Kozaks were encouraged to interfere in Muscovite affairs. Over forty thousand took part in the effort to make Wladyslaw Tsar of Moscow in 1610. Despite the similarity in religion the Kozaks fought as willingly against Moscow as they did at any time. They brought back to their homes the richest spoils of the tsardom and remained a continuous menace until the accession of Michael Romanov in 1613.

At the same time they were no peaceful citizens of Poland. They turned with equal fury against the princes, Orthodox and Roman Catholic, who were carving out estates in territory which they had made safe. Even the great Orthodox lord, Konstantin Ostrozky, the bulwark of the Orthodox in Poland, had to see his estates plundered and his serfs freed by the invincible Kozaks, who cared nothing for the pattern of rights set out by the King and the magnates.

The Polish government paid no attention until the Kozaks began to plunder the land of the Roman Catholic lords, like the Potockis to the east of the Dnyeper, and until they began to advance to the west and plunder in Volynia and White Ruthenia. Then it sent against them the Hetman of the Republic, Zolkiewski, and finally defeated them at the battle of Lubny in 1596. It was a crushing blow to the Kozaks but it was only temporary, for it was not long before the King, in sore need of troops for foreign wars, called again upon the Kozaks for support and again the whole process of endeavoring to use them in war and suppress them in peace was resumed.

In actual practice the Kozaks controlled practically all of Eastern Ukraine and much territory west of the Dnyeper. They represented the conscious active elements of the Ukrainian people and it was no accident that the Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves called in the followers of Nalyvayko to protect the Monastery when the King of Poland was trying to seize it for the Uniats. Had they formed a consistent policy, they could at any time have dominated a large part of Poland and forced their will upon the lords.

Yet the very strength of the Kozak movement as a military organization was its main weakness. The Kozaks had developed as frontiersmen but it was a long while before they definitely tried to influence the government or to take over the administration of the territory which they controlled. The rough democracy of the Sich was little interested in problems of administration. Even the families of many of the leading Kozaks lived on farms not far from the estates which they were plundering. They had a purely military organization divided into regiments and companies, formed on a territorial basis and they called it the Zaporozhian Host. Thus this powerful force which might cooperate with the various townsmen and interfere in behalf of the peasants rarely went further and it did not attempt to take over many functions of the Polish local administration that it could have done.

For its part the Polish government contented itself with sending commissioners to represent it at the meetings of the Host. At times it sent parts of its regular army to discipline the Host or to garrison forts in the areas where it dominated. Yet most of these troops were registered Kozaks and it was a fairly general rule that in case of any emergency, the registered Kozaks would abandon their Polish commanders and take sides with the unregistered.

It seems incredible that neither the King nor the magnates saw the danger inherent in the possibility that the Kozaks with their fanatical Orthodoxy would interfere in the struggle between the Orthodox and Uniats, after the first attempts of the Kozaks to prevent the turning over of the monasteries and churches. Yet they did not. The magnates and the Roman Catholic authorities continued to think that the Kozak movement was unable to think of anything but plunder and war. Perhaps they relied upon the fact that many of the Ukrainian townspeople and the last of the Ukrainian Orthodox lords shared the same opinion. The Zaporozhians had pillaged many of the estates of Prince Ostrozky and others of his friends and it may have seemed that there was no possibility that anything constructive would come out of the movement.

It was however as a result of the understanding between the Kievan Brotherhood and the Hetman Sahaydachny that this was finally brought about. For its part the brotherhood insisted that the Kozaks were the direct descendants of the people of Rus’ who had fought against Byzantium on land and sea, the same people whose ancestors had fought with Volodymyr and with Volodymyr Monomakh and who were still devoutly Orthodox.

When there came the desire to restore the Orthodox hierarchy which had almost completely died out, it was Sahaydachny who came to the assistance of the brotherhood. When the Orthodox learned that the Patriarch Theophanes was going to Moscow, they induced him to come to Kiev. For a time the Patriarch hesitated from fear of the King and the Poles but Sahaydachny as Hetman promised him safe conduct and under armed protection, the Patriarch consecrated new bishops for the Orthodox. Still not influenced by this fact, the government refused to allow the new bishops to enter their dioceses.

The government may have counted on the fact that there was a certain conflict within the Kozak organization. On several occasions, the Kozaks below the rapids, the Zaporozhians in the strict sense of the word, had chosen hetmans who were different from the hetmans elected by the Kozaks in the more settled regions to the north. The latter, living in the more settled portions of the country, were often deeply interested in the cultural and religious aspects of the problem. They were more settled people who were more interested in the cultural development of the Orthodox Ukrainians than were the Zaporozhians, who in this respect were nearer to the original conception of the Kozaks.

Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, there continued more or less constant disturbances. There were a number of armed outbreaks of the Kozaks against the Poles in which the Kozaks presented modifications of their essential demand, a constant increase in the number of registered Kozaks. Most of these were finally put down by the Poles under the leadership of Koniecpolski and Potocki and after each new setback the Poles carefully restricted the number of registered Kozaks. More important than that, they worked constantly to weaken the rules about the election of the Kozak hetmans and sought to restrict their choice to the Kozaks of good family, who came of gentry stock. In this way they hoped to drive a wedge between the Kozak officers and the rank and file and thus to prevent the movement from taking a more serious turn. They also arranged to build a fort near the rapids of the Dnyeper, so as to prevent free passage between the Zaporozhian Sich and the rest of the Kozaks.

This perpetual conflict seriously weakened Poland, which still declined to take any measures which would either solve the Kozak problem or put the state in a position to defy them. In general the King was more inclined to support or compromise with the Kozaks than were the magnates and the gentry, who usually demanded severe measures against both the Kozaks and the Orthodox, but who were equally against any measure that would carry their policy into effect. It was no more favorable to the Kozaks, for the hetmans were continually forced to sign agreements which they could not and did not wish to carry out, while at the same time no hetman was strong enough to plan and carry through any policy which might allow him to win any real concession from the Poles. The ordinary Kozaks could not secure any permanent improvement in their status, and so there commenced a general exodus of the lesser Kozaks from the Ukraine and the Dnyeper valley to the so-called Slobidshchina, the land of free communes, a region in the neighborhood of Kharkiv but which was under the jurisdiction of Moscow. For years this region was weakly governed for it was still on the border of the Muscovite state and it offered many of the same advantages that Ukraine and the Dnyeper valley had a century earlier.

A definite defeat of the Kozaks in 1638 finally brought this series of wars to an end. For ten years of peace there was little change in the situation. The Poles had succeeded in forcing the bulk of the unregistered Kozaks back into the hands of their masters and the number of registered Kozaks was not full. It seemed as if the problem had finally been settled and that it would not arise again. On the other hand, the Orthodox had succeeded in recovering their bishops and in getting them at least in part restored to their dioceses. The educational policies had taken a new lease on life with the development of the Kiev Academy under the leadership of Peter Mohyla. There were, however, grave doubts as to the extent to which the cultural and religious movements and the Kozaks were integrated.

All this was but a preliminary to a new struggle which was destined to start, for there soon appeared at this moment of apparent quiescence a new leader, who was to take a long step forward in coordinating all the movements and also in outlining a definite program for the Ukrainian people, Kozak and non-Kozak, which was to give them temporary success and then lead to a more complete fiasco. This new leader was Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

CHAPTER SIX

BOHDAN KHMELNITSKY

In 1638 it might have seemed to a superficial observer that the cause of the Kozaks had been crushed once and for all. The old liberties and rights on which they had prided themselves had been abolished and a surface calm had been attained. The King of Poland and the Polish magnates seemed to have reached their goal and to have ended a force that was both valuable and threatening, valuable in case of war and threatening in time of peace.

Yet a more careful observer could easily have predicted trouble in the future. Michael Romanov was steadily increasing his power in Moscow and his agents were already looking for ways of extending the country to include the easternmost provinces under the Polish crown. The feud between the Roman Catholic and Protestant branches of the royal family of Sweden was taking an ever sharper course and Sweden was seeking to turn the Baltic Sea into a Swedish lake. To the west the Thirty Years War was raging and devastating country after country, while still further off Richelieu was at the height of his power in France and the controversy between Charles I of England and Parliament was beginning to assume a serious form. All Europe was in turmoil and with diplomatic agents rushing back and forth and armies marching over the entire continent, it would seem to have been no time to have forced the Kozaks into new extremes of anger and of discontent.

Yet at this period, when an explosion seemed so near on every side, no one gave a thought as to whether Ukraine should be pacified or goaded further. Every one in the country was dissatisfied. Kozaks registered and unregistered, townsmen and peasants, Orthodox and members of the Union, gentry and landowners, all had some special grievance. There was needed only a leader who would be able to galvanize the entire mass into active measures to create an outburst that would jeopardize the very existence of the Polish state; but no one gave any attention to the problem in the proud confidence that no leader could be found. Yet one appeared and that man was Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

This man who was to open a new period in Ukrainian history was the son of an Orthodox squire and had served on the staff of the Polish hetman Zolkiewski, who had defeated the Kozaks in several of their uprisings and had later been killed by the Turks. Born around 1595, Bohdan had had the best of opportunities for an education at the Jesuit college in Yaroslav. He had filled several posts in the Kozak Host and had been one of the men removed after the changes of 1638. He had then retired to his estate at Subotiv, where he was living quietly with his wife and family.

It might seem that Khmelnitsky was finished with politics and war. He was about fifty years of age but he was still active and vigorous. His wife died and then he took into his house a beautiful woman named Helen, but for some reason he did not marry her. The whole episode with Helen savors of the theatrical and is even more inexplicable than are the usual events of life. Suddenly a Polish nobleman, one Czaplinski, appeared at the home of Khmelnitsky, beat Khmelnitsky’s youngest son so badly that he died, burned the mill and barns, and carried Helen off and married her under the Roman Catholic rite.

Bohdan was furious and sought justice. It was not forthcoming. The Polish authorities laughed at his case and even ordered his arrest. This was too much for the Kozak officer and he made his way to the Zaporozhians and sought refuge among them.

He very soon became a recognized leader, was elected hetman and thus became able to plan for revenge on his enemies. His position among the Kozaks was the stronger because he possessed definite knowledge that King Wladyslaw was planning to restore the Kozak liberties on condition that they aid him against the Turks. It was the same old device that had occurred again and again. Kozak aid was desired in war and spurned in peace. The King was more kindly disposed to the Kozaks than were the magnates and was himself taking the initiative in stirring up the Kozaks to attack the Turks.

Khmelnitsky’s scheme was simple. He played for time with the Polish authorities and meanwhile made an alliance with the Khan of the Crimea to send him some military aid in his new venture. Then when all was ready, he took the field.

The Poles were by now well aware of what was going on. They sent an army under the Crown Hetman Potocki and the Field Hetman Kalinowski to Fort Kodak to keep the Zaporozhians from moving northward. This time they were too late. The King, who had himself incited the Kozak leaders, urged his officers not to fight. They decided to do so and sent the son of Potocki with a force of 1500 Poles and 2500 registered Kozaks overland to Fort Kodak, as a preliminary reinforcement for the troops stationed there.

Bohdan learned of this movement and with some 8,000 Kozaks, by forced marches, he surrounded the young and unsuspecting Potocki at Zhorty Vody (the Yellow Waters) on April 29, 1648. Seeing himself outnumbered, Potocki fortified a camp, where he was besieged and waited for the aid of the Kozaks who were coming down the Dnyeper on barges. Bohdan reached these Kozaks, easily won them to his cause, and added them to his own forces. When the news of this reached the Poles, Potocki realized that his only chance was to cut his way out and reach his father and the main body of the troops at Korsun. He failed disastrously in this and was compelled to ask for terms. Khmelnitsky allowed them to retire without their artillery. They had barely started on their march when the forces of the Tatars under Tugai Khan attacked the disordered and heavily laden Polish force and destroyed them almost to a man. Stephen Potocki was taken prisoner but died of his wounds the next day.

The news of this terrible defeat struck terror into the hearts of Potocki and Kalinowski. They realized that the entire country would soon be up in arms and that their plan of cutting off the Zaporozhe from the north had completely failed. Yet they disagreed on everything else. Kalinowski wanted to press on to Fort Kodak, Potocki wanted to stay where they were, and the lesser officers called for a retreat. This was finally decided upon and as they moved north, Potocki commenced to set fire to the villages and burned the city of Korsun for terroristic purposes. The result was not what he had expected. He merely aroused the anger of the population, who joined the Kozaks. In the meanwhile the Tatars attacked the army in front and Khmelnitsky sent to the rear a detachment of the Korsun regiment of Kozaks under the command of a Scotch adventurer, known by the name of Maksym Krivonos (Crooked-nose). Everything went like clockwork for the Kozaks. The Poles fell into the ambuscade and lost all semblance of discipline. One detachment under Prince Koretsky succeeded with heavy loss in cutting its way to safety, but the two hetmans, Potocki and Kalinowski, and over one thousand men were captured. The rest were killed. The prisoners were turned over to the Tatars and the leaders were sent to the Crimea until they should pay 20,000 gold coins each.

This overwhelming defeat was the signal for a general uprising of the oppressed Ukrainian peasantry. The fire of revolt spread rapidly through the province of Kiev and throughout eastern Ukraine. Everywhere manor houses were burned, the nobles and their families were killed and the country was caught up in a savage civil war which threatened Polish control of the entire region. It was not only a struggle of the Kozaks but of the entire Orthodox Ukrainian population which was now seeking redress for all the cruelty and oppression which it had suffered.

To add to the confusion, King Wladyslaw died on the same day as the battle of Korsun and under the loose Polish constitution, months were required before a new King could be elected. Never before had such a storm been unleashed.

It would have been a simple matter for Khmelnitsky to have marched across Poland and menaced or taken Warsaw, but he had no desire to be at the head of a peasant uprising. The same dualism that had existed between the Kozaks and the peasantry, and the pride of the Kozak officers who felt that they were on a par with the Poles prevented him from taking this solution. Instead, he sent a letter a few weeks later to the Polish King as if he were still alive and set forth the main Kozak demands. They were, as can be well imagined, the restoration of the Orthodox Church, the doubling of the number of registered Kozaks, and the restoration of the old Kozak rights which had been abolished in 1638. The Polish government seemed inclined to accept them and in addition steps were taken whereby the marriage of Helen to Czaplinski was annulled and she married Bohdan in accordance with the Orthodox rites.

Just at this moment, when it seemed as if Khmelnitsky and the Kozaks would effect some solution of their problem with the Poles, Prince Jarema Wisniowiecki sprang into action. One of the great landowners on the left bank of the Dnyeper, he was a descendant of that Prince Dmytro who had been one of the founders of the Sich a century earlier. Now as a convert to the Roman Catholic Church, he set himself to wipe out the Kozak movement with fire and sword. By far the ablest and the most warlike of the Polish magnates, he assumed the lead of the Polish opposition to Khmelnitsky and marched through the Ukrainian regions, giving no quarter and devastating ruthlessly all the Ukrainian villages. The result might have been foreseen.

He forced Bohdan, after futile appeals to the government, to take the field again. The two armies met at Pylyava on September 13, 1648 and again the Poles were decisively defeated. The Ukrainians were then joined by the army of the Crimean Tatars, who insisted on continuing the war in order to secure booty. For this purpose the combined forces moved on Lviv which finally paid a large ransom. Just at this moment, Jan Kazimierz was elected King of Poland and Bohdan, trusting to his good intentions, repeated his demands on a somewhat broader scale, for now he demanded the recognition of the Orthodox Church and the abolition of the Union.

Khmelnitsky returned to Kiev during the Christmas holidays in 1648 in triumph. He was received with overwhelming acclaim by the entire population and all classes vied in doing him honor. Perhaps it was only then that his thoughts and his aspirations expanded, for he found waiting for him representatives of Turkey, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia and they were soon joined by an ambassador from Moscow. He could not fail to be impressed by the difference between his position at the moment and that of a year before when he was regarded as only a Kozak officer striving to avenge his personal wrongs and to win for the Kozaks some vestige of their ancient liberties.

At the same time Patriarch Paisius of Jerusalem, who was present in Kiev on his way to Moscow for the collection of alms and for conferences on Muscovite Orthodoxy with the Patriarch Nikon, is said to have addressed Bohdan dan as King of Rus’ and to have encouraged him to undertake a grand alliance of all the Orthodox States which were represented at Kiev. The successful campaigns of 1648 certainly opened up visions of a future to Bohdan Khmelnitsky and inspired him to undertake extensive diplomatic negotiations among all the neighboring powers. They made him consider himself a real head of an independent people and he felt more confident than ever that he could tackle the problem of relations with Poland on a grand scale.

As a result there is no reason to doubt the reports of the Polish commissioners whom he met in February, 1649. According to these he demanded that the Polish administration definitely quit Ukraine, that the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev be given a seat in the Polish senate, that the Union be abolished, and that the Kozak Host be responsible only to the King. All this meant that Ukraine would become a third member of the Polish state along with Poland and Lithuania.

Yet to do this, it was necessary to have a more permanent political organization. The old Kozak system was well devised to win military victories but it had never taken up the problems of administration in any area. The Kozak officers had come to feel that they were the appointed mouthpieces of Kozakdom and compared themselves to the Polish magnates. The ordinary Kozaks, equally proud of their position, resented these claims of their officers and clamored for the old rights of frequent election. At the same time they looked down upon the non-Kozak elements of the population, even though the latter had taken an important part in the campaigns of 1648.

The very success of the Kozak movement had created a new embarrassment. The pressing task before Bohdan and his associates was to build a state, to establish in it the rights of the townspeople and the burghers, the intellectuals and the peasants. They had to draw a line between the completely autocratic rule of Moscow and the aristocratic republic of Poland, to secure unity and obedience, democracy and authority. This was a colossal task and it is perhaps doubtful if even Khmelnitsky realized the many ramifications of the political problems.

The best that he could do was to expand the Kozak authority and system, to make the regimental commanders the local authorities, and to hand over to them all the necessary functions of administration. In the long run this could not prevail in time of peace. It was little better as a permanent basis in war, when the commanders would be busy in the field. Thus the ruling groups of the Kozaks failed to set up a true government in the territory which they had with such relative ease acquired.

It seemed far more tempting and agreeable to seek for foreign support and Khmelnitsky spent his time in endeavoring to secure foreign allies who would assist him against his main enemy. For this the Crimean Tatars seemed easily the most suitable and he bent his efforts to securing their aid in the future.

When hostilities finally broke out in 1649, the Kozaks again speedily obtained the advantage and after a few minor defeats in the north, they entrapped the armies of their main enemy, Wisniowiecki, in the town of Zbarazh. It was only the daring and skill of Wisniowiecki that saved the day until the armies of the new King could arrive. Even that was no salvation, for Khmelnitsky and his men speedily defeated the reinforcements at Zboriv and besieged the King and the remains of his army in a fortified camp there. At the darkest hour for the Poles, they succeeded in bribing the Tatar Khan to abandon his Kozak allies. He was the more willing to do this, since he also had no desire to see a strong Ukraine.

The result was the Treaty of Zboriv which granted on paper practically all of the Kozak demands. It conferred upon them complete control of the three provinces of Kiev, Braslav, and Chernihiv, placed the Orthodox Metropolitan in the Polish Senate and made the number of registered Kozaks 40,000. This was considerably less than Khmelnitsky had demanded the winter before and it aroused annoyance in both the Ukrainian and Polish camps. The Catholic prelates in the Senate declined to admit the Orthodox Metropolitan to their number and he obligingly returned from Warsaw to Kiev. It displeased most of the magnates, even those more moderate than Wisniowiecki, because it recognized the Kozak leaders as their equals. On the other hand it promised little for the bulk of the Ukrainian population, who had joined Khmelnitsky’s army, since in many sections it compelled them to return, even with an amnesty, to the harsh rule of their former lords. Many of the more independent went across the border of Moscow to the so-called Slobidshchina or Free Land which was still practically a lordless domain. Their departure of course weakened the Host and deprived it of many men who had done it good service.

Yet the years after the Treaty of Zboriv marked the height of the influence of Bohdan. It was the time when he could have carried through far reaching reforms and strengthened the country internally. However he spent his energies in trying to marry his son Timosh to the daughter of Vasyl Lupul, the ruler of Moldavia, and in carrying on negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey and the Khan of the Crimea. As a result he gave the Poles the opportunity of recovering their strength and, under the driving force of Wisniowiecki, the work went forward rapidly, with the result that the Kozaks were badly defeated at the battle of Berestechko in the summer of 1651, again due to the treachery and fear of their Tatar allies. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva of that autumn reduced the Kozak power but it still left Bohdan strong. It increased discontent against him among the Ukrainians and drove him to still more far reaching diplomatic schemes. His mood was made worse by the discovery that his beloved Helen was intriguing against him and when proof was forthcoming, he had her and her friend executed. The final certainty that Helen had played him false wrecked his general shrewdness and embittered him in every way.

Then came his most disastrous move. He appealed for assistance to Moscow, and offered to place the Kozak Host under the protection of the Tsar on condition that its privileges be respected. He had undoubtedly many reasons for this, but when the matter was put before the general body of the Kozaks, the argument that convinced them was religious. Moscow was also Orthodox and this appealed to all those classes of people who resented the Roman Catholicism of the Poles. It was not so favorably received by the Kozak officers who realized that the Muscovite regime did not and could not recognize any inherent rights in any class of the population. The Kievan Academy and many of the Orthodox hierarchy welcomed the move, however, for already many of their distinguished members were being invited by the Patriarch Nikon to Moscow and they felt that the act of Bohdan would place them in a better position there.

After prolonged negotiations, the Muscovite envoys met Bohdan at Pereyaslav on January 18, 1654. In a last gesture Bohdan asked the Tsar’s envoy Buturlin to swear in his Sovereign’s name to respect the treaty. Buturlin refused on the ground that the Tsar could not swear to any subject. Popular sentiment had been so stirred up that Bohdan could not retract and the oath placing the Kozak Host under the Tsar was duly administered.

Shortly after the Tsar confirmed various Kozak privileges. He granted the maintenance of the traditions of the Host, the right of maintaining Kozak courts, the raising of the quota of registered Kozaks to 60,000, the preservation of the privileges of the Ukrainian gentry, and the free right of election of the hetman, the payment of a large sum of money to the hetman, the officers and all registered Kozaks and the right of the hetman to receive foreign envoys (except that the Tsar insisted upon knowing and authorizing all negotiations with the King of Poland and the Sultan of Turkey).

All this seemed very good and the Kozaks at first believed that they had profited by the agreement. The leaders were not long in discovering their mistake. There was no more peace than there had been before. It is true that the Kozaks in their wars with the Poles could depend upon some support from the Muscovites but the territories which they conquered from Poland passed directly under the control of the Tsar and did not add to the prestige or power of the Kozak Host. The Poles continued to invade their territory. Now they usually had the open support of the Tatars and the uncontrolled and encouraged devastations of these nomads often caused the Kozaks greater exertions than in the old days. Besides that, it was not long before it became evident that the Muscovite troops intended to settle down as garrisons in Kiev and in other Ukrainian cities, as an ostensible protection against the Poles, but in reality as an occupying force.

Khmelnitsky, completely disillusioned, began to look for other allies. Sweden seemed the most promising, for it was then at the height of its power. It was invading Poland and was on such terms of friendship with Moscow that no open criticism could be made of the negotiations. His relations with Moldavia became entangled with the hopes of Lupul to capture Wallachia and these only led to the death of his son Timosh during the siege of Sochava, shortly before his submission to the Tsar. His plans for a great union of the Orthodox countries were definitely disrupted and it was not long before Sweden too proved a broken reed.

In the spring of 1657, he was taken ill. To please him, his son Yury, a boy of fourteen who had shown no signs of having a strong character, was elected hetman over Ivan Vyhovsky, who had been secretary to Bohdan and was familiar with all of his plans and negotiations. Then the father died on July 27, 1657, was buried at his birthplace of Subotiv.

It is difficult to evaluate correctly the work of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. There can be no question that he was an able and sincere patriot. He towered in ability, in military skill and in political vision high above all the hetmans who preceded and followed him. He became in a real sense the outstanding diplomatic figure of Eastern Europe during the years when he was at the height of his power.

He definitely moved the Ukrainian, or more accurately, the Kozak question from one of purely internal Polish politics to the international arena where it deserved to be placed. In this connection he was the first of the hetmans who revived the Ukrainian claim to be a complete and sovereign state, able to negotiate as an equal with the various countries which were taking part in the game of Eastern European politics.

Yet the defect and the tragedy of Khmelnitsky, and with him of the Ukrainian people, lay in the fact that he did not realize soon enough the essential problem which required an immediate solution. That was the relationship of the Kozak Host to all the other classes of the Ukrainian population. For Ukraine to rally all of its strength and resources, it was necessary to call upon all classes of the population. This was no easy task in the seventeenth century, when political thought concentrated upon the rights of the nobility, even more than upon the well being of the peasantry and the towns. The Polonization of the gentry had deprived the Ukrainians of exactly that class of their population which would have been most able to steer the course of the ship of state. The Kozaks and especially the Kozak officers felt themselves called upon to assume the role of a new nobility. At the same time they had so long conceived of themselves as a military group that they hesitated to make the transformation into a permanent administrative organization.

Hence arose the insoluble conflict between the Kozaks and non-Kozaks in the growing Ukrainian organization. Perhaps had Khmelnitsky lived longer and had the time to think through the reforms that he was introducing, he might have changed his policies or in a period of peace he might have cemented his power and accustomed the people to accept it. He had neither time nor peace. It was necessary to organize, fight, and build all at the same moment and the result became a bitter circle in which he could see his way only through a complicated scheme of diplomatic intrigue. He did not have the power to carry to success any of his plans and as a result, Ukraine and the Kozak Host were left at the mercy of either Poland or Moscow or both, depending upon the general state of their relations at any given moment.

Despite this fact, his work was not lost, for he had created an attitude, even if only in theory, that would assure to thinking Ukrainians a permanency and a place in the world. Even those later thinkers who condemned his submission to Moscow recognized that it was not a mere act of union, a mere desire to change masters for the Kozaks, but that it involved a deep political philosophy which circumstances destroyed.

Khmelnitsky was the real founder of the Ukrainian national movement and he came nearer to making it successful than any one between the fall of Kiev and the modern Ukrainian Republic. That was a major achievement to carry out in less than nine years of uninterrupted turmoil. In one sense he was too late. Had he played his role a half century earlier, it is very possible that he might have accomplished more. Had he been able to hand the state over to some successor with the same breadth of vision, that man might have been able to continue and stabilize his work. As it was, he became the incarnation of the Ukrainian struggle for liberty and independence, and the inspiration of many of his followers. It was an unkind fate that preserved to the world only a knowledge of his submission to the Tsar and a distorted idea, zealously fostered by the Russians, that this was his ultimate goal.

He died too soon, for he had not healed the breaches that were apparent in the Kozak organization, he had not solved definitely the entire Kozak problem from a Ukrainian standpoint and it was left for lesser men to corrupt his ideas and to lead Ukraine to a new and more complete ruin, with only his example to serve as a beacon light of what Ukraine might be.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REVOLT OF MAZEPA

The seventeenth century, which saw the settlement of the English in America, witnessed a shift in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and no one had contributed more to this than had Khmelnitsky and the successful revolt of the Kozak Host. The sudden awakening of the Ukrainians politically to a sense of their importance was an event of more than usual significance, and they undoubtedly hoped to play the role of a neutral state between Poland and Moscow. To both contestants they presented an entirely new situation.

The Poland of the beginning of the century was mortally wounded by the Kozak revolt. At the beginning of the century, the King of Poland had dared to dream of establishing himself in the Kremlin, and while he failed, the results were not disastrous. The lack of success in the Polish Kozak policy was disastrous, for the great revolt had not only torn away from Poland a large part of its eastern lands but had encouraged the Swedish wars which wrecked the country still further. The damage was done at Pereyaslav, for an honest acceptance of the demands of Khmelnitsky up to that moment might easily have permitted the restoration of the Republic under a different form and have allowed it to continue strong and powerful.

The magnates and the Polish Catholic authorities would not hear of any settlement. They were neither ready nor able to support the thoroughly militant ideas of Wisniowiecki which would have laid upon them a heavy and continuous burden, perhaps beyond the power of the state, but which would have provided a consistent policy, the success or failure of which might be calculated in advance. They would not accept a policy of compromise, even when Khmelnitsky offered it, lest it injure their dignity. Thus again Polish wavering promised nothing but ill to the state as it had when the Kozak question was still a purely internal problem.

Moscow welcomed the control over the Host. The defeat of the Golden Horde in the sixteenth century had in a way freed the hands of the Tsars. The submission of Khmelnitsky advanced their boundaries to the Dnyeper. Yet there was a definite fly in the ointment. The Kozaks were liberty-loving people, they were accustomed to personal rights, and they formed a serious menace to the monolithic structure in which the Tsar and the Tsar alone possessed absolute rights. If Moscow was to triumph over its old enemy to the west, it was necessary to hold the Kozak Host and if it was to continue its policy, it was necessary to break its influence.

Thus Moscow could not rest satisfied with the conditions produced at Pereyaslav. Almost at once it commenced to infringe upon the rights of the Kozaks and to seek to turn them into typical Russian serfs. It knew that its acceptance of the Host would speedily involve it in war with Poland and that there would be a clash in which the loyalty of the Kozaks would be the decisive factor.

This left the Host and the Ukrainians in a relatively advantageous position. Besides that, there was still the Sultan of Turkey who could play a hand in the game, for we must never forget that at this moment the Turkish tide was still running strongly. It was still twenty years before it would reach its height outside the walls of Vienna and all of Europe would be terrorized at the thought that a victorious Islam might push its way further into the heart of the continent.

Everything depended upon the successor of Khmelnitsky. Would he be able to continue the task of welding the Host and the Ukrainian population into a strong whole which would be able to speak unhesitatingly and firmly to both friend and foe? Would he be able to heal the rifts that were already evident in the organization, which had been evident for a century and which awaited only a strong and continued effort to mend, or would he allow them to increase and destroy what had been already accomplished?

Unfortunately disorder and blind passion were destined to be the guiding forces of the next half century. None of the successors of Khmelnitsky possessed his political acumen or the ability to control the unruly bands of Kozaks and to continue his work of turning a purely military order of fighters into a modern state. All the disruptive tendencies which had existed from the beginning appeared again with renewed force now that the Kozak question was pitched on international lines and formed a part of the European struggle for power.

The Kozak officers were a body by themselves. Wherever the old landlords were driven away, the officers sought to secure their estates. They no longer considered themselves elective servants of the Host but they saw themselves as a new nobility. They demanded that they receive as their own the abandoned estates and that required the control over the former serf population, if the lands were to be run properly and profitably. They saw the Polish and Muscovite nobles ruling autocratically over large tracts of territory and being the masters of many villages. They realized that the old hit and miss elective system was not suited to the administration of large areas of territory and the maintenance of a consistent foreign policy and they could not visualize reform in any other way than by assimilating themselves to the prevailing mode of life in Eastern Europe. Their object was either the formation of an aristocratic republic like Poland or unrestrained overlordship like Moscow. They resented the rights of the lesser Kozaks and once they had secured estates, they were determined not to allow their serfs and peasants to join the Kozak body and thus escape the more burdensome obligations. Quite the reverse. Just as the Poles, they sought to force the Kozaks into servile labor. Their demands were mild at first but with each year they became more oppressive and galling. As a result they began to hire mercenary guards for their persons and property and this marked an overwhelming change in the constitution of the Host. The early Kozaks who had dared to raid the outskirts of Constantinople would have been aghast at this development, at this denial of the fundamental equality of the members of the Host, but the process went on inexorably.

The ordinary Kozaks deeply resented this transformation of their corps of officers into something like the hated landlords and tried in every way to thwart and hinder the movement. They swung like a pendulum from one group of officers to another and allowed themselves to become the prey of all kinds of intrigues. Nevertheless very few of them thought seriously of the situation and even when they did succeed in electing a hetman from their own class, they did not support him and he in turn adapted his manners to those of the other officers. Thus the mass of the Kozaks in their search for their old freedom maintained only their old turbulence and their wild and unreasoning attachment to Orthodoxy and this prevented them from exerting the full force of their influence in a constructive way. At the same time, the Kozaks, even when they were almost reduced to serfs, still maintained their superiority to all other classes of the population.

A new cause of discord arose over the Zaporozhian Sich. The Kozaks of the Sich, still in a sense the real frontiersmen, argued that the choice of hetmans should be conducted there and they developed an open hostility toward the officers and the Kozaks of the permanent regimental and territorial organizations that existed in the more settled part of the country. It only added more unpleasantness, for the Kozaks of the Sich did not realize that it required a consistent policy if the Host was to maintain itself under the new conditions.

At the same time the international pot continued to boil. Both Moscow and Poland, busily engaged in fighting one another, angled for the support of the Kozaks. Both sides in cases of necessity made liberal promises. The Poles were only too willing to give the Kozaks anything for which they asked when they were driving back the Muscovites; the Muscovites were willing to extend political and financial assistance whenever the Kozaks were needed to turn back the Poles. As soon as discord raised its head in the Kozak ranks, the favorable offers were withdrawn, the Polish magnates renewed their claims to Ukrainian land and the Muscovites began to abrogate the Kozak privileges granted at the Treaty of Pereyaslav. At times the Turks and the Crimean Tatars, their vassals, took a hand in the game but they likewise did not carry out any consistent policy and did not try to fulfil the promises which they had made a short time before to the Kozak leaders.

Under such conditions everybody suffered, but the Ukrainian population, which might have profited by the duel between Poland and Moscow, fared the worst. The land was terribly devastated and there came the period graphically called by the Ukrainians of this and later periods the Ruin. The helpless population, Kozak and non-Kozak alike, wandered from the right bank of the Dnyeper to the left bank. They went on into the land of free communes which was outside the Hetman state and then discovered that Moscow would not confirm their privileges there, since it was regarded as purely Muscovite territory. Then with a slight change or rumors of change in the west, the trend of wandering reversed its course and the settlers streamed back to the right bank, only to be again disillusioned and resume their melancholy travels.

Under such conditions it is idle to seek for a coherent history. It is impossible even to speak of Polish and Muscovite parties among the Kozaks, for regiments and companies swung from side to side with appalling rapidity, handicapped their more able hetmans and either killed them or discredited them so thoroughly that they received little hearing at either Warsaw or Moscow.

To cite but a few cases. Shortly after the death of Khmelnitsky, his secretary, Ivan Vyhovsky, almost unified the Host as a new hetman succeeding the weak Yury Khmelnitsky. Vyhovsky and his friends realized that with a weakened Poland, it might be possible for the Kozaks to force upon the King a recognition of their rights. He drew up the Union of Hadiach in 1658 and this more than fulfilled the dreams of Khmelnitsky, for it made the Kozak Host and Rus’ a third member of the Polish state along with Poland and Lithuania. It again gave the Orthodox Metropolitan the right to sit in the Polish Senate and conferred upon the Academy of Kiev the same rights that were given to the Polish Universities of Krakow and Wilno. It was all in vain. The blind hate of the Polish clergy and aristocratic landowners and Muscovite intrigues destroyed the plans of Vyhovsky and the Poles speedily withdrew their promises.

Ten years later Peter Doroshenko, more hostile to the Poles, manipulated his power so skilfully that he was able to win complete independence from Poland and became the master of the right bank. Through an alliance with Mnohohrishny, the hetman of the left bank, he bade fair to unite again the whole of Ukraine with the hope of securing a definite autonomy from the Tsar. It was of no use. The officers overthrew Mnohohrishny because he was the son of a peasant and then they appealed to Moscow against Doroshenko. Of course the Tsar heard them for he welcomed the opportunity to deprive the Host of its rights to deal with foreign policy, and executed Mnohohrishny. Doroshenko tried in vain to secure Turkish help but this was not forthcoming and the hatred of the Kozaks for Islam brought about his downfall. When he had to surrender to Moscow, he received a long term in Siberia.

Then came the turn of Ivan Samoylovich, who was as sympathetic and obedient to Moscow as the others had been critical and independent. He won a certain amount for the Host at the price of taking part in Muscovite plans against Turkey. Yet when an expedition under Prince Golitsyn met with failure against the Crimea, because of disregard of his advice, the other officers accused him to the Tsar of betraying the Russians. Samoylovich was deposed and imprisoned and his son was executed.

Thus while the Host was relapsing into discord, it gave both Tsar and King the power to do with the Ukrainian lands as they would. In 1667, by the Treaty of Andrusivo, the two divided Ukraine at the Dnyeper, with Poland holding the right bank and Moscow the left and the city of Kiev on the right bank. This last was nominally for two years, but Moscow never returned the prize and used the occupation for still greater demands.

The chief of these lay in the elimination of the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was still nominally under the control of the Patriarch of Constantinople but Moscow wanted it under the Patriarch of Moscow to cement its own power. Diplomatic pressure on the Sultan led him to force the Patriarch of Constantinople to consent to this and then the ever obedient Samoylovich appointed a relative Metropolitan of Kiev and the thing was done. Moscow had been able to lay its hand upon the last strong factor of Ukrainian independence and the rest was easy.

It was in the midst of this chaos that Ivan Mazepa became hetman after the arrest of Samoylovich. He was the last of the hetmans who possessed any real strength of character and assurance of his position. Perhaps he misjudged his situation. Perhaps it was an unkind fate that drove him along the path of destruction and with him the Kozak Host and all Ukraine. Yet he played a striking role, albeit an unsuccessful one, in the events of the day and achieved lasting fame or ill-repute among his fellow countrymen and their oppressors.

Mazepa was born about 1640 in Bila Tserkva on the right bank and received an excellent education. For a while he was at the court of the King of Poland and conducted various diplomatic negotiations with Ukraine for the King. Then he suddenly vanished, perhaps because of an unconventional love affair as described by Byron, and he turned up in the Hetman state. He attracted the attention of Samoylovich who made him the Inspector General of the Host. This brought him into prominence both with the Ukrainians and the Muscovites and when Samoylovich was arrested in 1687, Mazepa offered Prince Golitsyn ten thousand rubles for the post of hetman and Golitsyn saw to it that he was the sole candidate for the position.

The world had changed since the time of Khmelnitsky and it would be impossible to recognize the traditional type of hetman in Mazepa. The gulf between the early Kozak hetmans, who acquired their power merely to conduct a raid against Constantinople, and Khmelnitsky was not so great as that between Khmelnitsky and Mazepa. The latter had become hetman only of the left bank. He might indeed possess some nominal control over the Kozaks of Paly in Poland but it was utterly ineffective and he had no power to bring them as organized units under his control. There were Muscovite garrisons in all of the important cities and the maintenance of his power depended upon his retention of the confidence of the Tsar. Still less than Khmelnitsky could he think of the welfare of the people. Still less than Khmelnitsky did he have the power to organize armies and use them for purposes of his own or of the Officers’ Council. He was bound hand and foot by the Tsar and this Tsar was Peter the Great.

Mazepa had been hetman for only two years, when Peter succeeded in forcing his half-sister Sophia out of power, making her take refuge in a convent. He immediately removed Prince Golitsyn from all of his important posts, that same man who had been the patron of Mazepa and had placed him in the hetmanship. Then Peter began his policy of reforms. This is not the place to describe his transformation of old Moscow into the modern Russia, but it can well be seen that Ukraine and the Kozak Host, already stripped of most of the rights guaranteed by Tsar Alexis, would not escape his centralizing tendencies.

Mazepa, although he was closely associated with Golitsyn, profited by the latter’s downfall. He succeeded in winning and holding the confidence of Peter, who willingly took from the Golitsyn estates and returned to Mazepa the money that he had paid Golitsyn for his election, and the generous Tsar gave him a good slice of the Golitsyn fortune as a mark of favor.

This fortune together with the income of the Kozak Host allowed the new hetman to start an unparalleled period of monumental building in Ukraine. Thus, for example, he remodelled in Baroque architecture the old Church of St. Sophia in Kiev. He constructed the Cathedral of St. Nicholas and the Church of the Epiphany. He surrounded the Monastery of the Caves with an elaborate wall. In everything that he touched Mazepa showed the influence of the contemporary art of the West and his hetmanship marked the flowering of Ukrainian Baroque architecture.

He had many motives for this. In the first place, he could feel the desire of Peter for the elimination of the old forms of Muscovite art and life. His liberal expenditure of funds for a westernizing purpose could not fail to increase the certainty of the Tsar that he was not interested in the maintenance of the old form of life. It appealed to large elements of the Ukrainian population, and Mazepa used his liberal support of the Orthodox Church to prove that he had no Polonizing tendencies and that he was not, as his enemies charged again and again, a mere servant of the Poles, for this was the favorite charge against the hetmans and could rouse against him both the suspicions of the Tsar and the ill will of the Ukrainian population, Kozak and non-Kozak alike.

On the other hand, Mazepa was a true hetman of the later type. He was not in general on good terms with the leaders of the Zaporozhian Sich, who claimed to speak for the common Kozaks, and emphasized in their turbulent way the last elements of that democracy that had characterized the entire Host of a century earlier. Mazepa found his chief elements of support in the officers of the Kozak Host and he relied upon the gifts of the Tsar to these men to maintain their loyalty to him. For his protection he trusted chiefly to his mercenary forces, on whose continued loyalty he could count for financial reasons. His ambition was to be recognized as the master of Ukraine, perhaps the King of a subservient state, and his ambitions perhaps went no further than to hold the same position toward Moscow as the princes of Georgia and other bordering vassal states. His role was far different from that of the older hetmans who had felt themselves owing no responsibility except to God and the assembly of the Host. He himself owed supreme allegiance to the Tsar and he demanded the same loyalty to himself.

The policy of Mazepa naturally did not make him friends among the ordinary Kozaks who bitterly denounced him and his officers for their high-handed actions. Yet when Petryk tried to secure the aid of the Zaporozhian Sich against him and also secured recognition from the Turks and Tatars, very few joined him and Mazepa was able to weather the storm without difficulty.

Yet Mazepa was something more than a mere supporter of the Tsar. His friend Kochubey denounced him to Peter for writing a poem glorifying the independence of Ukraine and visualizing the hetman as an autocratic and independent monarch. Peter laughed at the accusations and merely condemned Kochubey to death when he added other insinuations against the loyalty of the hetman. Kochubey was probably right. Mazepa ardently desired to see Ukraine free but he was too well aware of the abuses of the past to risk a struggle under the old manners and customs of the hetmanate. He apparently had convinced himself and his friends that Ukraine could only recover its liberty under an absolute monarch and he intended to be that man.

In the meanwhile the Northern War had broken out, and this radically changed the situation. Charles XII, a man of superb military talent and a ruthless desire to employ it, had inherited the Swedish army at a time when Sweden, as a result of the Thirty Years War, was one of the great powers of Europe. In 1700 he attacked Russia and badly defeated Peter at the battle of Narva. Then he wasted the next years in trying to depose August II, King of Poland, and replace him with Stanislas Leszczynski, a move in which he had the support of all the anti-Russian factions of Poland. This alliance of the King of Sweden and one faction of the Poles against the Tsar of Russia and the King of Poland opened new vistas to the Kozaks, who had not forgotten the negotiations between Khmelnitsky and the Swedes during the great Kozak revolt of a half century earlier.

Intermittent hostilities between the forces of King August and the Kozaks of Paly, the leader of the Kozaks in Poland, led Paly to appeal for aid to Mazepa, but at the moment Peter was interested in maintaining relations with the King and he forbade Mazepa to interfere. Instead of that he offered himself to help in the suppression of Paly. This of course displeased Mazepa for he had hopes of bringing Western Ukraine under his control, but again he was compelled to wait.

Finally in 1704 Peter ordered Mazepa to enter Western Ukraine to subdue the Polish nobles friendly to Charles. Mazepa obeyed in his own special way to aid the Kozaks. However, he distrusted the influence of Paly, who represented more democratic traditions, arrested him and reported to Peter what was probably the truth: that Paly was in touch with the Swedes. He replaced him with one of his own relatives, a Colonel Omelchenko, and finally this man was accepted by the Kozaks of the west and still more warmly by the population of the various towns. However, in 1707 Peter ordered him to restore Western Ukraine to Polish rule. This Mazepa was unwilling to do, although instead of open disobedience to the Tsar’s order, he made all kinds of excuses and promises, and evaded action.

Mazepa had apparently already made up his mind to strike for the independence of Ukraine, if Charles showed any sign of success. The war was dragging on and Charles, true to his character, was dashing hither and yon through Europe, wasting his troops, winning victory after victory but not concentrating on any definite policy. The Kozak hetman therefore opened some sort of negotiations with Stanislas Leszczynski, and through him he could of course reach Charles. Yet he was so overcautious that he kept even his closest friends from knowing of his plans and continued to strengthen his bonds with Peter.

This policy could not fail to overreach itself. On the one hand the Kozaks knew only of his apparent devotion to the cause of the Tsar and those officers and men who were most hostile to Peter steadily lost confidence in him. On the other hand he could not rally any wide classes to his standards nor could he take the most elementary steps for moving his own troops into advantageous positions for the coming struggle. Perhaps he believed that he had only to give the order and all the Kozaks would spring to arms in his behalf. If so, he was badly mistaken, for his whole policy had alienated a large part of the Kozak forces and he could not appeal to them as easily as could the older hetmans who had tried to keep in close contact with the masses of the Host.

The sequence of events is still uncertain, but after a year of this double play, Charles suddenly turned his attention back to Russia and attacked Peter from Lithuania, not far from the Ukrainian border. His original plan seems to have been to seize Smolensk and march on Moscow, while General Loewenhaupt attacked from Livonia. Suddenly, as winter was coming on, Charles turned south into Ukraine.

Mazepa now could realize the evils of his excessive caution. Peter, at the first attack, had ordered a large part of the Kozak regiments moved into Lithuania and had sent a Russian army into Ukraine to protect Mazepa and his officers from the hatred of the Ukrainians, something for which Mazepa had previously begged. This left him in an impossible position and did not strengthen Charles, for the very troops that might have swelled the size of the Swedish army were where they could not be easily reached and the Russians were in the very heart of Mazepa’s territory.

Still it was now or never. There was the one chance that Charles might defeat the Russian army in the first encounter. If he did, Mazepa would have won his game of freeing Ukraine from both Russia and Poland, for Sweden was willing to promise them complete independence and Leszczynski and the Polish magnates were not in a position to oppose this. If Charles failed for lack of Ukrainian help, the fate of Ukraine was sealed. Mazepa could remain loyal to Peter but he would have to resign all thought of liberating his country and becoming an independent ruler.

It hardly seems possible that Mazepa invited Charles to spend the winter in Ukraine, before he threw off the mask of allegiance to Peter. If he did, it certainly reflects upon his understanding of the military situation and it was a poor move on the part of Charles, although he might hope that he could receive more supplies and have better winter quarters in Ukraine than further to the north.

Mazepa took the chance. He secretly set what troops he had in motion and led them to the camp of Charles before any of them were aware that a revolt was going on. Peter took immediate action and sent a Russian force to burn Baturyn, the capital of Mazepa, massacred the garrison and destroyed a large part of his supplies. This made it very difficult for the hetman to rally to his standards large numbers of the Kozaks and to spread the revolt far and wide through the Ukrainian lands.

During the winter both Peter and Mazepa engaged in large scale propaganda. The former denounced Mazepa as a Pole and a Catholic and ordered the Kozak officers to meet at Hlukhiv and elect another hetman. This time he designated Ivan Skoropadsky. He also won back several of the officers who had gone with Mazepa to the Swedish camp. For his part, Mazepa sent word through the whole of Ukraine that he was now determined to free Ukraine once and for all from Muscovite domination and he urged all Ukrainian patriots to rally to his cause.

The Tsar further ordered the authorities of the Orthodox Church to utter anathemas against Mazepa and the Church willingly complied, although Mazepa had been their most munificent donor during his entire period as hetman. Mazepa’s estates were confiscated and distributed to the officers who had remained loyal and the townspeople humbly assured Peter of their fidelity. In a word it was very difficult to stir up effective revolt, so carefully had Mazepa covered his steps and negotiations in advance of his declaration of rebellion.

His main success lay in winning over the Kozaks of the Zaporozhian Sich. These doughty fighters for the old rights of the Host had long been opposed to Mazepa and to his policy of favoring the Tsar. They had been opposed also to the introduction of serfdom or practical serfdom in the country. Nevertheless, when they saw that the hetman had taken the final step, the Sich began to swing toward the side of Mazepa and Charles, and soldiers soon began to arrive in the Swedish camp. Yet their aid was not as important as it would have been a century earlier, for the Sich too had lost much of its original glory and prowess. There were no longer the abundant supplies of arms and artillery that had been there in the days when the Kozaks gathered and prepared their expedition against whoever seemed the most profitable foe.

Charles moved southward toward the Sich but he was held up at Poltava, which refused to surrender to him. In the meanwhile the Russian armies in Ukraine had attacked and captured the Sich by treachery and then, in defiance of the terms of surrender, massacred and tortured a large part of the garrison. The rest escaped into Tatar territory and set up a Sich near the mouth of the Dnyeper.

The final battle took place at Poltava on July 8, 1709. It was a crushing defeat for Charles, whose troops had been worn down by years of fighting and by lack of proper winter quarters. The Swedish and Kozak forces were cut to pieces and only a handful, including Charles and Mazepa, succeeded in escaping into Turkey. Here they were practically imprisoned by the Turks, while the Sultan deliberated whether or not to accept Russian offers of a handsome ransom to have the fugitives turned over to them. Charles was finally released and obliged to quit Turkey. Mazepa lived only a few months and then died.

The officers with him still did not lose hope. They elected Philip Orlyk to be the new hetman and made plans to draw up a formal constitution for the Host. This was far more in accordance with Western standards than had been the old informal system of administration, for it provided for a regular governmental body to be composed of the officers, delegates elected by the ordinary Kozaks and still others selected by the Sich. The measure also provided those limitations on the power of the hetman that experience in the Western countries had found useful. Thus the hetman was no longer to control all the finances of the Host but would have his own source of income, and the treasurer would handle the general funds, subject only to the general assembly or staff. Of course this remained only a paper constitution, for Orlyk and his friends were never allowed to return home.

They continued to hope, however, that relations between Russia, Turkey and Sweden would develop in such a way that Ukraine would regain its independence. The Swedes promised to treat Ukraine as an independent country, but their own strength had been exhausted. Turkey seemed more promising, especially after Peter and his forces were surrounded by the Turks near the Pruth. Once again bribery saved the day and the Turks, who had Peter definitely in their power, released him and signed a treaty that appeared to satisfy Ukrainian aspirations but which in reality gave increased power to Russia.

The battle of Poltava and the fall of Mazepa definitely crushed the hopes of Ukraine and established the supremacy of Moscow, which now formally and officially accepted Russia as its new name. It was the last great attempt of the Ukrainians under the Russian Empire to attain their freedom and it had failed disastrously. Perhaps it hastened the destruction of the Kozak rights, but these had already been so whittled away by amendments to the Treaty of Pereyaslav carried through by imperial edict that the end could not have been long in coming.

More important than that, the Russian government held Mazepa up as an outstanding example of a traitor. The Russians could carefully edit the career of Khmelnitsky and give him certain praise for his signing of the fatal treaty. In Mazepa they had a clear opportunity to vilify the unfortunate leader and to label all Ukrainians who henceforth sought freedom for their country as Mazepintsy, followers of Mazepa, with the definite implication that he was false to the great destiny of the Ukrainians: to be submerged in the great mass of the Empire and to abandon all their traditions and ideals.

It is small wonder that the tradition of the hetman has lived on among the Ukrainians, and that they are willing to glorify him. Mazepa represented a last phase in Ukrainian development. Unfortunately, he was unable to solve the problem. The general trend of the seventeenth century had drawn a constantly wider gulf between the officers and the masses of the Kozaks and the civilians. Mazepa knew no way of organizing the country after the disastrous experiences of his predecessors except by adopting an anti-democratic attitude and setting himself up as almost an absolute ruler. His environment and his training had taught him to act by devious paths and he dallied too long before he took the final step. Had he acted earlier and more firmly in connection with the Swedes, he might have achieved his goal.

Yet in another sense his doom was necessary. It was not until the constitution drawn up by Orlyk in exile that there emerged a clear idea in the minds of the Kozak leaders as to their relationship with the masses of the Ukrainians. Too long had the Sich and the hetmans sought to remain purely a military body without political implications. The need for organizing a Ukrainian state had seemed to them less immediate than the defending of the military rights of the Kozaks. In their political inexperience, they had neglected again and again opportunities that were really priceless. It was not until it was too late that they grasped the responsibilities of their position and freed themselves from their narrow political outlook.

If Khmelnitsky was really the architect of Ukrainian conscious independence, then it was Mazepa and his followers who definitely cast away all hope of continuing the old ambiguous situation. It would have been one thing to have done this in the middle of the seventeenth century. It was quite different to undertake it in the eighteenth against such a Tsar as Peter. Mazepa’s only hope was to lay a broad foundation for his movement, to prepare a real basis for a national revolt. This was not in the spirit of the man; it was not practical in the face of the agents of Peter and of the murmuring and dissensions that still lingered on among many of the Kozaks. As a result, Mazepa became a really romantic figure, risking everything on what was almost certainly a lost cause, which only a miracle could have turned into victory. Yet that miracle was near at many moments and it was another tragedy of the Ukrainian people that they were not able to grasp the right moment, make the right moves and bring themselves to final independence.

The fall of Mazepa marks the end of the Kozak wars and of the political significance of the Kozak Host. It marks within the Russian Empire the ending of a phase of history, turbulent but romantic and heroic to the last degree. It marks also the passing of the Ukrainian movement from a purely military enterprise to the modern political and economic struggle that it was to be in the future. At the same time the followers of Mazepa began to raise the Ukrainian question in the chancelleries and thought of Western Europe.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SPREAD OF KIEVAN CULTURE IN MOSCOW

At the very moment when Moscow was pursuing its consistent policy of reducing Ukraine to the level of a Muscovite province, it was falling just as steadily under the influence of Kievan culture. The monks and scholars of Kiev flowed in a steady stream to the northeastern capital and prepared the way for the transformations that were to be brought to their full fruition by Peter the Great in the early part of the eighteenth century. It is not too much to say that every scholar or literary man of Moscow during the eighteenth century was of Ukrainian origin or had been largely trained in the Academy of Kiev.

The reason is not far to seek. During the period of subjection to the Tatars, the culture of Moscow and the general mode of life came under a marked oriental influence. After the liberation of the country, conditions changed little, despite the marriage of Tsar Ivan III with Sophia Paleolog of the royal house of Byzantium. Now and then there might be some slight influence from the west brought in, as was the case when an Italian architect was employed to remodel the Kremlin, but such cases were relatively rare and for all practical purposes there was little interchange of goods or ideas with Europe.

The Muscovites of the day were not desirous of opening their country to foreign influences. Their national pride had worked out the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome, the capital of the Christian Orthodox empire par excellence, and they stubbornly believed that any contact with the outside world or the new learning could only lead to the development of heresy and the marring of the pristine virtue of their Orthodox religion. The Patriarch of Moscow was forbidden to dine at the same table with foreigners, even of the highest rank, and the example was followed by all classes of the population.

Within the country formal education was at a low ebb. Education had never taken root at Moscow as it had in Kiev. There were not the direct connections with the outside world that had made the Grand Princes of Kiev part of the European family of nations. Moscow was a closed centre and the ideas of intellectual regimentation had gone so far that in the religious disputes of the sixteenth century, it could seriously be advanced that the writing of a book on theology was prohibited by the Seventh Oecumenical Council and that the preparation of any work was necessarily heretical.

The Muscovites despised the Greeks, even though they were Orthodox, and they had little more respect for the scholars of Kiev. There are very few records of attempts made by the Tsars of Moscow to secure Greek scholars from Constantinople during these centuries, at the time when the Ukrainian princes and brotherhoods were only too willing to have Greek teachers in their schools and were trying to raise the intellectual level of the clergy and the other classes of the population. It goes without saying that Moscow regarded Poland and Lithuania, with their Catholic culture, as worse than pagan and refused to have any relations with them.

The outstanding example of an attempt to secure a scholar from abroad was the case of Maxim the Greek, who was invited to Moscow to correct the Church books in the reign of Tsar Vasily III. The attempt was disastrous to the poor Greek, for even the slightest change in the books seemed to be ominous to the Muscovites and Maxim found himself in prison for many years.

The only city included in the Muscovite Tsardom in which there was any attempt to develop independent thought was Novgorod, which as a trading centre had maintained connections with the Hanseatic League; but even the efforts of the Archbishops of Novgorod were received with little favor in the self-satisfied Moscow.

Yet everyone in Moscow who went from one Church to another was well aware that during the ages there had occurred mistakes in the Church books, errors of copying, slight interpolations, even cases of corruption which destroyed the sense of the passages. What was to be done? The recognition of the need for some correction of the books was blocked by the impossibility of accepting any standard for the work. For nearly a century there went on a sterile debate on the subject and at the end of that time there was still no agreement as to the texts which should be taken as models. The nationalistic Muscovite leaders absolutely refused to accept any Greek texts, even though it was generally agreed that the Church Slavonic services had been translated from the Greek, for in their eyes the fall of Constantinople had seriously damaged the Orthodox character of even the oldest Greek texts and it was beneath the dignity of the Third Rome to learn from outsiders. As the last and greatest of these leaders, Avvakum, proudly declared at his trial before the Eastern Patriarchs in 1666, it was their duty to come and learn from Moscow rather than to pass judgment upon any Muscovites, for they alone possessed the true faith and a Christian and Orthodox autocrat.

It is impossible to overemphasize this ingrown character of Muscovite culture and thought in the sixteenth century. Xenophobia was the order of the day and even such a tsar as Ivan the Terrible who allowed Germans and other foreigners to come in small numbers to Moscow could not defy the will of the boyars and the masses and accept foreign ideas.

The Troublous Times that followed the death of Boris Godunov and saw the occupation of the Kremlin by a Polish army showed, however, to some of the intelligent Muscovites that all was not well at home. They realized that Moscow would sooner or later be compelled to accept some elements of Western and contemporary culture or the state would be in serious danger. They realized that it would be impossible to make progress at the expense of Poland and Lithuania, if they maintained this deliberate exclusion of all foreign ideas, and a steadily increasing number of men determined in one way or another to change the situation.

The leading spirit of this group was Nikon, who was destined in 1652 to become the Patriarch of Moscow. No less overbearing and haughty than had been his predecessors, Nikon was intelligent enough to know that something had to be done and done rapidly, if disaster was to be averted and in this he had the sympathetic backing of Tsar Alexis.

It was only natural that they should turn with sympathetic interest to Kiev, for the revival of Ukrainian culture appealed to them in various ways. They were well aware of the bitter feud that was going on in Ukraine between the Orthodox and the followers of the Union and they had hopes of bringing Ukraine under their own domination. There was something attractive in the Orthodoxy of Kiev and they could dream of Moscow as an Orthodox Slav state accepting support from other Orthodox Slavs when it galled them to appeal directly to the Greeks. Besides that, there was a group of the Orthodox in Kiev whose religious antagonism to the Catholics overshadowed any questions of Ukrainian patriotism. As early as 1626, some of these monks had broached the idea of a union with Moscow, and exactly as they in a later time tended to facilitate the submission of the Kozaks to Moscow, so they dreamed that they might tap the more abundant resources of that state for intellectual accomplishments and perhaps for personal aggrandizement.

Yet there was no doubt that any such rapprochement would be stubbornly contested by the masses of the Muscovite population and by many of the boyars and nobles. It required all the power of an autocratic monarch and ruthless force to carry through even the slightest correction of the books and the introduction of any ideas that were at variance with the traditional Muscovite mode of life. Throughout the entire seventeenth century, the Old Believers, as they were called, adopted the most desperate methods of opposition. Mass suicides of people who objected to living under the regime of Antichrist took place. The streltsy, the guards of the tsar, rose in armed revolt and the Don Kozaks burst out in several waves of destructive fury as they demanded the preservation of the old faith and the beard. It was undoubtedly this furious attitude of fanaticism that prevented any close relations between the Kozaks and the revolt of Stenka Razin or between Mazepa and the revolt of Bulavin in the days of Peter the Great.

It was probably more than a coincidence, however, that the first serious invitations to Kievan scholars to come to Moscow coincided with the beginning of the revolt of Khmelnitsky. In 1649, Tsar Alexis, under the influence of Nikon, invited the Metropolitan of Kiev to send Arseny Satanovsky and Damaskin Ptitsky to Moscow to translate the Bible. Ptitsky went later, but he was replaced on this mission by Epifany Slavinetsky who remained in Moscow to the end of his life. Nikon and his friends were undoubtedly as much aware of the possibilities of securing control of Ukraine, if Poland were to be disintegrated, as they were of the aid that they would receive in intellectual matters from the Kiev scholars.

A year before this, in 1648, there had appeared in Moscow an edition of the grammar of Melety Smotritsky, which had been first published in Kiev in 1619. This work, entitled The Correct Construction of the Slav Grammar, represented an attempt to purify the Church Slavonic language from some of the more glaring elements of popular speech which had been absorbed during the past years, and so represented exactly that attitude of the Kievan school which was working against the acceptance of the ordinary speech as the written norm. Yet it gave the general Ukrainian system of pronunciation and when it was taken to Moscow, it was used almost exclusively for over a century as the standard grammar, not only for Ukrainians but also for Muscovites and Southern Slavs, with notes carefully added so that the Muscovite scholars could make the necessary corrections to make the language and teachings of Smotritsky fit Great Russian. The work continued in popularity and was one of the main models in the eighteenth century when Lomonosov arranged his grammar.

A little later Pamva Berinda published in 1627 a Slave-norossian Lexikon and Interpretation of Names, which after the work of Lavrenty Zizany marked the best attempt at a dictionary.

All these books served as a basis for the work of Slavinetsky and his companions when they appeared at Moscow, for they represented at least an effort on the part of the Kiev Academy to provide the Church Slavonic language which they were teaching and using with the same kind of material aids that existed for Polish and Latin and the other languages of the West. Nothing of the sort existed in Moscow. It was not desired by the Muscovite bookmen, who devoted themselves to an unintelligent repetition of already known data from a purely religious training.

Year by year Slavinetsky and the other Kievan scholars toiled on in Moscow against the steadily repeated accusation that their Orthodoxy was suspicious because they knew Polish and Latin. When Nikon appointed a Kievan scholar to a commission for reforming the Church books and it was discovered that the man had once studied at Rome, there broke out an open torrent of denunciation of Kiev and even of Patriarch Nikon, for daring to employ for Orthodox purposes a person who had actually been in a Catholic atmosphere.

Nikon understood that he could not carry through his reforms of the Church books without the aid of the Kievan scholars, and he made every effort to attract more and more of them to Moscow. Practically the entire increase in theological writing there was due to their assistance, and they colored with their ideas and the Orthodox scholasticism which had been developed at Kiev all the intellectual outlook of the Great Russians.

At first these Kievan monks busied themselves in Moscow only with purely religious writings. Thus Epifany Slavinetsky prepared over 150 works, most of which consisted of translations from the Bible and the writings of the Church Fathers and also of short introductions to various sacred writings which he translated. This was all that could be developed at first in view of the prejudices of the Muscovites.

It was not long, however, before these Kievan scholars gradually undertook to introduce to the court of Alexis all the various forms of literature which were practiced in Kiev and elsewhere in Ukraine. As we have seen, the Kiev Academy had a very limited theological outlook. It was more interested in maintaining the Orthodox faith and in carrying on polemical disputes with the Polish Catholics than it was in building up a high and widely varying secular culture. It imitated and put into Orthodox form the already antiquated scholasticism of Poland, which was itself all too often a pale reflection of what had been done in western Europe a few centuries earlier. The old miracle plays were reworked, comic and sometimes coarse scenes were added to suit the manners of the time, little interludes were composed, and there sprang up a rather uninspired but still active school of drama illustrating biblical themes and filled with moralizing and didactic teaching. It was in general a picture of the European literatures in the late Renaissance, without that spark of life and genius that had lifted English, French and Italian literatures to the heights of the sixteenth century and it was far below what had been achieved by the Polish writers of the same century, and then neglected.

All this literature forms a dreary period but it was infinitely more advanced than was anything that was found in Moscow. As the various genres were made available in that capital, they seemed daringly novel to the younger Muscovites, who were blissfully unaware of how far Western Europe had advanced in recent decades. As a result there developed in the latter half of the seventeenth century a craze at Moscow for the Ukrainian literature of the day and Ukrainian monks and laymen who made their way to the Russian capital found themselves in constant demand. Ukrainian scholasticism dominated the reigns of Alexis and the following tsars, and students of Russian literature and history have often failed to emphasize the importance of this period as the first step in the Europeanization of the country.

We can take for example the career of Simeon Polotsky as typical of this era. He was born in White Ruthenia in 1629 as Simeon Emelyanovich Petrovsky-Sitnyanovich. Like most of the leading students of the day he was educated at Kiev and then became a monk in the city of Polotsk, whence his usual name. In 1664 he went to Moscow as a teacher and there he won the favor of the Tsar, was appointed tutor to the various children of the monarch and became practically the court poet of Moscow. Here he poured out a long and never ending stream of works, usually destitute of any real inspiration and all based on the models with which he had become acquainted in Kiev. He even used that peculiar Ukrainian adaptation of the Polish system of verse in which, after the French system, more attention was paid to the number of the syllables than to the accent of the metre or the words. Simeon also produced various mystery plays, as the Story of the Prodigal Son and the Tale of Nebuchadnezzar and the Three Children in the Fiery Furnace. The very titles give us a good picture of the contents and show us how far the drama and the poetry of the Kiev Academy were removed from the average life of the day. The interest in the poems and dramas of Simeon soon passed but we cannot overestimate his importance in awakening the minds of the Muscovites, for it was the reading of these poems well into the eighteenth century that inspired the first of the native born Russian poets, Mikhail Lomonosov, to undertake his work.

As the Russian hold upon Ukraine grew tighter, the number of educated Ukrainians who went into the service of Moscow steadily increased. They formed the overwhelming majority of Russian officials whose position required something more than dry and formal duties. They rose to high rank in state and church and it is interesting that the three outstanding clergymen of the reign of Peter the Great were all of Ukrainian origin and graduates of the Kiev Academy. They differed in many ways among themselves and also in their attitude toward Peter but they represented different sides of the Ukrainian and Kievan development.

The oldest of the three was Dmytro Tuptalenko, who was born in 1651. After receiving his education at Kiev, he spent several years in various monasteries, especially those which were the most rigid in upholding the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was during this period that he conceived the idea of writing a book on the lives of the Saints and of preparing a work to take the place of the older editions of the Chetyi Minei. After the forced submission of the Ukrainian Church, Dmytro became friendly with the Patriarch Joachim and undertook to secure the publication of his work. It was a very difficult task for there were many troubles with the ecclesiastical censors, which were not fully settled for over half a century. Finally he was called to Moscow and in 1703 he was made Metropolitan of Rostov, where he died in 1709. The writings of Dmytro Tuptalenko, who was later canonized by the Russian Church, were among the most attractive of the Kievan School. They included the Lives of the Saints, chronicles, and Christmas and Easter plays and they reveal their author as a sincere and deeply spiritual man, earnestly trying to do his best for his people.

The second of the three, Stefan Yavorsky, (1658–1722), was one of the men who were less interested in the Ukrainian problems and found it relatively easy to assimilate himself to the new situation which was confronting him. As Metropolitan of Ryazan and later the locum tenens for the Patriarch, Yavorsky opposed the reforms of Peter and his efforts to turn the Church into a mere department of the state; he even dared to criticize him for divorcing his first wife. On the whole, Yavorsky defended the traditional teachings of Orthodoxy as it was understood in Kiev and he represented that stalwart but narrow Orthodox scholasticism that had been developed by the school of Mohyla.

The third of this group was very different. Teofan Prokopovich, who was born in 1681, received his entire education after the Ukrainian Church had been forced to acknowledge the Patriarch of Moscow as its canonical head. After graduating from the Academy, Prokopovich became a Uniat and thus secured the possibility of a course in the College of St. Athanasius in Rome. This was an institution aiming to prepare talented young men for energetic propaganda on behalf of the Catholic Church among the Greeks and the Orthodox peoples. It gave Prokopovich a good acquaintance with the classical world and also with the post-Renaissance developments in Western Europe, and fitted him to take the lead in breaking from the older scholasticism. On his return to Ukraine in 1702, Prokopovich left the Union and became an Orthodox monk and a teacher in the Academy of Kiev. Here he commenced his writing with a drama on Volodymyr. The work was dedicated with the greatest compliments to Mazepa and was perhaps one of the first attempts to introduce the later pseudo-classic style. Yet it was intended also to be a glorification of Peter the Great. As soon as Mazepa rose in revolt and the battle of Poltava had been won by Peter, Prokopovich turned to him with new compliments and with the most unsparing denunciations of his former patron.

This naturally brought him into favor with Peter, who constantly relied more and more upon him, and finally made him Archbishop of Novgorod. It was in this capacity that he faithfully served the Tsar in drawing up the constitution that was to govern the Orthodox Church after the abolition of the Patriarchate. Prokopovich, whether from his experiences in Rome or otherwise, had become a bitter foe of the entire Catholic position and he turned with considerable ardor toward the Protestant theologians of northern Europe and especially of Germany. It was due to him that Peter was able to find ways of suppressing most of the activities of the Church through his control of the Holy Synod.

It is no exaggeration to say that from the period of the revolt of Khmelnitsky to the final triumph of the Western pseudo-classicism under Peter, a period of more than half a century, every sign of intellectual and progressive life in Moscow and the later Russia was the direct product of the scholars of Kiev. At the moment when Ukraine was losing its political rights and independence, it was taking cultural control of its conqueror. The youth of Moscow were being trained by Ukrainians, they were being taught for the most part in Ukrainian, they were learning to read Great Russian from Ukrainian texts and grammars, and they were learning to think along the lines that had been developed in Kiev. It was an amazing phenomenon and we can only wonder what would have happened, had the Kievan Academy early in the seventeenth century adopted a broader attitude toward worldly knowledge and toward the national cause.

As it was, the greater men of the Kievan school never came into contact with the world as it had developed in the West after the fall of Constantinople. They made no attempt to understand what was going on in England, France, and Germany, and they rested content to remodel their culture merely on the lines of the Polish-Jesuit schools. On the other hand, their ardent defence of Orthodoxy made them blind to the situation that was developing at home in the political field. It was undoubtedly not only a desire for personal aggrandizement that rendered them incapable of understanding the thoughts and the desires of their own people. It was not only deliberate selfishness that threw them into the arms of Moscow with the resulting confusion at home and the loss of those things which the intelligent part of the population valued so highly. It was rather a curious blindness which was perhaps inseparable from the circumstances under which the cultural revival had commenced in the sixteenth century.

Yet for the most part Moscow did not welcome their assistance. The native spirit of Moscow continued to regard the Kiev scholars not only as men of doubtful Orthodoxy but as foreigners in the full sense of the word. Even the extension of Russian rule over Ukraine did not reconcile the Muscovites to the giving of good positions in Church and state to the people of Kiev. The gap in the mentality of the two races was too complete. The gibes of the conservative Muscovites were answered by equal attacks from these scholars that the Muscovites were barbarians with no culture and no civilization and it was a long while before the mutual dislike was even toned down on the surface. It was to crop up again years later when Kotlyarevsky and his associates began the use of the Ukrainian language in literature, at the end of the eighteenth century.

It was in the field of theological education that Ukrainian and Kievan influence continued longest, for it was in this that the Academy of Kiev had found its chief interest. Elsewhere there was a speedier end, for the reforms of Peter called for the introduction of large numbers of Germans, Dutch and French into the service of Russia. They brought with them a new attitude toward life, new styles of dress and living, new manners of thinking which were alien to both Kiev and Moscow. St. Petersburg was from the beginning a place apart, where the old Muscovite traditions were securely hidden by the Western European facade.

Nevertheless, all through the eighteenth century, one is surprised by the number of talented Ukrainian gentlemen who appeared in the newly developed Russian literature. Those men, who had been able to move by reasons of their wealth and influence in the higher circles of life in the old Ukraine, found themselves attracted to the new learning at St. Petersburg. They joined in the steady outflowing of the new literature and even though they no longer had the monopoly of learning, they formed a by no means negligible group in the life of the northern capital.

Yet it is to be noted that at the same time, the Holy Synod, like the preceding patriarchs, was constantly on the lookout lest the Kievan school show too much independence of thought and action. The leaders of Moscow and later of St. Petersburg still cherished too much of the old xenophobia that had characterized the Muscovite past. They made every attempt to limit the publications of the Kiev Academy and of other schools in Ukraine. They even held up for decades the printing of the works of St. Dimitry of Rostov (the Ukrainian Dmytro Tuptalenko). He might be declared a saint but that was no reason why his writings should not be regarded for style and language as something alien to the new regime. The situation was worse with lesser men and once Moscow had taken over the scholarship of Kiev, it was only eager that that source should not be available to create a new generation of independent thinkers that might re-Ukrainianize their own land and spread a new influence abroad.

The cultural successes of the Kievan scholars form a striking parallel and contrast to the failure of the Kozak Host to maintain and strengthen the political position and independence of Ukraine. The lack of political interest on the part of the scholars was as dangerous to the normal intellectual development of Ukrainian culture as were the unbridled dissensions of the men of action. Had the two groups worked together along the same lines and toward the same goals as they had done at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries, it is quite likely that the history of Ukraine would have contained more bright and fewer gloomy chapters, for the intelligence and the ideas which might have made the state modern and progressive were all torn away. The Ukrainization of Muscovite thought was a startling phenomenon. It could only be of passing importance in the great drama of history, but it remains as one of the great achievements of the work of the Ukrainian lords and the Brotherhoods, and it certainly strengthened those factors which enabled Ukraine to pass through the dark night of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

CHAPTER NINE

THE LAST ACTS IN POLAND

At the beginning of the seventeenth century nearly all of Ukraine was within the borders of Poland and the Polish King and the magnates were able to feel that Ukraine offered a purely Polish internal question. They were to be disillusioned. The formation of the Church Union and the Ukrainian cultural revival, together with the actions of the Kozak Host, proved that the Polish state as then constituted could not master the problem. The revolt of Khmelnitsky and his placing of the Host under the supremacy of the Tsar definitely established Ukraine as an international problem, perhaps the greatest in Eastern Europe.

Poland had a last chance at the time of the Union of Hadiach in 1658, when it seemed for a moment as if Ukraine would enter along with Poland and Lithuania into a new tripartite form of government. It was not to be. The Kozaks were not willing to back Vyhovsky in his undertaking, the Polish King and magnates had learned nothing, and the scheme fell through. Instead there was made between the King and the Tsar the Treaty of Andrusivo in 1667 whereby Ukraine was definitely divided along the Dnyeper and Kiev passed into Muscovite hands.

As we have seen, the struggle continued and Ukraine was cruelly devastated. More and more the Kozak Host was driven to the eastward and a large part of the Ukrainian lands in Poland lost contact with it. The last endeavor of the Kozaks came during the hetmanship of Mazepa, when Paly had endeavored to unite what was left of it in Poland with the main forces of the Kozaks.

Poland was steadily falling into ruin. The Kings were no longer able to govern, except on paper, and during the eighteenth century, Russian and Swedish armies were constantly marching across her territory. The King and the magnates were only too ready to be peaceful, provided they were not asked to fight for themselves or for any else. It might have seemed an ideal time for a Kozak movement, but the main body of the Host had been so punished after the defeat of Mazepa, that it could give no support to the Kozaks in Poland. Step by step the Host vanished from the Polish lands. It was consistently deprived of its possible supports and from the early part of the eighteenth century, it ceased to play any role in Polish affairs.

Lviv had been one of the centres of the Ukrainian cultural revival, but this too languished under the new conditions. By now there were practically no noble families that continued to support the Orthodox Church. The Poland of the late seventeenth century was no longer interested in the welfare of its own cities. Trade and commerce were hampered in every way by the senseless quarrels of the magnates and the szlachta and by the impotence of the Diet to take any action for the good of the state and the improvement of economic conditions. As a result the Brotherhoods which had played such an important part in Ukrainian life a few years earlier, no longer had the income that would permit them to continue their old scale of activities. The schools which they had supported languished and were finally closed, while the Polish government worked to accelerate the process of their dissolution.

The formal division of the country in 1667 and the addition of Kiev to the Muscovite lands, foreshadowed the diminution of the power of the Orthodox in Poland. When the Tsar was putting pressure upon the Sultan of Turkey to have the Patriarch of Constantinople formally transfer the Metropolitan of Kiev and his subordinate dioceses to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow, the Poles considered it time to act. In 1676 they forbade the Orthodox in case of dispute to appeal to the Patriarch and they demanded that all Orthodox cases be tried in Polish courts. They placed the Brotherhoods under the control of their bishops and the Polish courts and forbade the Orthodox to leave or re-enter the country. Such measures, far more drastic than those of a century earlier, aroused hostility but no revolt, for the Orthodox Church, except in a few areas, was now too weak to do more than present ineffectual protests. It was now unable to stage those mass demonstrations that fifty years before had revived a threatened hierarchy and under Kozak protection raised it to new heights of power.

The next act was the elimination of Orthodoxy almost entirely from the bulk of the Polish lands, especially in Western Ukraine where the process of Polonization had gone furthest. The work of inducing the people of this area to accept the Union was accomplished largely through the efforts of Josef Shumlyansky, (1643–1707), the Archbishop of Lviv. Shumlyansky had very early in his career accepted the Union. He was doubtless an able, if hardly spiritual, man. He had taken part in various military campaigns and he was later, after his acceptance of the bishopric, wounded at the siege of Vienna, the last great exploit of Polish arms. He was also a skilful diplomat and served on many missions for the King. He profited by the Treaty of Andrusivo to have himself nominated by the King as the administrator of those lands of the Kiev metropolitan that still remained in Poland. All in all, he gathered under his own control all those Orthodox threads that still served to hold together a dying movement. Yet he felt that time was playing on his side and when the King, in 1680, attempted to expedite the Union by calling a council similar to the one in Brest a century earlier, Shumlyansky refused to attend. However, he secretly notified the King and the Roman Catholic authorities that his return to Orthodoxy from the Union was not a sign of altered interests. He won the confidence of the authorities and for twenty years he undermined the Orthodox Church by appointing only secret partisans of the Union to the more responsible posts. When he felt himself strong enough to come out into the open, he was ably seconded by the other bishops and the elimination of the Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine was an accomplished fact. Neither the Brotherhoods nor the nobles were able to resist the movement and that undertaking which had been so disastrous to the Polish state a century earlier was carried through as a well-prepared scheme by a Polish government that was already losing its control of events.

Even the Brotherhood of Lviv, though it continued the struggle, was no longer able to protest effectively. Shumlyansky established his own printing press and this deprived the Brotherhood of its source of income, for it had formerly had a monopoly of printing in Church Slavonic and exported many books to the rest of Ukraine, a trade that had been cut off by the actions of Moscow. Finally, when the Swedes besieged the city in 1704, the Brotherhood was compelled to contribute an enormous sum to the ransom demanded. By these and many other acts of annoyance, it was finally ruined and in 1708 it too accepted the Union.

Thus the two pillars of support of the Ukrainian revival, the cultural work of the Brotherhoods and the power of the Kozaks, were both liquidated in Poland, and Western Ukraine was put entirely at the mercy of the Polish government. The nobles had long since become Polonized and the eighteenth century is a sad period when there seemed even less hope of a revival than there had been in the sixteenth.

All that seemed to be left of the old movement was the fanatic faith of the peasant serfs, who clung to their Orthodox religion and their native traditions. Yet what could they effect under the conditions of the time?

They could merely grumble and at times break out into desperate revolts. Particularly in the eastern parts of the country and along the Hungarian and Moldavian borders there was a constant state of unrest headed by the Haydamaks. The name apparently comes from a Turkish word for brigand, but the Haydamaks were no ordinary bandits. They were a manifestation of that tendency that had earlier produced the original Kozaks, and had developed in the Ottoman Empire the various Chetniks and other groups which fought stubbornly and often without definite plan for the welfare of the enslaved populations. They could always rely upon the sympathy and protection of the peasants in their raids upon the manor houses and the Jewish merchants who worked for the nobles, for throughout the entire area the collapse of the Kozak movement had brought back the great estates that had existed before the time of Khmelnitsky and the landlords were even more tyrannical and overbearing than they had been before. Their demands for money to supply their western tastes were greater and life was almost impossible for their unfortunate underlings.

It was small wonder then that the peasants welcomed the incursions of armed bands to burn and to plunder their oppressors. The result was a wild and turbulent period which made life dangerous but which could not offer, as had the Kozak Host, any prospect of improvement. The Haydamak bands rarely united except for some major operation. The leaders were even more torn by mutual feuds than had been the old Kozak organization, which had been on the way to achieving a stabilized organization.

The Zaporozhian Sich, which had returned to Russian territory after a short stay in Turkey, was also only a shadow of its former self. Nevertheless now and again some particularly bold Haydamak leader would get in touch with the Sich and detachments of Kozaks would swarm across the unprotected border to aid them, and in case of defeat the Haydamaks would go back with the Zaporozhians. Yet this no longer had the same force as when the Kozaks would dare to defy even the Sultan of Turkey. The world was becoming settled and the social order had no real place for these doughty champions of liberty and independence.

The Orthodox Ukrainians had still enough power and energy to rise up in short but furious revolts. Yet these usually lacked any directive purpose and spent themselves in savagery, without the formulation of any definite plan or purpose. They were usually called forth not only by the deplorable conditions of the people but they were abetted for the purposes of Russia in order to punish Poland and interfere with her affairs.

This was the case with the revolt of the Haydamaks in 1734. Poland was in turmoil after the death of August II. The Russian Empress Anna was backing August III for his father’s post, while many of the anti-Russian nobles were trying again to place Stanislas Leszczynski on the throne. Under such conditions Russian armies, together with detachments of Kozaks, were invading the country. Rumors, perhaps spread by the Russian commanders, had it that the Russians and Kozaks were coming to expel the Polish landlords and to free Ukraine as in the days of Khmelnitsky. It was only a rumor but the peasants took it seriously and rose in revolt throughout the eastern provinces. This was especially marked in the province of Braslav, where the Russian commander had actually asked the nobles supporting August to send their Kozak retainers to help the Russians. On the strength of this, Verlan, who commanded the Kozaks of Prince Lubomirski, embroidered his fancies and declared that Anna had ordered a rising, so that the peasants could become Kozaks and join the Hetman state. Armed with this, he raised a considerable army and set out to plunder the nobles’ estates.

In the middle of the spreading fire, the city of Danzig, the chief base of Leszczynski, fell to the Russians and August III ascended the throne. There was no longer any need of rousing the peasants against the Poles. As a result the Russian troops were at once put at the service of the Polish King and the nobles to suppress the uprising. Once the peasants had realized that the Russian army was backing their enemies and not themselves, the movement quickly subsided and the peasants had nothing to do but to return to their former serfdom. Those who were unwilling to do this or were too deeply involved to feel safe made their way to the Sich or into Wallachia and joined the more or less permanent Haydamak bands.

Disorders continued during the following years but not on a sufficiently large scale to influence the general course of events. It was not until the revolt of the Kolii in 1768 that the fires of unrest flared up violently and again the revolt followed the same course as that of 1734. It is only remarkable because the grandfather of Shevchenko served in it and his tales induced the great poet to compose his longest narrative epic, the Haydamaki.

The eternal controversies between the Orthodox and the Uniats were the spark that set off this turmoil. In 1760 there broke out renewed fighting in the Polish parts of the province of Kiev as the Uniats tried to force the Orthodox to join them and the Orthodox, under the backing of the abbot of the Motronin Monastery, refused. Violence followed violence on both sides and the Orthodox sexton of Mliiv was murdered. At the request of the people of the area he had hidden the chalice of the local church. He was accused by the Uniats of using it for purposes of orgies, and was publicly tortured by them and put to death.

Even then these disturbances would have followed the normal course, had it not been for the Confederation of Bar, when the Pulaskis, including Casimir who was to die as a general in the American Army, raised the standard of revolt against Russian interference in Polish affairs. Russian troops were moved into the Ukrainian area in the southeast and the peasants again jumped to the conclusion that Catherine the Great was encouraging them to revolt against their landlords. Maksym Zalyznyak, a Zaporozhian Kozak, led the revolt and when he and his bands marched toward Uman, they were joined by Ivan Gonta, captain of the Kozak retainers of the Potocki estate at Uman. There was a considerable massacre at Uman when the Kozaks and the Haydamaks took the town and other bands operated in the southern part of the province.

The outcome was the same. In June, the Confederates of Bar were forced to cross the Polish border into Turkey after being defeated by the Russian troops. The Russian commanders then willingly listened to the plea of Stanislas August Poniatowski for assistance. They invited the leaders of the revolt to meet them as if they were ready to give them more support, and then arrested them and turned them over to the Poles, where they received severe punishment. Some, including Gonta, were tortured to death.

Again the situation returned to normal. The Haydamaks continued their raiding on a small scale. There were the usual burnings of manor houses, and the killing of nobles, but none of the attacks called forth a wide movement on the part of the population. The mood of the people continued uneasy but there was no open struggle and in 1792 the division of Poland brought the Ukrainians directly under Russian control.

Yet during this century, which saw the definite triumph of the Union in Galicia and the downfall of the Orthodox Ukrainian organizations, there began to be signs of an astonishing metamorphosis in the thought of the Union. It had been initiated in the sixteenth century to break the power of the Ukrainian cultural revival among the Orthodox and to safeguard the Polish state against the Kozaks and their unbridled devotion to Orthodoxy. For nearly two centuries it had been generally understood that the members of the Union, in submitting themselves to the Papacy, were cutting themselves off from the Ukrainian cause. It had been confidently believed that the Union would swing ultimately into the Roman Catholic Church and that it would lose its identity in the mass of Catholic Poland, exactly as the nobles had done, when they became Polonized and Catholic. This had been the great argument of all the Orthodox and had been the cause of the bitterness that had existed between the two groups.

As Russia extended its control over Kiev and then abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, things began to change. The Russian censors arbitrarily banned many of the books which had been circulating among both Orthodox and Uniats and insisted on replacing them with books of the pure Russian type. The Uniats adopted a contrary policy. They continued to use the old traditional books, written or printed in the old traditional way. It gave them a strong hold on many sections of the Ukrainian population who could no longer look to Kiev for the writings to which they were accustomed. In many sections, especially in Galicia, the bulk of the population, once they had accepted the Union and their children had been brought up in the new environment, commenced to feel at home in it.

Some of the more enterprising and capable bishops of the Union spoke out very strongly against a further process of Latinization. For example, Bishop Shumlyansky who had played such a large part in winning over by guile or persuasion the population of Lviv and the Brotherhood of that city, was equally emphatic in his recommendations to his clergy to try to start parish schools and to build up the Ukrainian Uniat educational system. His work was watched and followed by many of the other bishops. The successes achieved were far scantier than had been those won by the Orthodox cultural movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but the seed was sown, although it was not to take effective root until after the division of Poland. A keen observer could have predicted by the middle of the eighteenth century that the Union was not only a means of disrupting the Orthodox but that it would in time take its place as a definite Ukrainian Church. The idea seemed preposterous at first sight, but with each new effort that was put forth the tendencies in this direction became more clear and the actions of the Austrian rulers after the division of the country worked strongly in this direction.

It thus happened that the very period that saw the ending in Poland of the old form of the Ukrainian problem witnessed another aspect of it that was to dominate the province of Galicia during the nineteenth century. The dream of using the Union to Polonize the country failed exactly as had the more direct methods that were employed before the Union, for the Union was in itself enrolled in the service of the Ukrainian cause, and it had its chance to be effective when Russian pressure was directed toward the suppression of that Ukrainian Orthodoxy that had been the first inspirer of the recovery of the national consciousness.

CHAPTER TEN

THE END OF KOZAK LIBERTIES

The disastrous outcome of the revolt of Mazepa gave to Peter the Great his opportunity. The battle of Poltava had definitely strengthened his position and that of Russia in Europe. It carried with it the definite weakening of Poland and made it clear that henceforth the Polish state would not be able even to cherish hopes of resisting the demands of the Russian Tsar. Thereby it freed him from any necessity of consulting the wishes of the Kozaks, who might in other cases have been tempted to resume their loyalty to the King. Besides that, the disloyalty of Mazepa had been so evident that Peter could have an open excuse for acting.

As soon as the old Hetman’s treason had been made clear, Peter ordered the Kozak officers to elect Ivan Skoropadsky in his place; but he already took care that the new hetman should not have the power of the old. Within two months, as soon as Charles had been defeated and it was possible for Peter to make far-reaching plans, he sent a Russian official, Izmaylov, to remain with the hetman “to be resident minister at the hetman’s court with the function of assisting him with ‘forceful’ advice in settling all issues, because of the recent rebellion in Little Russia and the Zaporozhian uprising.” Skoropadsky and all the Kozaks well knew what this meant, especially when the Tsar refused to allow a formal confirmation of the conditions of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. To make the significance still plainer, the Tsar moved the hetman’s capital to Hlukhiv near the Russian border and assigned two regiments of Russian troops to watch over the safety of the hetman and arrest him at the slightest suspicious sign.

This was a good beginning, for every one knew and realized that from that time on Skoropadsky would be hetman only in name. He and the Kozak officers would have to bear the brunt of any unpopular actions. The Kozaks would merely murmur at their own officers and the Russians could then step in to act as the champions of the masses and try to win them away from their allegiance to the Host. At the same time Peter very ostentatiously treated Skoropadsky with respect on the occasions of his state visits to the capital, and waited.

The building of the city of St. Petersburg and the various other works in the north, like the construction of the Ladoga Canal, demanded an abundance of labor. The Kozaks were in a way bound to government service and Peter summoned large numbers of them to the north, where they were compelled to labor under the most unhealthy conditions. They died by the thousands, and the Host the next year or on the return of the survivors was compelled to furnish other large contingents. Orlyk, who kept in touch with the situation from abroad, openly said that it was the object of Peter to exterminate the whole Host by these methods. He may have exaggerated Peter’s purpose but facts certainly seemed to support him.

At the same time Skoropadsky was not strong enough to maintain order at home. He was much under the influence of his wife and his friends. His son-in-law, whom he made army judge, indulged so extensively in bribery that Peter again felt himself called upon to intervene and in 1722, he appointed a Little Russian Board under Brigadier Velyaminov to supervise the administration of justice under the hetman. This act definitely transferred the most important functions of the Host in times of peace to the Russian commanders of the garrison in Ukraine. Even Skoropadsky protested against this last act, and the refusal of his petition so hurt the old man that he died a few months later.

In the meanwhile all the old vices that had existed in the Hetman state, of striving for the control of estates and land on the part of the officers, continued with increased energy. Peter saw to it that his favorites, like Menshikov, received large estates in Ukraine. He appointed Russian officers in the Kozak regiments and saw to it that they were richly rewarded, so that even the officers of the Hetman’s Council consisted largely of Russians and not of Ukrainians.

On hearing of the death of Skoropadsky, Peter followed the same tactics that he had used in disposing of the Patriarchate. He appointed Colonel Polubotok Acting Hetman with instructions to listen to Velyaminov, exactly as he had used Stephen Yavorsky to carry on the Patriarchate until the Holy Synod was ready to function. Then he transferred the responsibility for the Little Russian Board to the Senate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it had previously rested. It was another symbolic act in the elimination of all privileges on the part of the Kozak Host and the Ukrainian population, and was intended to show that the Ukrainians were only Little Russians and part of the Russian state. When the officers petitioned for the election of a new hetman, Peter postponed decision on the ground that all the hetmans had been traitors, except Khmelnitsky and Skoropadsky and he sent another agent to Ukraine to aid Velyaminov in securing evidence of Kozak dissatisfaction with their officers and in investigating the misdeeds of the latter.

He also summoned Polubotok to St. Petersburg so that the Acting Hetman could be near the Tsar. This made it more difficult for Polubotok, who was sincerely endeavoring to restore justice and discipline in the Host, to undertake any positive action. His efforts to do this merely made his position worse and when it was discovered that he was sending letters to Ukraine to tell the people how to act under the new investigations, Peter solved all problems by arresting and incarcerating him in the Fortress of Saints Peter and Paul in Petersburg together with Colonels Apostol and Miloradovich, who had been summoned also to the capital. Thus the governing body of the Kozaks and their most influential leaders were in prison, while Peter was planning his next step. Polubotok could not stand the new insults and he died in prison in the fall of 1724, just a few months before Peter himself passed away.

It is fair to presume that had Peter lived, he would ultimately have wiped out the Host. As Tsar he had no use for any factor in Russian life which reminded him too strongly of the past and which could find no parallel in Europe. The Kozak Host as the government of Russian Ukraine seemed to him superbly out of date. Its leaders still claimed to be entitled to the rights and liberties which they had enjoyed when they joined Moscow. They continued a military organization of the past and as Peter had abolished the old streltsy, the old Muscovite army, so he would the Kozaks.

The ambitious monarch had already realized one thing which perhaps had not impressed itself so deeply upon the Kozak officers. They were to a certain degree outmoded as a military force. His long struggle with Charles XII had shown him that the irregular cavalry of the past, the Kozak strength, was not so fitted to cope with the trained armies of Western Europe as they had been with the mobile cavalry of the Turks and Tatars. With Russia interfering more and more in European quarrels, Peter needed the manpower of Ukraine. He did not need the Kozaks and his practical mind was only too ready to believe that the Host was no longer of service. It could, however, be employed to advantage in the far southeast, and so thousands of Kozaks were sent there on practically constant military service, where again their losses were tremendous.

With the death of Peter, the era of rapid westernization spent its force. The Tsar’s successor and widow, Catherine I, with her favorite, Menshikov, did not have the energy of her late husband. She was not so permeated with the spirit of ruthless change and not so sure of her position that she could alienate large classes of the population. Difficulties were again appearing along the Turkish border and it seemed to the governing powers that the aid of the Kozaks might be useful, if hostilities broke out. Besides, the country was becoming dangerously underpopulated as a result of Peter’s inhuman methods, his excessive taxation, his deportations and his drawing off of thousands of Kozaks to practically certain death in the swamps of the north.

Catherine, too, soon died but Peter’s grandson, Peter II, who came to the throne in 1727, carried out the policy at the advice of Menshikov and later of Prince Dolgoruky. Once more the Kozak officers were allowed to elect a hetman, the aged Daniel Apostol, who had been released from the prison where Polubotok died. The Kozaks were given back some of their privileges but not all, for they were now to be allowed to elect a hetman only when the Tsar gave permission. Besides that, the general army court was to be composed of three Russians and three Ukrainians, and the treasury of the Host was to be administered by two treasurers, one a Russian and the other a Ukrainian. In time of war the Host was to be under the field marshal of the Russian army. The lower officers were to be nominated by the companies and appointed by the hetman, the regimental officers were to be appointed by the hetman, but the colonels and the officer’s council had to have the approval of the Tsar.

Apostol, who was over seventy years of age when he was elected to the post, did his best to revive the dignity of his position. He tried to arrange for the codifying of the Ukrainian laws and to prevent the Kozak officers from getting control of the lands still in the hands of the Kozaks. It was a difficult task because the constant assimilation of the position of the officers, first to the Polish nobles and then to the Russian, had started and continuously strengthened the demand that the officers act entirely like those of equal rank around them and this involved the lowering of the lesser Kozaks into serfdom.

It was during the hetmanate of Apostol that the Zaporozhian Kozaks who had fled into Turkey after the fall of Mazepa finally returned to the country and in 1734, they were allowed to resettle on the site of the Sich. They were now only 7000 in number, but they were to be used under their own officers in the guard of the border.

Meanwhile, in 1730, Anne had ascended the Russian throne as Empress. Anne left the control of the high positions in Petersburg almost entirely to German favorites but in general she approved the policies of Peter the Great, and the death of Apostol gave her the opportunity to renew the Little Russian Board, which was to consist of three Russians and three Ukrainians. The board was to be under the chairmanship of the Russian imperial resident, at first Prince Shakhovskoy. Shakhovskoy typified the harsher type of Russian administrator and constantly sought to be placed in complete control of Ukraine without any consideration of the rights of the Kozak officers. Although he did not succeed in this, the period became memorable in Ukrainian history for the harsh conduct of affairs, and the arrests of even the most important persons. The Metropolitan of Kiev and the city government of Kiev were all arrested on varying pretexts for desiring to maintain some part of their traditional rights.

In 1741, following the death of Anne and the removal of the baby Emperor, Ivan VI, Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter the Great, seized the throne after a palace revolution. It might have been presumed that she would continue her father’s policy, but she had a personal reason for changing it.

Elizabeth had been kept in retirement for many years and during this period she had met and fallen in love with a Ukrainian singer, Alexis Rozumovsky. The two were morganatically married and while Rozumovsky played no open role in Ukrainian affairs, he quietly influenced Elizabeth to look upon Ukraine with more sympathy and favor. She went with him on a trip through Ukraine in 1744 and at that time came into contact with the Officers’ Council. They assured her of their loyalty and petitioned for the election of a new hetman. She asked their leaders to Petersburg on the occasion of the marriage of her nephew, Peter of Holstein, to Catherine and then informed them that the new hetman would be Cyril Rozumovsky, the brother of Alexis, but that he was still being educated abroad and could not be considered for two years, when he would return to the country. She kept her word slowly. In 1747 the Senate was ordered to provide for the election of a new hetman, and in 1749, after Rozumovsky, who had been showered with various honors including the Presidency of the Academy of Sciences, had met the Kozak delegates and had visited Ukraine, the delegates were informed that an Imperial Minister was travelling to Ukraine to arrange for the election.

The election took place on February 22, 1750 and of course Rozumovsky was unanimously elected amid general rejoicing. Elizabeth, following this, officially invested him with the insignia of office, turned back the control of Ukrainian affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officially restored the Kozak rights as they had been in 1722 before Peter commenced his changes almost simultaneously with the death of Skoropadsky. Rozumovsky was made a Russian Field Marshal.

It might have seemed as if conditions of the past were back. But it was only an archaeological revival. Cyril Rozumovsky had the nominal and perhaps the real power of the preceding hetmans but Ukraine had greatly changed. In the past the hetmans, even if they had been elected under imperial orders, had been chosen from among the outstanding colonels of the Host. Rozumovsky was a young man, fond of pleasure, little skilled in administration and he owed his power entirely to the whim of Elizabeth, his more or less open sister-in-law. He had no desire to stay in Hlukhiv but spent most of his time in St. Petersburg where he frequented the court circles.

He left the administration of the country entirely in the hands of the Officers’ Council, which did its best to reorganize the administration after the changes that had been made during the reign of Anne. It was really a thankless task, for in the last analysis they had the job of remodeling an administration which had never been quite suited to its purposes.

The regimental areas still retained the purely military form, but the practical independence of the colonels separated them to a considerable degree from the Officers’ Council which handled the general affairs of the country. There were the same changes in the laws, whereby the smaller villages were theoretically under the army courts and the cities possessed their own courts, under the Magdeburg Law and the Lithuanian Law, both organized before the union of the Host and Russia.

The great difficulty was that during the eighteenth century there had vanished almost the last remnants of the old Kozak democracy. The power of Russia rested outside of the tsars and bureaucrats in the hands of the great landowners, and the Kozak officers loved to think of themselves as the gentry of Little Russia and acted accordingly. Yet they were still proud of many of their ancient liberties and the hetmanate of Cyril Rozumovsky allowed at least the officers to be happy and contented. As for the peasants they were on the whole no worse off than they had been for decades, so that this period had really some justification for seeming the best part of the eighteenth century.

It was however a period of cultural Russification. The abolition of the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church brought the teaching of the Academy of Kiev into a purely Russian system. The richer people preferred to send their children to the newer and more fashionable schools in St. Petersburg and other Russian centres, and there was repeated again what had happened in the sixteenth century, when the older Ukrainian aristocracy became almost completely Polonized and there were left only the Kozaks and the townsmen to carry the burden of the cultural revival. Now the higher Kozak officers had become the aristocratic element and were Russianized superficially at least, and the towns had lost most of their original importance.

The situation, such as it was, rested too largely upon the close bonds between Cyril Rozumovsky and Elizabeth. When she died in 1761, her nephew Peter III ascended the throne, only to be overthrown in a few months by his wife, Catherine, who then became Empress.

Catherine at once decided to standardize the government of the Empire and to this end she decided to abolish the local autonomies that had existed in various border provinces. This meant the actual elimination of all the Ukrainian rights and privileges and the placing of the Ukrainians on the same basis as the Great Russians. At the same time Cyril Rozumovsky, in his role as Colonel of the Izmailovsky Regiment, had been one of the men to whom she owed her throne at the time of her coup d’état and she did not wish at once to cast him out of his position. She therefore waited until she received a report that he was seeking to have the hetmanate made hereditary in his family.

It is not known definitely whether this proposal was put forward by some of the Officers’ Council in an endeavor to please him, whether he had engineered the move, or whether it was inspired by Teplov, who had accompanied him to Ukraine as his tutor and who was regarded as the spearhead of Russian influence during his hetmanate. Although the proposal was not signed by the officers, word of it was reported to Catherine and along with it were sent reports of the oppression of the peasants and ordinary Kozaks by their officers.

The Seven Years War, which saw the end of the French possessions in America and the rise of Prussia, ended in 1763. Then, with peace in Europe, 1764 proved another turning point in the complicated game that involved Russia, Poland, and Ukraine. In that year Catherine succeeded in forcing the election as King of Poland of Stanislas August Poniatowski, a former lover. His relatives, the Czartoryski Family, had hoped to put one of their number on the throne, but Catherine by her energetic use of Russian money and Russian troops definitely had her way and she could know with satisfaction that Poland would from that time on cause no trouble. Just as the weakening of Poland had caused the Tsars to increase their control of Ukraine, so the placing of a Russian puppet on the Polish throne justified Catherine in going further in Ukraine.

She accordingly requested the resignation of Rozumovsky. He postponed doing it as long as was practicable, but was finally compelled to yield and asked to be relieved of his difficult and dangerous office. This was accepted on November 10, 1764 and in return she gave him a pension of 60,000 rubles a year and allowed him to keep the vast estates that had formerly been connected with the post of hetman. She replaced him with a new Little Russian Board composed of four Russians and four Ukrainians, seated in order of seniority to show that there was no difference between the two peoples, and left the power in the hands of the governor general, Count Rumyantsev. At the same time she instructed Rumyantsev to give particular attention to the introduction of serfdom and to beware of the general dislike of the Kozak officers for Russia.

At almost the same period she remodelled the Land of Free Communes. This was the area to the east where Kozaks who were dissatisfied with the Hetman state took refuge, and which had been spontaneously organized into regiments by the population on the Kozak model. Various hetmans had tried to secure the annexation of this territory to the Hetman state, but the Tsars had persistently refused to allow it and had encouraged the settling of Russians in the same area. Catherine accordingly turned this into a definite province, abolished the Kozak regiments, replaced them with hussars and introduced the Russian system of taxation.

The restored Sich was the next to receive the attention of Catherine’s centralizing policy. She had early begun to colonize the south of Russia and she looked with envy at the lands occupied by the Kozaks. Yet they were still very useful whenever a Turkish war broke out. They fought with their usual bravery and received many honors for their courage both on land and sea. They might have expected some real sign of the gratitude of the Empress, but she was not interested in maintaining the organization despite its usefulness. It was in the way of Russian expansion.

Finally in 1775, she issued a conflicting statement that the Zaporozhians were neglecting the land and also were abandoning their past mode of life and permitting farmers to settle on their lands to raise grain. The truth seems to have been that the Kozaks, under their koshovy Peter Kalnyshevsky, were trying to develop their own land in their own way and were succeeding too well.

General Tökölyi was accordingly sent secretly with a large force of Russian troops and artillery to the Sich. When it was in position, Tökölyi peremptorily announced that the Sich was to be destroyed. The koshovy and several of the officers, including the chaplain, finally persuaded the Kozaks to yield without fighting, as many had wished to do. The fortress was razed on June 5 and the property was entirely turned over to the government.

Then as a curious aftermath of this, Kalnyshevsky and the other officers who had led the movement for surrender were all arrested. The koshovy himself was sent for imprisonment to the Solovyetsky Monastery in the far north where he lived until 1803 in solitary confinement and was allowed to leave his cell but three times a year. It was the last ungrateful act of the Empress.

The rest of the Kozaks who did not enter certain regiments were reduced to serfdom and the very name of the Zaporozhian Kozaks was ordered wiped out. Many of the Kozaks, however, succeeded in escaping into Turkey where the Turks allowed them to live near Ochakiv and about 7,000 soon gathered there. Later they were allowed to settle near the mouth of the Danube, but they were on the whole dissatisfied with life in the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, in 1783, Prince Potemkin, to prevent the flight of more of the Kozaks from Russian control, persuaded Catherine to renew the institution under the name of the Kozaks of the Black Sea and settle them in the area of the Kuban to the east. This brought together under Anton Holovaty a large number of the Kozaks who continued to take part in the Russian wars, and finally, early in the nineteenth century, a considerable number returned from Turkey on the outbreak of another war between Turkey and Russia.

With the Sich and the eastern areas properly consolidated, Catherine turned her attention to the Hetman state, which had continued quietly under the iron rule of Count Rumyantsev. In 1780 Catherine issued a new order, completely abolishing this and dividing its territory into three provinces which were to be administered on the Russian pattern. This was done the next year and serfdom was introduced exactly as in Russia proper. In 1783, even the old regiments were dissolved as military units and those who wished to continue service were enrolled in new regiments of carbineers. Nothing was left which would preserve the memory of the Hetman state or of the heroic past of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. Finally in 1786 even the last remnants of autonomy in the Church were abolished and the property of the individual churches and monasteries was taken over by the state and placed in the same pool with all the property of the Church in Russia.

Then in 1793, with the second division of Poland, the largest part of right bank Ukraine was also brought into the Russian Empire and those of the Ukrainians who had remained under Poland found themselves again united with the Ukrainians of the left bank under the new conditions. Their position had been hard enough before, but the masters were given even more power under Russian law than they had had under the rule of Poland and the condition of the helpless peasants grew steadily worse.

The only people who profited were some of the officers, for the complete abolition of all Ukrainian rights and privileges moved them into the status of Russian landowners and nobles. Some of them had been striving to achieve this for a long while. To accomplish it they had broken down the democratic ideas of the Sich and throughout a troubled century, they had sought in every way to separate themselves from the mass of the Kozaks. Now they had at last succeeded, but at the cost of all of those special privileges which they had so long valued.

The ruin was overwhelming. There was left not a vestige of that independence or of those traditions which had endured in the Dnyeper valley since the days of Prince Volodymyr. The spirit of Moscow had conquered and its will to unity had been achieved. Nothing could be left except the songs sung by despairing serfs. The written records were preempted by the conquerors and the official Russian history whereby Moscow was the legitimate descendant of Kiev had no one to contradict it.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed by the forces of Catherine the Great of Russia on June 5, 1775 and on August 3 of the same year the Empress by an edict abolished the very name of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. This was the symbolic ending of the old Ukraine, of the old struggle for liberty and independence. More than the Hetman state with its shadowy hetmans and its confused Russianized Little Russian Board, the Sich had embodied the ideals and aspirations of the Kozaks. Around it had gathered the memories and the traditions of the days when the Kozaks had formed an independent body of free men, administering their affairs and choosing their enemies in popular assemblies. It had typified the Kozak spirit of individual daring and of individual resource. Now its destruction meant that all that was past and that the autocratic sovereign of Russia felt it had no place in her domain.

It is interesting and significant that this took place barely two months after the outbreak of the American Revolution at the battles of Lexington and Concord. It took place just two weeks before the battle of Bunker Hill, when for the first time the American army met a determined attack from British regular forces. It took place just a month before George Washington assumed at Boston his post as Commander-in-Chief of the American Army. The eleven years that followed, during which the Empress methodically eliminated every trace of Ukrainian independent rights, were the same that saw the successful carrying on of the American Revolution and the beginning of plans for the forming of the American Constitution. The year 1783, which witnessed the definite recognition of the independence of the United States, saw the elimination of the Kozak regiments from the already defunct Hetman state. In a word the old Ukraine passed away just as the new United States was coming into existence.

It would be easy to draw sentimental parallels between these two events but there is something even more important that this, for it was only three years after the final liquidation of Ukraine that the French Revolution broke out and an era opened when all of the intellectual ferment of the eighteenth century turned into political activity. The new Europe, the new Europe of the nineteenth century, was in the making and Ukraine by the narrowest of margins missed being included in it. The new current of nationalism was beginning to run its course. In ten years more, Kotlyarevsky with the Eneida was to create the modern Ukrainian literary language. The various nations and peoples included within the Hapsburg Empire were to begin their agitation for national recovery by the simple expedient of linguistic revival, and by the demand for the restoration of old and forgotten rights and privileges that had fallen into disuse, though they had never been officially abrogated.

In the ferment that was to come, the very existence of the Sich would have served as a rallying point for Ukrainian national sentiment. All those classes of people who could appreciate the meaning of the new movements would have found a definite centre, and even though the Sich had lost its old time power and independence, it would still have been a living connection with the great past. With the Sich gone, the link with the great days was broken and the new movement was compelled to start from the beginning without any existing juridical basis.

For this reason it may be well to pause a moment and look at the conditions as they existed in Ukraine at this crucial period.

For all intents and purposes the noble class had either been Russianized or Polonized. In the sixteenth century a large part of the old noble families had definitely adopted Polish culture and the Roman Catholic Church. The newer nobles and landowners who had arisen from the ranks of the Kozak officers had nearly all been Russianized. They felt that it was beneath them to use the language of their peasants and serfs and they endeavored to carry on their daily activities in either one of the more fashionable languages. Many of them used French almost exclusively in their relations with members of their own class. These people sometimes preserved some relics of the past. They dearly loved to have serfs and attendants dressed in Kozak costume, as did the Engelhardts, the owners of the young Shevchenko, early in the nineteenth century. They enjoyed hearing Ukrainian folksongs sung by peasant choirs but they looked upon them as an inferior form of amusement and had that superior attitude that was so bitterly attacked by Shevchenko in his introduction to the Haydamaki. All in all, these people found the present situation to their personal interest and they did not care to jeopardize their own fortunes by challenging the power of the government or to injure their social standing by associating with people of the lower classes.

In the same way the townsmen who had played such a large part in the cultural revival of the sixteenth century were no longer so influential. The towns had lost much of their importance, the leading classes, like the landowners, had fallen under the spell of the conquering cultures and those who still maintained the Ukrainian tradition had been so subjected to political disabilities that they were unable or indisposed to play their old role.

The Ukrainian language and Ukrainian traditions were then largely restricted to the peasantry. Their lot had always been hard but as they approached the modern period, their burdens were increased by the law. They had lost the power of changing their homes, even though this had been rather closely restricted, and the vast majority were mere serfs on the estates of masters who were either of foreign origin or had been completely denationalized. They were overwhelmingly illiterate and could not be presumed to know much of the history of their country.

Yet they were wiser than might easily be thought. The villagers had their rich and varied folksongs and there was hardly an occasion of the religious or secular year, hardly an event of public or private commemoration and festivity, when there did not appear some kobzar or bandurist to sing them songs of the exploits of the Kozaks or to retell some narrative of the past. These kobzars were often blind bards, accompanying themselves with a form of stringed instrument, something of the type of a banjo. They knew large numbers of songs, especially historical songs and dumy, which would serve to remind the peasants of other tales which had been handed down by their fathers. When we remember that scarcely a half century had passed since the last desperate revolts, we can understand that there was hardly a village where some old man or woman did not remember the stirring tales of the past and tell them to the young during the winter evenings or in the scanty hours of leisure. Shevchenko’s account of his grandfather’s tales of the Koliishchina can be paralleled again and again and allows us to see how the oral tradition of the village handed down much that was ignored or forgotten in the manor house.

It was in this wealth of peasant tradition and of vague and indistinct memories that there lurked the dying sparks of Ukrainian consciousness. It was easy to see that the hard conditions of life were tapping this supply. Without literacy or writing, each generation knew less than had the preceding of what had gone before. The death of one old man might mean the irreparable loss of much that was valuable and true. With each decade there remained fewer and fewer accounts of the history of the past. Had the conquering classes thought of such a trifling subject, they would have realized that time was on their side and that the unpleasant and disturbing nightmares of the past would pass away and leave them in peace. The time was surely coming when the peasantry too would lose their consciousness, exactly as had the nobles and the upper classes who had been won over to the new and fashionable culture and accepted a new nationality!

Of course there were some manuscripts that told the ancient history, but these were rarely printed and they remained hidden in the various archives and libraries. Thus there was the Istoria Rusov, the History of the Rus’, probably by Hrihori Poletika, who had prepared an appeal for the old rights of the Kozaks for presentation to Catherine the Great. Later this work was to have considerable influence on the development of the study of Ukrainian history. It was to inspire Kostomarov, Kulish and Shevchenko, but it was still an unknown work collecting dust in the archives and not valued even by the few people who stumbled upon it.

The condition of the language was still more tragic. No one thought of using the vernacular speech, the language of the folksongs and the dumy in writing. The burden of Church Slavonic lay as a heavy weight upon the people and even a man like Skovoroda did not venture to challenge this spectre.

After all, Church Slavonic had served a noble purpose in the past. It had been the distinguishing work of Orthodoxy. It had contributed to the splendid culture of Kiev in the beginning, but it was now outmoded. Even so, the Church Slavonic of the day was not the language of the early Chronicles. It had been brought from the Balkans by the first Christian monks that had penetrated the country. The people had received it at the time of the baptism of the nation and it was hoary with age and sacred from its many traditions. It required a man of genius to defy the centuries of reverence that it had acquired.

In the early days, the old Balkan Church Slavonic had been modified to make it more intelligible to the people. There had been no attempts to translate it into the popular speech, but step by step popular words crept in and within the old framework there had come something that was well on its way to being the speech of the people. The cultural revival of the sixteenth century, with its emphasis upon religion and Orthodoxy, with its attempts to purify the national faith and consciousness, looked askance at these innovations. Patriotic and intelligent men had believed that the advance of Polonization and of the Roman Catholic Church could only be checked by a more rigid adherence to the old standards. As a result, with the best intentions in the world, the scholars of the sixteenth century and of the Kiev school worked directly against the popularization of the language. Their program was strikingly similar to that of the Ciceronian Latinists of the Renaissance who tried to make their Latin purely classical in scope, vocabulary and grammar and who only succeeded in making Latin truly a dead language.

It was they who did so much to insure the triumph of the vernaculars of Western Europe, but then Latin was so different even from French and Italian that it was impossible to confuse the old and the new. The case with Church Slavonic was different. It had entered in large part into the phraseology of the peasants, it had colored the speech of the villages, and while it was not flexible and not adapted to the needs of the population as a medium of expression, it was too close to it to be cast off without regret and without remorse. Muscovite had already freed itself and become a modern language. The similarities between Muscovite Great Russian, Ukrainian and Church Slavonic were such that Russianizing influences could argue that there was no need to adapt Ukrainian to every-day literary use and that if the Church Slavonic were to be abandoned, Russian should be used in its place. The very unnational and religious attitude of the Kievan School all too often seemed to bear out this interpretation, and with each succeeding decade, the doom of the native speech seemed to be more surely impending. The action of the Russian ecclesiastical censorship after the destruction of the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church seemed to be working in the same way, for the Church books were henceforth to be remodelled on the Russian Church Slavonic, even though that had been at one time really reformed on the Ukrainian pattern by the scholars who had gone from Kiev to Moscow in the seventeenth century.

On the other hand, the Uniat Church did preserve the old Ukrainian Church Slavonic books. The result was the same, for their conservatism led them to preserve the old as a sacred tradition and to the devout members of the Uniat Church, it likewise seemed almost heretical to change the accepted forms and to seek to bring them in touch with the language of the uneducated people. The pride of these poorly educated priests in their superior knowledge worked as well as the conceit of the nobles and the censorship of Moscow to put apparently insuperable barriers in the way of adapting the ordinary language to practical and literary purposes, and added to the general conviction of the educated that the Ukrainian language was finished as a potent factor in the educated life of the day.

Yet we would be much mistaken if we regarded this as a purely Ukrainian problem. Wherever the Church Slavonic liturgy had penetrated, whether in communion with Constantinople or with Rome, the same problem inevitably arose. The language question, the burning discussion as to whether the written language was to be that of the people or of the Church, was actively considered everywhere. Russia was the first to solve the problem and to restrict the Church language to the Church. The Serbs in the Balkans and the Bulgarians were destined to have the same conflict.

More than that, they were faced with the same situation and even with the same books. Peter the Great had sent to the Balkans men educated in the Kiev tradition. He had sent down the same grammar of Smotritsky that had served for a century to teach the Russian grammar from the Ukrainian Church Slavonic standpoint. The same books appeared at Belgrade and Sofia that had vanished from Kiev and Chernihiv under Russian influence. During most of the eighteenth century, there was used among the Serbs exactly that same mixture of Church Slavonic, Muscovite and Ukrainian that was preventing the revival of the Ukrainian spirit. It had the same effect elsewhere. The Russian Church Slavonic that mastered Serb and Serb Church Slavonic blocked for nearly a century the cultural revival in the Balkans.

The Russian rulers played heavily on the theme of the linguistic unity of Slavonic Orthodoxy. When it was necessary to check a dissent, they ignored the language and demanded the unity of the Orthodox Church. They stressed the religious unity as opposed to the Catholic West. At other moments, they were ready to ignore this and to emphasize the linguistic similarities and to argue that there was no need for linguistic reform among the Slavs, since Russian had already been thus favored and there was no need to have two literary Slavonic languages. They emphasized with a bland disregard of facts that it would be child’s play to remodel all the languages on the Russian basis and to combine into one Russian language all the varied tongues. It was no wonder that they aroused in the Balkans the same reactions that they did in Ukraine. The more rigid monks refused to listen to their demands and there was repeated on a small scale something of that revulsion of feeling that had come when the Kiev scholars first appeared at Moscow.

We can parallel the Ukrainian situation with that of the Czechs and Slovaks. From the time of the Thirty Years War to the end of the eighteenth century, there was hardly a book of any value published in Czech. There was nothing as important as the History of the Rus’, for here it was Latin and German that took the lead as the permitted and encouraged languages. We must never forget that the great work of Dobrovsky which began the Czech revival was itself written in Latin, exactly as the few surviving scholars of Ukraine wrote in the archaic form of Ukrainian Church Slavonic.

It is of interest that the only two Slavonic languages which were in a more or less healthy condition were Russian and Polish. In both cases, the upper classes had not been denationalized. They were still willing to use the popular language, even if in a refined or revised form. They were still able to produce literature such as it was and to secure access to printing presses to make their works known. They still maintained a historical culture, even though Peter had completely overturned Russian life and had started his new creation off on a Polish-Ukrainian-Western European tack. It gave the two peoples a tremendous advantage which they were not slow to recognize and it added tremendously to the burden of the other Slavonic peoples, who had not lost all hope and ambition of recovery. Even the dismemberment of Poland had not had time to damage the dreams of the Poles and to take away the advantages that centuries of political life had given them.

The special burden of the Ukrainians was rather to be found in the nature of the Kozak Host. As we have seen, the Host did not in the beginning think of taking over civilian administration. It had been a brotherhood of fighting men. Its remains, the tales of its exploits, looked very little to territorial control and much to heroic deeds. Where a Czech, whether he were writing in Czech, Latin or German, could not fail to know of the achievements of the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Ukrainian could not look back easily to the Ukrainian state of two or three centuries before. He had to go back to Kiev and those traditions were torn and confused by the tragedies of seven hundred years. The Kozaks gave him much but not what was most important in a national revival.

The people had confused ideas of the Kozaks but not of their valor. They could admire the songs of the fearless raiders; they could draw from them very little of political education. There was needed a long series of scholars and of thinkers to delve into the annals of the past and to draw the proper conclusions, before an intelligent and clear theory could be put before the average peasant serf. There was needed a work of study and of synthesis and it seemed clear under the conditions of the eighteenth century that that could not take place. As Catherine the Great looked out on the reorganized Ukraine, now turned into typical Russian provinces in Little Russia, she could be sure that there was no danger, that the last sparks of the Ukrainian idea had been quenched and that her work had been a success.

She was startlingly incorrect, for all that the eighteenth century could not imagine suddenly happened. The intellectual changes of the world in one or two decades laid the basis for a Ukrainian revival in a form that would have seemed incredible to the leaders even a half-century earlier.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE AWAKENING IN EASTERN UKRAINE

In 1798 there suddenly appeared in St. Petersburg, a volume entitled the Eneida, written by one Ivan Kotlyarevsky. It was a travesty on Virgil’s Aeneid, in which the Trojans were depicted as the wandering Kozaks who had been expelled from the Sich less than twenty-five years before. Furthermore the volume was written in the popular dialect of the province of Poltava where the author was serving as an official of the government. The revival of the Ukrainian spirit had commenced.

All possible honor must be paid to Kotlyarevsky for his audacious effort which was crowned with so much success and it would have been a godsend for Ukraine, had any one a century earlier had the courage and the intellectual independence to have made the same attempt. The tragedy of Ukraine had been, as we have seen, largely caused by the fact that the scholars of Kiev had adopted only a reactionary attitude toward the language question. They had striven so hard for the preservation of Church Slavonic that they had ignored the revival of the vernacular in both Poland and Russia. Even Skovoroda with all of his inspired teachings as to the rights of the individual had not ventured to break this old and stultifying tradition. Kotlyarevsky did and the results were at once visible.

Yet there was more to this innovation than the mere publishing of a book in the Ukrainian language. The spirit of Europe had been changing for over a quarter of a century and consciously or not Kotlyarevsky was a reflection of that change. Not only he among the Ukrainians but such men as Dositey Obradovich among the Serbs and Dobrovsky for the Czechs reflected the new attitude.

All of these men were products of the Enlightenment, that interesting movement of the eighteenth century which endeavored to apply the rule of reason to human affairs. They were often well trained in the classical languages and their cool intellectual powers fitted well with the powdered wigs and the stately manners of the courts of the enlightened despots. There was much in the writings of the Kievan school which encouraged a man like Kotlyarevsky. The various comedies produced in the school, the comical intermezzos, and all the varied performances which had dragged on at weary length in pseudo-Church Slavonic, all could be cited as prototypes for a whimsical treatment of a classical theme.

There was more to it than this. The Russian scholars under the influence of Lomonosov carefully adapted to the new Russian literature the ideals of Boileau and the French scholars who created the high, low and middle styles of literary language. The low was to form the language of comedy and of humorous episodes. It was to be free from those survivals of Church Slavonic that still maintained a definite position in the odes and tragedies of Russian literature. There were many burlesques of classical authors being published in Russian. Ippolit Bogdanovich, a Ukrainian writing in Russian, had metamorphosized LaFontaine’s Amours de Psyche into a Russian form. Free adaptation was the order of the day and if an author were to create humor by the use of the vernacular, how much better it was for a Ukrainian gentleman to employ the real vernacular and to transform the characters of Aeneas and his followers into the real Kozaks who were even then wandering around the Black Sea?

That was one possible source of inspiration but there was another which was rising with increasing vehemence throughout Europe. For centuries, the goal of literature was to appeal to the educated and noble classes by describing in elevated language the feelings and the emotions of the nobles and the more elevated and developed personalities. The common people had vanished from literature, except in comic interludes.

A new trend started with the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau who taught the superiority of the simple and natural man to the pattern of civilization and sophistication. His ideas were developed in the literary sphere by Johann Gottfried Herder, who emphasized the value of folksongs and of the poetry of so called primitive nations. Herder’s influence resulted in the collecting of folksongs from all the people of Europe. Among these the gatherings of Serb folksongs were especially prominent. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century, interest in the ideas, the poetry and the customs of the various peoples hitherto ignored had become one of the leading components of the new studies.

It was thus that the Eneida appeared at the psychological moment when interest in the people was reaching a new high and when the French Revolution was already disturbing the settled political situation. The work revealed Kotlyarevsky both as a masterly adapter of the Aeneid and also as an authority on the manners and customs of the Kozaks. With its jesting and serious tone, it aroused attention among many of the descendants of the Kozak officers who had already become Russianized, and at the same time it fitted so well within the official and tolerated literary bounds that it was impossible for the authorities to regard it as revolutionary and administer any punishment to its bold author.

Still later, in his two comedies, Kotlyarevsky gave examples of the drama in the vernacular Ukrainian, and in both he drew clear differentiations between the manners and customs of the Ukrainians and those of the Moskals. There is still in these no question of political separation, but the author went back very definitely to the ideas of the older Kievans who had gone to Moscow and St. Petersburg, and emphasized the difference in the psychologies of the two peoples.

Whatever may have been the definite purpose of Kotlyarevsky in starting his work, he succeeded in giving the Ukrainians what they had long wanted—a definite modern language, and by doing this he laid a sound basis for a new movement. From the day when he first published the Eneida, Ukrainian literature has not lacked for writers. Of course in the beginning various people turned their hand to practicing the new medium for various purposes, but there has been an overwhelming tendency for all who had any special talent to emphasize the hardships of the people and to follow Kotlyarevsky in using their influence on behalf of the people as against the foreign and denationalized landowners. Thus from the very beginning the revived Ukrainian was not burdened with that type of aristocratic idealism that so marked the other Slavonic languages.

Opponents of the modern Ukrainian movement have often spoken slurringly of this literary movement, because its early writers did not directly challenge the Russian government and remained merely literary men. It betrays a curious ignorance, for in all of the Slavonic revival the process was exactly the same. The emphasis, whether in Ukraine or among the Czechs or elsewhere, was at first on literary and grammatical points. The very nature of Kotlyarevsky’s work pushed the Ukrainian cause much further in the direction of democracy than was the case in the other languages.

The second stage in the revival was the introduction of Romanticism. This movement tended to look back toward the past. Its masters, in Russia and Poland and in all other countries, sought striking episodes from the past. They looked for outbursts of unbridled passion, of daring and of excitement and they found it in plenty among the Kozaks. The History of the Rus’ was now printed and it, even more than Karamzin’s History of the Russian Empire, became the source book for the Romantic writers. Pushkin knew of it in Russian and so did Kondraty Fedorovich Ryleyev, that stormy petrel of the Decembrist movement who paid with his life for his participation in the movement in 1825. Many of his best poems dealt with the exploits of the old rulers of Kiev, of the Kozaks, of Nalyvayko and Voynarovsky, the nephew of Mazepa. Even though they tried to keep within the confines of the lawful type of Russian history, they could not fail to emphasize those qualities of personal independence which were rarely stressed in Muscovite tradition. Nikolay Gogol, the son of one of the earliest writers in Ukrainian, felt the same drive and in Taras Bulba he pictured the unbridled courage and daring of the old Kozaks in their struggle against the Poles. The Poles too felt this same influence and there appeared again a large number of Polish poems with their scenes located in Ukraine among the Kozaks.

It was to this phase of the revival that Taras Shevchenko, who was to be the stabilizer of Ukrainian and its greatest master, belongs. In the Kobzar, after dealing with various aspects of Ukrainian life and legend, all typical of the Romantic movement at its best, he turns to themes from Kozak history; and in the Night of Taras, in Ivan Pidkova, and later in the Haydamaki and Hamaliya, he gives us some of the greatest poems in Ukrainian when he describes the campaigns of the Kozaks against the Poles and the Turks. It is noticeable that most of these themes deal with the struggle against the Poles. That was more filled with the type of episode which suited the Romantic poet than was the period of conflict between the Hetman state and Moscow. The grinding force of the Russian steam-roller had prevented incidents of the old traditional type and we need not wonder that the Romantic poets in their desire to go back to the distant past paid more attention to events of the days before Khmelnitsky, when the Kozaks were the most democratic, the most unrestrained, and the most successful.

Thus, by the time the rumbles of the Revolution of 1848 began to be heard, Ukrainian literary and linguistic revival was well under way. The literature had reached in the works of Shevchenko the level of the other Slavonic literatures. It had done this despite the disapproval of the Russian literary critics, especially Belinsky, who affected to believe that there was no real call for the erection of Little Russian, as he loved to call Ukrainian, into a literary language. His judgments on the Kobzar and the Haydamaki are almost ludicrous in their efforts to prove that Shevchenko was only a peasant trying to show off before Russian society. A few years late Apollon Grigoryev unhesitatingly placed him on a level with Pushkin and Mickiewicz, but he was exceptional in his willingness to follow his own ideas rather than the official promulgations of the intelligentsia.

In another field the Ukrainian revival went far: the field of ethnology and of folklore. The Romantic temperament, aided and abetted by the teachings of Herder, turned its attention to the manners and customs of the village. There grew up a veritable harvest of investigators who, whether in fiction form as in the case of Hrihori Kvitka-Osnovyanenko or in the form of scientific treatises, pictured every aspect of Ukrainian life. These men, and some of them were to be found among the Russianized gentry, emphasized the differences that existed in the manners and customs between the Ukrainians and the Great Russians. They noted with care the differences in the construction of the village houses, the arrangements of the houses and the farms, the embroideries, the legends, the folklore. They collected the popular songs, the dumy, the historical poems. Anything and everything that marked the life of the people in all of its manifestations they willingly committed to paper and step by step they gathered and preserved a picture of life in a Ukrainian village as it existed in the days of serfdom.

It is easy to overlook this kind of work and to regard it as the mere product of literary men and scholars. Yet the works of Maksimovich, of Tsertelev, and of many more served as a preliminary step to the raising of political aspirations. The study of the past carried on both by Ukrainians and by the Russian authorities brought to light much forgotten information. Thus the Governor General Bibikov in 1843 founded the Kiev Archaeological Commission, on which Shevchenko was for a time employed. This aimed to collect information on the past, to secure paintings of old buildings, and to supply details of history. It is highly significant that a firsthand knowledge of the past obtained in this work brought many of the young scholars and artists to realize more clearly than they had done before the historical value of many of the old Ukrainian writings which had existed up to that time only in manuscript.

A comparison with almost all of the other cultural revivals of the suppressed nations of Europe shows that such a beginning was the usual procedure. Even among the Czechs it became necessary to awaken the country to an appreciation of its past and the earliest leaders were poets such as Kollar and Jungmann, and historians like Palacky and Safarik. Among the Serbs it was Obradovich and his friends who undertook the task of acquainting the people with the achievements of the past and with modern conditions.

In all cases the political development came later and was not always in the beginning closely coordinated with the cultural movement. It was here that the difficulties of the Ukrainians multiplied. During the eighteenth century, the Estates of the Kingdom of Bohemia had become a completely moribund institution. They still went through the motions of existence and the same kind of historical study that called attention to the language and literature could be applied to searching out the rights of these long surviving traditions and breathing new life into them.

So it could have been in Ukraine, had there existed even a rudimentary form of the Hetman state. When we realize that the Russian Governor General Repnin could fall into governmental disfavor because his wife was a relative of the last hetman, Cyril Rozumovsky, we can see what might have been the consequences of even a paper continuation of the old order. Catherine had done her work well and she had eliminated every vestige of the former Hetman state. She had eliminated the Sich and while she had allowed some of the Kozaks to form a new organization in the Kuban, there was after fifty years no sense of continuity anywhere. The nobles had been almost completely Russianized in outlook. They owed their wealth and position to the ruin of the old order and while they might sympathize with and be moved by the plea of Kotlyarevsky, there was no likelihood that they would bestir themselves and risk their position in any mad adventure. For good or ill, they were lost to the call of Ukraine.

All they could do was to contribute in some small way to the foundation of the Universities of Kharkiv and Kiev, which had been started during the reign of Alexander I, largely through the advice and influence of Adam Czartoryski, one of the close friends of the Tsar and an ardent Polish patriot. His influence was rather expended on the problem of Poland and for this reason he had worked energetically in the revival of the University of Wilno in the old capital of Lithuania. For the same purpose he had inspired the foundation of universities in the Ukrainian cities but he had hoped that these would serve as centres of a Polish rather than of a Ukrainian revival. He partially succeeded, for Polish influence in both Kiev and Kharkiv grew rapidly during the years before the Polish revolt of 1831, even though it was from these institutions that many of the early Ukrainian song collectors, archaeologists, and historians were drawn.

Besides this, the Russian system did not contain, as the Austrian did, any loopholes for the formation of legal parties or political agitation. Catherine had seen well to this and in fact her attitude was only a legitimate Westernized expansion of the attitude of Tsar Alexis, when his delegates refused an oath to Khmelnitsky at the moment when the Kozaks first accepted the protection of the Tsar at Pereyaslav. Russia was indeed a monolithic state in which no one possessed any real rights except the tsar. The Kozak Host had been an anachronism and it had perished. Now with the Ukrainian revival there was no legal means of recalling the old rights and privileges for any one, much less the peasants living as serfs on the lands of denationalized and foreign masters.

The revival of the Ukrainians was, and was destined to remain, a purely cultural revival in a monolithic Russia which proudly had annexed the ancient history of Kiev and considered itself as its legitimate successor. Little Russia seemed to the authorities merely a part of the whole and once all distinguishing characteristics had been removed in law, there was no way of restoring them except as the gift of the tsar or by the disintegration of the country.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE SOCIETY OF SAINTS CYRIL AND METHODIUS

It was impossible under Russian rule to have any immediate hopes for the beginning of definite political activity and this was no more true for the Ukrainian population than for any of the other nationalities of the Russian Empire, including the Russians themselves. Even those scanty means of popular expression which had survived the reforms of the Congress of Vienna and the growth of reaction in Western Europe were here excluded.

It was impossible to shut out ideas. The years of conflict with Napoleon had shown to many of the Russian officers who had entered Paris with the victorious allies the difference between the situation in Russia and that in western Europe, and they willingly joined with the surviving older enlightened thinkers of the eighteenth century to make certain demands upon the government. The success of the United States as a republican federation affected many of them, and they began to dream of reorganizing their own country in the same fashion.

The result was the development of a number of secret societies modelled on the Tugendbund (League of Virtue) in Germany and the Carbonari in Italy. Most of them demanded at least the limitation of the power of the tsar and the granting of more or less definite rights to the rest of the population. Some even demanded the complete abolition of serfdom.

These societies, which were parallel to secret societies in Russian-occupied Poland, existed in all important garrisons of the Russian Empire. The Southern Society formed by Colonel Pestel among the Russian troops in Ukraine was the most radical of the entire number. Yet it cannot be said clearly that even this Society thought much of any special rights for Ukraine. It was composed largely of Russians or Russianized Ukrainians who had acquired rank and wealth in the Russian service, and they were not disposed in any numbers to do anything to harm the national unity. They made no effort to reach the masses of the people and win them over to any special cause. In a word these secret societies, instead of building on the past, sought rather to create something new and theoretically ideal.

Conditions came to a head on the occasion of the death of Alexander I, when there ensued a dynastic tangle. The succession should have gone to the next younger brother Constantine, but he had abdicated under confusing circumstances. Finally on December 14, 1825, when it became certain that he was not going to assume the power, the third brother Nicholas ordered the troops to swear allegiance to him. When part of the Guards Regiments in Petersburg refused, under the leadership of members of these societies, he suppressed the recalcitrants by military force. It is interesting that the only serious fighting was in Chernihiv, where the regular garrison revolted under the influence of Colonel Pestel and was almost wiped out by loyal troops. Yet it is difficult to say that this was a manifestation of a Ukrainian desire for independence, since it was closely tied up with the movement in St. Petersburg and there is little evidence that the leaders of the movement had given any thought to the nature of the decentralization which they wished to introduce.

The Decembrist movement was, however, a prelude to other action. On the one hand it increased the determination of the tsar to maintain order and the autocracy at all costs. On the other, it drove from active leadership in political movements the representatives of the higher aristocracy, who were without exception the foremost representatives of Russian influence in Ukraine and the best educated people of the day. It thus cleared the way for newer groups to appear upon the scene. It settled nothing in reality.

There came a new tendency for autocratic control of everything and the new measures still more infuriated the Poles, who had already begun the work of active organization of secret societies. More and more, in places like Wilno, these societies became very active. Finally they burst out in a great Polish revolt in 1831 and its failure thrust down the hopes of the Poles for a restoration of their country. It is to be noted that Taras Shevchenko, as a young serf, was shortly before this time in Wilno and could not fail to have heard of the preparations for the revolt. Because of the danger, his master Engelhardt left Wilno and went to the capital and the young Shevchenko with his inquiring mind had the opportunity to make the acquaintance of several of the leaders of the revolt. Instead of winning him to the Polish cause, they seem to have sharpened his interest in his own people and to have revived in him an appreciation of the rights of Ukraine, even if those rights had been abolished by the decrees of Catherine the Great.

It was at this moment that the poem of Jan Kollar, The Daughter of Slava, began to circulate throughout the Slavonic world. Kollar, a Slovak Protestant, went to Jena in 1817 to study. There he was greatly impressed by the sentiments of the students calling for a unification of Germany and the introduction of a republican form of government. It set him to thinking and when he fell in love with a German girl from the south, he transformed her in his own poetic way of thinking into a descendant of the Germanized Slavs. He published in 1821 his first collection of Sonnets and then in 1824 he increased this to the book, The Daughter of Slava, in which he called for a great Slavonic union on liberal principles.

It was probably as a result of this that there appeared a Pan-Slavic Society in Ukraine about the time of the Decembrists, but so few details have been preserved that it deserves little more than a passing mention, for we know very little of the actual development in Ukraine at this time, except among the officers of the Russian army who took part in the secret societies.

With the suppression of the Russian movement, there came the Polish revolt of 1831, and then the poems of Pushkin, who, under the influence of Kollar and Russian imperialism, declared that all the Slavonic rivers had to flow into the Russian sea or they would dry up. This was the special Russian brand of imitation of Kollar and in this connection we can see how closely Pushkin follows the attitude of Tsar Alexis, Peter the Great and Catherine.

Yet outside of Russia, Kollar found quite a different interpretation. The Southern Slavs, especially the Serbs, and the Czechs became enthused with his ideals and began to dream of a great Slavonic brotherhood in which Russia might play a leading but not a dominant role. Soon after there appeared such books as the History of the Slavonic Language and Literature by Pavel Josef Safarik, in which the author attempted to give an introduction to all the writing in the various Slavonic languages. It is true that his remarks on Ukrainian or Little Russian are very scanty, but he does mention Kotlyarevsky and comments on the small amount of work that had been done in the study of this “dialect.” He alludes to the still more confused condition of knowledge of the language of Galicia. All this was just the beginning and more and more Czech students began to appear in Kiev and make known around the University of Kiev the recent discoveries and ideas of Czech scholarship.

In the forties, the era of romantic idealism was not yet over. There was stirring already that ferment which was to lead to the revolutions of 1848 and there were high hopes that by some form of popular miracle the millennium would be speedily achieved. How or by what means were relatively unimportant questions to many of the young idealists, but these were no longer to be found among the ranks of the gentry or the army officers but in the universities.

It was then no chance happening that the young men at Kiev became tremendously interested in the new movements, which were still wavering between dreams of a general Slavonic union and agitation for the recovery of the liberty of each individual people. The ideas were ardently discussed and it was only natural that those who were interested should form themselves into the traditional pattern of a secret society.

At some time, perhaps in 1846, there was organized at Kiev the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius. This may well be regarded as the first formulation of the dream of a self-governing Ukraine as part of a general Slavonic federation. The men who took part were the keenest thinkers and the outstanding characters of the Ukrainian movement for many years. Foremost among them was Taras Shevchenko. He had already made a name for himself as the author of the Kobzar and the Haydamaki and as a promising painter in St. Petersburg. Now he was in Kiev, attached to the Archaeological Commission, with a commission to paint the churches and the ruins from the times of the Kozaks and Khmelnitsky. Not only that, but his travels had given him the opportunity to see the wretched conditions of the Ukrainian people and the evil that serfdom and dependence was doing to them.

Another of the group was Nikolay Kostomarov, a Russian by birth, but a close student of the history of Ukraine. He was becoming convinced in his own mind of the differences between the ancient culture of Kiev and of Moscow. Here too was Panteleimon Kulish, also a collector of folk songs and a historian. Others of the group were Vasil Bilozersky and Prof. Mikhail Maksimovich.

These men were all familiar with the existing condition of Ukraine, with the difficulties of the common people and with the work that was being done abroad for popular education. As a result they worked out a purely idealistic program for the future of the Slavs in general and the Ukrainians in particular.

What was this? They demanded the abolition of serfdom and they called for freedom of conscience, of the press, of thought and speech. All this meant merely the application to the whole of Russia and especially to Ukraine of those commonplaces of personal and civic liberty that had been achieved in the England of the day and were the common demand of all the thinking youth of Europe. They then went further and visualized an independent Ukrainian republic, which was to form part of a great Slavonic federation. This federation was not to be dominated by any one country but was to be a real federation, expressing the ideas of free and independent citizens.

It is easy to see that their ideas were influenced by the little that they knew about the United States. It is easy to see how far they were from the reactionary ideas of Pushkin, but they were not dominated by thoughts of hatred or antagonism. The interesting point was that while Belinsky and various other authors were arguing in St. Petersburg and Moscow for the same liberties for the Russians, these men dared to assert that the Ukrainian language could be developed as well as could the Great Russian and had equal claim to be studied and used by the people, by writers and by scholars.

Not one of the men who formed the Society was connected in any way with any military organization. They were for the most part typical of the university youth. Some of them came from the smaller noble families which had not been completely Russianized but which still retained traditions of the past. Shevchenko was a freed serf. Not one of them would have known or been interested in the type of political underground conspiracy that alone could have carried their program into execution.

Thus they could have formed no danger to the Russian state, except insofar as that was based on the oppression of other races and on conditions which were unhealthy and unjust. Of course they were opposed to serfdom, but in one way or another their feelings were shared by large numbers of the Russians, nobles and non-nobles alike. They were taking little active part in any plans for carrying out their policy, except in their aspirations to spread education among the people: education in the Ukrainian language.

However when Oleksy Petrov, a student who had overheard some of the glowing discussions in a neighboring room, reported the existence of the society to M. V. Yuzefovich, the supervisor of history, the latter was impressed with the idea that he had discovered a dangerous conspiracy. He hurriedly notified St. Petersburg and orders were given to arrest the entire group. It seemed to the mind of Nicholas I that this was exactly what he had suspected all along and he determined to make an example of the young men.

It was relatively easy to catch them, for they were without any suspicion of what was coming. Shevchenko was arrested on April 5, 1847 in Kiev with several others, for they had gathered there for the wedding of Kostomarov. Kulish, who had already received a fellowship to study abroad in preparation for a post in the University of St. Petersburg, was seized on his way to the border.

Trials were soon held and the vast majority received sentences of imprisonment or exile. Shevchenko, because of the contents of his poetry, was ordered to serve as a private in a disciplinary battalion of the army in Central Asia and the tsar added in his own hand, “with a prohibition of writing and painting.” He was destined to serve there for ten years and was a broken man at the completion of his service.

These arrests broke up the society. The trials revealed very clearly that the young men had taken no definite steps to carry out their ideas. Yet the decrees of the Tsar and the sentences made it very clear that the imperial regime considered it worse than treason to do anything to remind the Little Russians of their independent past or to indicate that in any way they were better off under the rule of the hetmans than under the beneficent rule of the Tsar’s officials. It was but another affirmation of the intentions of Catherine and Peter, and it put a definite stop to any political development in Russian Ukraine for many years.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE REVIVAL IN GALICIA

During the seventeenth century, there had gradually developed differences in those sections of Ukraine which had remained under Polish control after the Treaty of Andrusivo. This was largely the result of the endless conflict between the Orthodox and the Uniats, and was marked by the steady weakening of the Orthodox, especially after the beginning of the eighteenth century when the great Brotherhood of Lviv formally accepted the Union. In the eastern portions of the Polish controlled territory, the Orthodox still retained considerable, if only negative, power, and it was in those regions that the last revolts against Poland took place. At times the Koliishchina had threatened to spread westward along the Carpathians but the danger was averted and peace was maintained.

Then came the divisions of Poland and most of the areas in which the Union had secured an undisputed supremacy passed into the hands of Austria-Hungary. Soon after, the latter seized from Turkey northern Bukovina, which was still largely Orthodox and had formed the northern section of Moldavia, long a storm centre.

The Ukrainians living in the Carpathian Mountains formed part of the Kingdom of Hungary. These people had suffered from the vicissitudes of the past centuries and little is known of their early history or of their appearance in the area where they still dwell.

In his historical novel, Zakhar Berkut, Ivan Franko gives a picture of the early democratic life of these villagers in the time of the Tatar invasions but it is not certain whether or not they ever formed an independent state. In all probability the central authority in these mountain valleys was not well developed in the Middle Ages. The various valleys paid more or less feudal allegiance to the rulers of Ukraine but the mountain passes were closed several months in the year by snow and with the confused conditions in Galicia and the struggles between Poland and Hungary, the region was more or less forgotten.

The people were Orthodox and apparently formed part of the see of Peremyshl but the bishops rarely visited them. Education was on a far lower level than anywhere else in Ukraine and the revival of the sixteenth century had little or no effect upon the mountaineers. Hungarian rule, which had been established in the fourteenth century, weighed heavy upon them. Peasants and clergy alike were serfs, illiteracy was widely prevalent and almost the rule, and the physical, economic and intellectual conditions left everything to be desired.

Apparently also in the fifteenth century an Orthodox bishop was settled at Mukachevo, but this again did not mean much. The monasteries had lost most of their wealth in the disturbances of the preceding centuries and the bishops had to live on fees collected from the ordination of young priests and the annual contributions that they were compelled to make for the support of the central organization. It was the same situation that had come up elsewhere in the Ukrainian lands but there was really no centre to maintain any education and things went constantly from bad to worse.

It was an ideal situation for the spreading of the religious Union. One of the landowners, Homonai, introduced it on his estates in the seventeenth century. He won over the priests and monks, but the peasants, as they had done so often, refused to accept it. However, the idea took root and by 1640 a considerable number had more or less formally adhered, so that in 1649 it was possible for the adherents to hold a meeting at Uzhorod and formally request to be accepted under the same terms as had been satisfactory fifty years before at Brest. The Pope acknowledged this in 1652.

As can be seen from the above, the struggle for the Union or the Orthodox faith in Carpatho-Ukraine, as everything else in the area, was far less centralized, far less standardized, and the villages maintained a certain independence in their misery, for the Hungarian system of administration had grouped the area into several counties with little possibility of cooperation or mutual help.

There were times, however, when the temper of the people flared up to white heat and revolts broke out or were threatened. Thus, for example, at the time of the outbreak of the Koliishchina in the province of Kiev, around 1770, there was marked unrest in this area. The peasants, some of whom apparently did not know that they had accepted the Union, turned against their landlords and the Uniat priests and there were repeated on a small scale those disorders that marked the disturbances in the East. There were the same rumors that the Orthodox ruler of the east was going to come to their assistance and, as elsewhere, no help ever came, and the authorities put down the revolt and the unrest with an iron hand.

The Empress Maria Theresa of Austria and her son Joseph II were made uneasy by these troubles. They were already looking with greedy eyes at the southwestern sections of Poland and of Western Ukraine, and it did not seem a wise policy to allow disorders to spread among people related to those whom they were desirous of annexing. Besides that, the old feuds as to the relative rights of Austria and Hungary became involved in the picture and once peace had been restored, the rulers began to look around to see what could be done.

There were many things needed, but in the mind of the rulers of the eighteenth century, the idea of relieving the fundamentally bad economic conditions of the area made no impression. Rather the Empress felt that she was receiving good advice, when she was told that it was the ignorance of the people and still more of the clergy that was responsible for the confusion. As a result she soon turned her attention to the founding of schools in this area. One was established at Mukachevo for the clergy and steps were taken to improve the condition of the priests. These were timid and minor actions but they were destined to have great influence upon the future. Bishop Andrey Bachinsky, who was installed at Mukachevo at almost the same moment when the province of Galicia was falling into Austrian hands, was a competent administrator. He gathered around him a small number of educated priests and through his schools did what he could for the country.

All this was not much, but when Maria Theresa took over Galicia and the other Ukrainian lands, she had already an example before her. She felt that she had hit upon the correct policy and it was not long before she opened a school in Vienna for the Western Ukrainians, or the Ruthenians as the Austrian government, following Polish practice, insisted upon calling them. In view of the attitude of the Austrian government toward religion, it was only natural that this education was at first made available only for young men who were candidates for the priesthood of the Uniat Church.

As we have seen, the Uniat Church, which had been fostered by the Polish kings and magnates to disintegrate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the metropolitan see of Kiev, had become by the course of events inseparably connected with the Ukrainian cause in the west. Yet it possessed at the time of the division of Poland very few educated members, except some of the higher clergy. The parish priests and their congregations were woefully uneducated. The church was generally regarded as merely the church for the peasants and it was quite widely ridiculed by the Polish-speaking nobles.

It was then an act of real charity and kindness for Maria Theresa to endeavor to educate the clergy and to raise their intellectual standards and equipment. It was to determine for nearly a century the nature of the national revival in Galicia and Western Ukraine generally. On the one hand, it bound the leaders of the Uniat Church more closely to the Austro-Hungarian throne and put them in the position of a welcome counter-balance to the Polish aspirations for recovery of their lost territory and, failing that, to dominate and play the role of an upper class under Austrian control.

On the other hand, it preserved and strengthened all those conservative tendencies that had been inherent in the Kiev Academy during the seventeenth century and had been even earlier a handicap to the work of the Brotherhoods in the sixteenth. It meant the definite strengthening of those tendencies which were opposed to the introduction of the vernacular language. The vast majority of the educated priests and scholars of Austria-Hungary spoke Latin more or less well. It was only natural therefore that the Ukrainian clergy trained in the schools of Maria Theresa laid especial emphasis on the Church Slavonic in the form in which it had been traditionally preserved. Relatively little effort was expended on the modernization of this language and in many ways the writings of these men were even further from the daily speech of the people than had been the case two centuries before, when the scholars of Kiev sought to go back to the pure form of Church Slavonic.

It was therefore nearly fifty years before the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary reached the point that had been arrived at by Kotlyarevsky in Eastern Ukraine. The intellectual life of the Western Ukrainians and their writings remained in that same artificial form that had been prevalent everywhere before the publication of the Eneida. More than that, there were many who looked askance at the new Ukrainian system that was coming into vogue under the power of the Tsar. They saw in the apparently new writing something which might develop into a menace to the integrity of the Church teachings and they opposed its introduction into the schools of the province.

Nevertheless, although the Ukrainian revival came far later than that of many of the other peoples of the Austrian Empire, it followed the same general pattern, with a certain amount of political activity allowed to Ukrainians as Ukrainians, especially in the lower administrative levels and for those few members of the group who were not serfs but were recognized as free men.

It was not long after the provinces passed into the hands of Austria-Hungary that there was established a theological seminary for Uniat priests in Lviv and this was even more accessible than was the school in Vienna. Later, in 1784, the University of Lviv was founded and in this it was provided that there should be certain courses in the Ruthenian language, that is, the old mixture of Church Slavonic, Ukrainian and Polish that had been the dominant language of the Kiev school in the seventeenth century. A preliminary school to prepare the Ukrainians for admission to the University was established. For a while all seemed well, but it was a false dawn.

The key to these events was to be found in the policy of Maria Theresa and still more of the Emperor Joseph II, who reigned with her for many years and then was sole emperor from 1780 to 1790. Maria Theresa was devoutly religious. Joseph II, her son, belonged to the same class of enlightened despots as did Catherine the Great of Russia. He was interested in unifying his domains just as ardently as was Catherine, but he had a different problem to face, for he desired to make German and not another Slavonic language the general language of administration. Besides that, both mother and son were suspicious of the loyalty of the Poles, who had been just been annexed to the Austrian domains, and it seemed a wise measure to lighten the burdens of the Ukrainian population in an endeavor to win their loyalty. Besides these educational reforms, Joseph had very decided ideas on the necessity of lightening the burdens of the serfs and of abolishing most of the abuses to which they had been subjected in the past.

All of these varying motives, often conflicting with one another, tended to give an opportunity for the Ukrainian population in Western Ukraine to improve their status. All the results achieved were won during the years of the reign of Joseph II and the brief years of Leopold II, but when Francis II came to the throne in 1792, conditions changed.

Externally the French Revolution was then going on and Austria took a defiant attitude toward everything that savored of liberalism in any way. The rights of the landowners were restored throughout the Empire and this deprived the peasants of any hopes that might have been enkindled in them by the promises of Joseph II. Then too, there were no signs of revolt among the Poles in the annexed provinces. This was in a way a deliberate choice of the Polish authorities and even during the revolt of Kosciuszko in 1794, he did his best to prevent the spreading of the movement for a restored Poland into that part of the territory that was held by Austria, and endeavored to concentrate the national uprising against Russia and secondarily against Prussia. Thus it seemed to the interest of Vienna at this moment to cooperate with the Polish landlords in Western Ukraine and to try to limit the spread of dissension, while Austria prepared to take her share in the final division. Then with Poland out of the way, efforts to improve the conditions of the Ukrainians within Austria sagged severely and during the years that followed, the situation remained fairly static.

Yet the situation never went quite back to that prevailing before the time of Joseph II. It is true that by 1808 the courses in the University of Lviv and the preparatory gymnasium had faded away at the instance of the Poles and there remained only a few parochial and private schools where the traditional dead language was the medium of instruction. Yet there was an increasing number of Ukrainians who were able to secure an education in schools where German as well as Polish was taught. All too often, however, these men acquired a contempt for the peasant masses and sought for positions elsewhere in the Austrian civil service, so that they did not give to their people the benefit of their education. Many of those who remained tended to prefer Polish as a more fashionable language and thus added to the number of able people who were lost to the Western Ukrainian cause.

The real difficulty that prevented the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine from more successful work was the language question and until that was definitely settled, real progress was impossible. All the work at the University of Lviv was carried on in the old traditional language. None of the leaders of Western Ukraine had the vision or the energy of Kotlyarevsky to break away from the old ecclesiastical tongue and write in the language of the people. After the time of Joseph II, education fell back into the hands of the clergy and they maintained that same idea that had run through the history of the old Brotherhoods, the idea that the people’s cause and the people’s faith could only be maintained by emphasizing the use of the old ecclesiastical language. This never became adapted to the civil needs of the population, high or low, and in the early nineteenth century it had much to do with the delays in the Ukrainian cause.

When the secular writings of Kotlyarevsky were first brought into Western Ukraine, they aroused only a series of attacks on the part of the conservative leaders who saw in them something secular and therefore suspicious or heretical. They made their way very slowly even among the literate classes who were bound up with the old ideas, and were not welcomed as enthusiastically as they had been in Great Ukraine.

Indeed it was not until the end of the thirties, when Shevchenko was already doing some of his best work, that any serious attempt was made to introduce the speech of the people into literature. At that time Markian Shashkevich, a young priest, wrote a series of poems in the vernacular. They aroused a great deal of controversy and were refused publication in Galicia but the author succeeded in having them appear in Budapest. Still, such were the censorship laws of the time, that while they were officially approved in Hungary, every copy that reached Galicia was seized by the censor and police. Shashkevich died in 1843. His two closest friends, who survived him, ultimately left the Ukrainian cause. Ivan Vahilevich after some years accepted the Polish thesis as to the Ukrainians of Galicia, and Yakiv Holovatsky accepted a position in the Russian Archaeological Service.

Already there had begun that linguistic feud which was to stifle the life and thought of Western Ukraine for many years. The vast majority of the intellectual leaders were Uniat priests and they, together with some of the more conservative people, held out strongly for the maintenance of the old artificial Church Slavonic language. Among the more progressive elements there were the followers of Shashkevich, but there were others who seriously wanted to adopt Russian as the form of the vernacular to be followed, and these developed into the Moscophile or Russophile party of later days. It must not be supposed however that these people knew any Great Russian. Very few were ever able to read any of the Russian classics which were already being written, but they followed the most elaborate theories that almost any Ruthene would be able to use Great Russian in one hour, if he really set his mind on it. They refused to face any of the difficulties in their position and simply idealized Russia because it was not Austria-Hungary, and because it was a Slavonic country. Had they even attempted to learn Russian, the situation would not have been so absurd.

This feeling spread quite widely in Western Ukraine and in Bukovina and even more strongly among the Carpatho-Ukrainians, where it has continued to the present time, especially among the more illiterate portions of the population, and the Orthodox elements. It was a curious mixture of a romantic idealization of Russia, a confusion of rus’-sky and russky, and a desire to get away at all costs from the horrible and unsatisfactory present.

As the period of 1848 drew nearer, with the growing unrest among all the subject populations of Austria-Hungary, the situation again changed. After 1846 it was already becoming evident that unrest among the Poles was increasing. The government, especially Count Stadion, the governor of Galicia, set itself to woo the Ukrainians and to assure their loyalty. To this end there was allowed to be organized a political society, the Holovna Rada, which aimed to be the intermediary between the Ukrainians and the government. A newspaper the Zora Halitska (the Galician Star) was started, and a Congress of Ruthenian Scholars demanded that the language should be completely reorganized, with a uniform system of spelling for both Eastern and Western Ukraine and that it should be freed from all Russian and Polish influences. To further this goal, there was organized an Educational Society, on the lines of the Czech Matica. Politically the Congress demanded the separation of the Polish and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) parts of Galicia, so that the Ukrainian people would be directly under the control of the Austrian government.

The Austrian government did not look unkindly upon these demands and for a while it seemed likely that it would take steps to carry them out. Ukrainian lectures, this time in the vernacular, were introduced again into the University of Lviv and Ukrainian schools were started throughout the province. As a still further step, the government decreed the liberation of the serfs, and thereby it struck a powerful blow at the Polish landlords in a way well described a little later by Ivan Franko in the Master’s Jokes. The same promises were made in both Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, where Adolph Dobryansky took the lead during the revolt of Kossuth and the Hungarians. Finally he joined the Russians when they invaded the country to help the Austrians against the revolting Hungarians, and he carried with him many of the intellectuals in the province.

As so much else in Austria during the year 1848, little positive was gained, for when the unrest had subsided, the Austrians conveniently forgot all the promises that they had made a few months earlier. In 1849, with the danger passed, they again turned the control of Galicia over to the Poles and in both Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bukovina, where the Russophile movement had grown strong, they turned against all of its leading representatives. The Ukrainian newspapers were largely abolished and the power passed back into the hands of those classes who had little use for the vernacular language of the people.

The reaction after 1848 roughly coincided with the arrest of Shevchenko and the crushing of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Russia. Yet the revival up to that period had shown striking differences in Eastern and Western Ukraine. In Russia it had been a lay revival, with special emphasis upon the development of a modern literature in the face of a determined government, which insisted upon the unity of both Russians and Little Russians. Any thought of political action was in the beginning useless, and prison or Siberia was the fate of every one who dared to advocate national recognition. Under Austrian rule, the Uniat Church had taken the lead in the movement. It had developed into an anti-Polish but government-favored policy, which only too readily admitted the racial and cultural differences between the Poles and the Ruthenians. Unfortunately, there were no outstanding political leaders to profit by this opportunity. Before the triumph of reaction the Ruthenians were most hampered by the stubborn conservatism of their own people who refused to face the fact that it was necessary to modernize the language.

Actually the two Ukraines had become widely separated areas with differences in religion, in the goal of their efforts, and in their weapons of struggle. There was little knowledge on either side of what the other was doing and perhaps even less appreciation. Yet in both regions, and in Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, the Ukrainians had awakened from their long slumber. Something was stirring, but the trend to cooperation was still very weak and it was only the Congress of Ruthenian Scholars that had even mentioned the possibility of joint action, even in the cultural and linguistic spheres, so well had the enforced separation done its work. Everything seemed lost as 1850 approached, but the new dullness was not of long duration.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

PROGRESS IN RUSSIA

The arrest and exile of the members of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius brought to a halt the first phase of the Ukrainian revival in the Russian Empire. It had been the work of a group of brilliant idealists who had ignored many of the practical difficulties in the way of their cause under the influence of the Romantic movement. There was no romanticism and hardly any sense of realism in the response that was delivered by the government of Nicholas I, who had been born before Kotlyarevsky had commenced the revival with the Eneida, and who could, from his childhood, obtain information from the men who had actually suppressed the last vestiges of the Hetman state.

With the accession of his son, Alexander II, in 1855, conditions changed. Alexander started his reign with at least an appearance of liberality and issued a wide amnesty to persons who had incurred the displeasure of his father. Most of the members of the Society were released and allowed to resume work in St. Petersburg. Even Shevchenko, who had been singled out for special treatment because of his attacks on the Imperial Family, was released and he too joined his former friends in the Russian capital. As a result, by the end of the fifties, the former members of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius had come together again and were prepared to resume their work under conditions as they then existed.

Kulish, one of the members of the group, started the work with the appearance of the Memoirs on South Rus’ in 1856, but he was refused permission to edit a journal in his own name because of his former connection with the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius and the exile which he had suffered in consequence. Yet it would be wrong to assume that the new agitation was conducted only by the handful of people who had formed the former group.

In Kiev and Chernihiv other Ukrainians, subject to the limitations that were imposed upon them by the Imperial government, tried to work for their people. Popular schools, usually held on Sunday, were opened to teach the illiterate peasants their own language. New writers appeared, such as Marko Vovchok, the pen-name of Maria Markovich, whose husband had been one of the members of the Society. Provincial newspapers appeared, societies were established for the purpose of glorifying Ukrainian culture, thinly camouflaged under the name of South Russia, and many other activities were started.

This was the period on the eve of the emancipation of the serfs and it looked as if the new Emperor was going to open a new period in the life of his country. The first years of the reign of Alexander II indeed marked an era of good feeling, and there were wide hopes among almost all classes of society that he would wipe out all the dark memories of the strict reign of his father.

It was under this hope that in 1860 there was founded in St. Petersburg the journal Osnova, (the Basis). Kulish was really responsible for it, although the nominal editor was his brother-in-law, Bilozersky, one of the lesser members of the Society. It called to its staff of writers and assistants all of the leaders of the younger generation, and for about a year there seemed to be a new spring in the Ukrainian movement in Russia.

Then trouble began again. Kulish, Kostomarov, and Shevchenko, the leaders of the older generation, still endeavored to continue in the paths of the Society. In one of his articles Kostomarov referred to the dreams of the Ukrainians for membership in a great Federation of Slavs. This was, however, exceptional. The experiences of exile and growing caution with increasing age forced the writers to follow a more sober policy of emphasizing the necessity for educating the peasants and for promoting a modest cultural program.

At the same time, Russian society itself had travelled far from the optimistic hopes that had swayed it during the Romantic period. In a sense, the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius had been a belated child of that great idealistic movement that had swept over the Slavs in the thirties and had been inspired and nourished by the Czech writers of the period. It formed also a transition from the high hopes of the Decembrists of 1825 to the sentimental dreams of the forties. Now at the end of the fifties, the mood of the public had turned again. The intellectual leadership of Russia was in the hands of the intelligentsia, who were much interested in the social reforms that were sought for and were little interested in the general fate of Russia or of any particular part of it. It was the period of Fathers and Children of Turgenev, the volume that launched on Russian society the character of Bazarov and the philosophy of nihilism, the idea that nothing was good that could not be justified by natural science and by reason.

As a result, the younger men of the Osnova cared very little for the more idealistic and sentimental sides of the journal. There was no one to control the contents of the magazine and to win the respect of the entire mass of people who were interested in the cause of Ukraine. Shevchenko was dying and within a year the Osnova came to an untimely end. Yet it had done its work in transferring the cause of Ukraine from the older to the younger generation, even though the two differed in many important particulars.

For the moment the government, under the spell of the liberation of the serfs, was disposed to tolerate all this activity. Kulish was even encouraged to prepare a Ukrainian translation of the Imperial decree providing for the liberation of the serfs. It seemed as if the Ukrainians might be allowed to establish schools where the children would be taught in their native tongue. The success of the cultural program of the young Ukrainian leaders seemed assured. Of course in all this there was no open political action, for it must not be forgotten that at this period there was no opening for political life anywhere in Russia. There was nothing that corresponded to political parties, to elections or to free political discussion. There was even no organized group among the Russians which aspired or voiced their aspirations for such procedure, so that there was necessarily a vagueness about the real goal of all this cultural activity that has been used at a later time by the enemies of Ukraine to dub it mere literary nationalism.

Suddenly everything changed. In 1863 there came another revolt among the Poles in Russia. It was a heroic but desperate venture which was doomed in advance to failure. At the same time there were repeated the sad words of Shevchenko, “Poland fell but it ruined us.” A very few of the most Polonized Ukrainians joined in the movement. The Poles themselves complained that they did not receive Ukrainian support, but they succeeded in inspiring the fear in the Russian government that the movement to restore a free Poland would automatically involve the separation of all Ukraine from Russia. The leaders of the Empire now reversed the policy that they had taken in 1847. At that time they were afraid that the Ukrainians would long to go back to their days of practical independence and would throw off the Russian yoke. Now they became convinced that the Ukrainians would give up any hopes of winning their own liberty and would be glad to be lost in a Polish state.

As a result they decided to renew their efforts to wipe out the last vestiges of Ukrainian separatism and to end the Ukrainian language. Count Valuyev, the Minister of the Interior, declared that there never was, is not and never will be a separate Little Russian language but that it was only a peasant dialect of Great Russian. To that end he gave an order that henceforth there should be allowed to be printed in Ukrainian only those books which fell in the field of belles-lettres. Publication of all books in the Little Russian language which had religious content, textbooks and in general books intended for elementary reading should be forbidden. Valuyev pretended that Great Russian was intelligible to every literate person and that there was no reason why the illiterate masses should not begin their education in it. He also pretended to think that the writings of the early Ukrainian authors were on the same par as peasant dialect stories in any language and so he ostensibly left a loophole, but since these books could be put in simple form for the masses, the censors interpreted his ideas to hold that works in belles-lettres might be used as elementary readers and therefore they could not be published. As a result there were some years in which no work in Ukrainian appeared at all.

It would be interesting to know if this outburst of fear of separatism was in any degree aided by the American Civil War, then at its height. It was at this time that the Imperial Russian Government sent a fleet to New York, perhaps to serve as a counterweight to any possible interference by Western European powers on behalf of the South, and such authors as Dostoyevsky were making allusions to the bloody struggle that was going on in the New World. The establishment of the United States had had a great effect on Russian educated thought a half century earlier and perhaps some of the Russian officials now were apprehensive of trouble.

At all events the sixties defined precisely the attitude that the Russian government was to take toward Ukrainian cultural aspirations for the rest of the nineteenth century, until the Revolution of 1905. The various Ukrainian journals were suppressed. Some of the writers were sent to Siberia for several years. Others, such as Kulish, ultimately made their way to Galicia and lived in virtual exile, while their books, published there in Lviv, were smuggled into Russia to keep alive the spark of Ukrainian freedom.

It was difficult for the Imperial regime to maintain a consistent policy for long. In a few years there came a slight relaxation of the more stringent rulings of the censorship and some Ukrainian books were published. The seventies were the great period of the Narodniki, when the educated youth became convinced of their mission to go to the people, disguise themselves as peasants and try to educate their unfortunate brothers. Under such conditions it was only natural that the same movement was attempted by some of the younger Ukrainians, that there came similar publications intended for clandestine use by the Ukrainians who sought thus to keep their adherents from being submerged in the corresponding Russian movement. At the same time there can be no doubt that many of the more zealous partisans of social reform, especially in St. Petersburg, tended to join the Russian illegal movements and for a time at least lost any special interest in the fate of Ukraine in their zeal for humanity.

At the same time there was founded in 1872 the Southern Branch of the Geographical Society and around this there gathered a large number of Ukrainians, writing scientific articles in Russian but emphasizing those aspects of South Russian life that were most alien to the general Russian traditions. They helped to place the knowledge of Ukrainian culture on a firmer basis, even though some of the more socially minded sneered at their efforts as of no immediate importance.

These young men, largely at the University of Kiev, formed themselves into a society, the Hromada, which worked vigorously along purely scientific, ethnological and philological lines. They included Prof. V. Antonovich and later Mykhaylo Drahomaniv, by far the most brilliant of the scholars of this generation.

Yet even this scientific work, published for the most part in Russian, still seemed suspicious to the Imperial government. Anything which demanded any cultural rights for the Ukrainian people or mentioned differences between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians or Little Russians or South Russians seemed to be dangerous separatism. This was the more striking because the scholars of Moscow and St. Petersburg at the same time were emphasizing the great differences between the cultures of Moscow and Kiev in the past, were emphasizing that the culture of Kiev was often more Polish than Russian and were teaching their own students, with governmental approval, that the Kievans who came to Moscow in the seventeenth century were to all intents and purposes foreigners who were ill received by the masses of the Muscovites. At the same time the force of public opinion among the radical intelligentsia was emphasizing the fact that Russian literature belonged to the areas around the capitals. It is interesting that except for Count Alexis K. Tolstoy, who advocated the point of view that Kiev represented the European side of the Russians, there were practically no novels written during this entire period depicting the life of the people of Ukraine. After the death of Gogol in 1852, it was possible to rummage into the highways and byways of Russian literature without becoming aware that Kiev and its adjoining regions even existed as part of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. It is fair to say that never, even in the most stringent period of Muscovite isolation, was Russian literature so confined to Great Russian territory as in the Golden Age of the Russian novel and of the intelligentsia, that is the period between 1840 and 1881.

In 1875, a former friend of Kostomarov, one M. Yuzefovich, reported to authorities on the separatist tendencies of this work of the Kiev Hromada. As a result a commission was appointed consisting of him, the Ministers Timashev and Tolstoy and the Chief of the Gendarmes, Potapov, to study the dangerous situation that prevailed in “Little Russia.” The committee reported that, “the entire literary activity of the so-called Ukrainophiles must be considered as an attempt on the national unity and wholeness of Russia, only hidden by plausible forms.” As a result, the Tsar issued an order on May 18, 1876, forbidding the importation of books printed abroad in the Little Russian dialect and also forbidding the printing and publishing in the Empire of original works and translations in this dialect with the exception only of: “(a) historical documents and monuments; (b) works of belles-lettres, but with the proviso that with the printing of historical monuments there must be kept the correct orthography of the originals; in works of belles-lettres there must not be allowed any deviations from the generally accepted Russian orthography and that the permission to print works of belles-lettres should be given not otherwise than after the examination of the manuscripts in the Central Administration of the Press; and (c) forbidding various theatrical presentations and readings in the Little Russian dialect and also the printing of such a text to musical notes.”

It is well to note the emphasis laid upon spelling in this decree. In the seventeenth century Great Russian had been taught from Ukrainian Church Slavonic grammars, as that of Smotritsky, and the students had been taught to make the necessary corrections in pronunciation. Once practice had brought to these letters the Russian values during the intervening centuries, the acceptance of the Russian pronunciation made difficulties for the pronunciation of Ukrainian words. Kulish had prepared a new alphabet which retained the Cyrillic script but which was suited to Ukrainian and this was being generally accepted by the modern Ukrainian authors. It was to resist this influence that the government decided not only to bar the new literature, but even where it allowed it, to bar the new alphabet and thus create another obstacle to the spread of the “Little Russian dialect.”

The result might have been foreseen. Some of the more timorous souls dropped away from literature and consented to write in Great Russian. The others who were more determined, worked the harder to enter Galicia and to profit by the relative freedom there. The decree merely furnished more fuel to the fire and instead of ending the Ukrainian movement it caused it to take even more extreme forms.

Yet some of the Russian authorities in Ukraine themselves felt that some of these rules and still more their methods of application were only adding to the difficulties of the situation. The prohibition of printing songs with a Ukrainian text for example cut hard at the rendering of songs which all agreed were of superior quality. Plays produced in Russian in Ukrainian villages did not satisfy the popular demand and the habit grew of allowing Ukrainian plays to be produced, provided that the company would also produce at the same time some Russian piece.

In 1882 a group of Ukrainians secured permission to print in Kiev an archaeological journal, the Antiquities of Kiev, and this was granted in a temporary relaxation of the censorship. Later it became possible to include in it a few articles written in Ukrainian, especially when printed in the Russian manner. All such devices were unsatisfactory but the reign of Alexander III was a definite period of reaction in all fields and it was not until the time of Nicholas II that there came any marked lightening of the censorship.

The censorship in Kiev and the other cities of Ukraine was vastly stricter than it was in St. Petersburg. Hence during these years the centre of such publishing as was allowed was the very capital from which the orders were coming to prevent the development of a Ukrainian literature. It was often possible there to issue relatively cheap editions which could be transported to the south and it was there that the new writers like Lesya Ukrainka, Hrinchenko and Kotsyubinsky saw their works in print. For books which could not come out there, there was always Galicia.

In view of the conditions of Russian life, the Ukrainian revival in Russia had to take the exclusive form of cultural work and scientific study. There were many secret and underground groups as there were among the Russians. In many cases the two groups fused for actual revolutionary activity and Ukrainians were often involved in the plots of the various Russian movements. This was a handicap for the work of the Ukrainian leaders and it prevented a full appreciation of the situation by the often still illiterate peasants, who on the whole took relatively little part in the movements that were going on throughout the entire country.

Insofar as the masses of the peasants were affected by the growing unrest, it was rather their desire for land and for better living conditions that moved them. They continued to speak their native language in their homes and villages but far too many of them had not been interested in the general development of the country. They thought in terms of their own communities. Many of them emigrated to Siberia and to Russian Central Asia. Others made their way abroad.

At the same time there was a renewed period of Russification. This came from two distinct sources. As in the past, a considerable number of the Ukrainians who found it possible to secure an education in Russian schools tended to absorb the Russian point of view and to separate themselves from their original background. They accepted the theories which the government gave them, that Ukrainian was somehow a peasant dialect and that it was more fashionable and more modern to try to speak the ruling tongue. This was the same argument from which Ukraine had suffered for centuries and which had been aided immensely by the unfortunate decision in the sixteenth century to lay the main emphasis upon Church Slavonic as the bulwark of Orthodoxy.

A second source developed however in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when there began an extensive movement of Great Russians into the growing cities of Ukraine. More and more Russians came to live in Kiev and Kharkiv and the other important sites which grew up with the building of railroads and the increase of industrial activity in the area. Russians began to settle in the Donets basin, where there were extensive coal deposits, and in the neighborhood of the iron mines not too far distant. Others moved into Odesa which became the chief seaport on the Black Sea.

All of these factors proved a severe handicap to the development of the Ukrainian revival, but they did not hinder it and at the end of the nineteenth century, it was already abundantly clear that there was a large and steadily growing population which was proud of its language and of its traditions. It was evident that Ukrainian culture had again turned the corner and that it was a force to be reckoned with, despite the ideas of both the Imperial government and its enemies, the Russian radicals.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

After the failure of the movement of 1848, there ensued a period of reaction and of torpor in Galicia and the other Ukrainian lands in the Hapsburg Empire. For a brief moment it had seemed as if there might be a general solution of the various questions involved but outside of the formal liberation of the serfs nothing had been accomplished.

At the same time there came a period of crisis throughout the Empire. With Russian help the revolt of Hungary had been suppressed, and for a decade the Emperor Francis Joseph II was able to rule as an absolute monarch and defy the wishes of all portions of the Empire. Yet even this could not last, for at the end of that decade the Austrian armies were badly defeated by the Italians at the battle of Solferino and worse was to come with the battle of Sadowa in 1867, when the armies were overwhelmed by the Prussians. The outcome of these defeats was the reorganization of Austria-Hungary as the Dual Monarchy, which it remained until 1918, and the granting to the Poles of the control of Galicia.

These developments were not without significance for the fate of the Ukrainians, whether they lived in Galicia, in Bukovina or in Carpatho-Ukraine. The language question was still being bitterly debated but at this moment there were two leading parties.

The conservatives, and they included a large part of the Uniat clergy and the richer and more prosperous sections of the laity, held out strongly for the old Church Slavonic. They still maintained the theory that there was almost something sacred in the maintenance of the traditional language and they felt vaguely that there was something heretical and impious about the attempts to read and write in the language of the ordinary peasants.

On the other hand the influence of those who desired to approximate the language to Russian increased. The results of the intervention of the Russian army in its fight against the Hungarians had had a great effect upon the population of Carpatho-Ukraine in particular. Some of their ablest leaders, such as Dobryansky and Dukhnovich, had definitely taken sides with the invaders and had retired with them to Russia on their withdrawal. From this time on a large part of the people of this area remained devoted to the Russian cause and continued to use a jargon which they confidently believed to be Russian. The same was true to a lesser extent in Bukovina, and the Moscophile party in Galicia was very important.

For a while it even seemed that the conservatives would make common cause with them. They gradually lost hope in Austria. They realized that the defeats of the Austrian army were jeopardizing the security of the Empire, and the Austrian recognition of the Polish interests in Galicia cut them to the quick. Under such circumstances they idealized the Empire of Nicholas I and paid little attention to the results of the Crimean War. They saw only that for a moment the Russian army had offered a brighter prospect to the Ukrainians of Eastern Ukraine. They also completely ignored the fact that even under the conditions prevailing in Galicia they were still able to have certain political rights which were completely denied in Eastern Ukraine.

On the other hand, the younger generation passed under the influence of Shevchenko. They read the writings of Marko Vovchok and they realized the weaknesses of Imperial Russia. They had learned something of western ideals from study in Vienna and elsewhere and they felt more strongly the advantages of the more democratic tendencies which they learned from the West and from the modern literature of Eastern Ukraine.

Thus the stage was set for a bitter struggle in Western Ukraine as a whole and it lasted for a couple of decades before there came the definite triumph of those forces which sought to develop the national tradition. Some even went so far as to argue for the creation of a definite Ruthenia which would include all of the Ukrainians in the Hapsburg dominions and sought to differentiate themselves both from the Poles, the Russians and the Eastern Ukrainians. They glorified as well as they could the government of Austria and promised absolute loyalty to the Hapsburg rulers.

It soon became evident, however, that in its simplest and baldest form this position too was impossible. The differences between them and their neighbors proved to be greater than those between them and the Eastern Ukraine and it was not long before this idea went the way of so many other opinions in Ukrainian history.

The entire controversy was based upon a curious misconception. The Moscophiles knew little more of Russia than that the Russian armies had successfully invaded Hungary in 1849. They knew very little about the difficulties of the Ukrainians resident in Russia and they knew little more about the development of life in Eastern Ukraine. At the very moment when they were dreaming of how much better off the Ukrainians were in Russia, the Ukrainians of the east were looking hopefully to Galicia for a freedom which they did not have at home.

It was at this moment that the first copies of the Osnova began to arrive in Lviv and the other cities. Then came in quick succession the news that this journal had ceased to exist and that a ban had been imposed on all Ukrainian writings in Russia. This startling news was followed by the appearance in Lviv of Kulish and of other Ukrainian authors who brought eye-witness accounts of the forcible suppression of Ukrainian culture in the land where the modern revival had started.

The arrival of these refugees from their envied homeland started to turn the scale in the larger part of Galicia. It made it clear to the younger and more alert people that they had been mistaken and that much of the boasted well-being of the Ukrainians of Russia was only a mirage. They realized the advantages of their own position and they set to work to use the native language—sometimes in a Galician dialect which differed somewhat from that employed by Shevchenko and the writers from the left bank of the Dnyeper.

For the next decades as we have seen, the bulk of Ukrainian literature written in Eastern Ukraine was published in Lviv. The young men came to know the refugees and emigrants and slowly but surely the century-old barrier between the provinces began to break down. For the first time in centuries there came a real transfer of ideas between Eastern and Western Ukraine.

This movement was greatly assisted by the work of Mykhaylo Drahomaniv, one of the most brilliant of the publicists, who had profited by the relaxation of censorship in Russia during the early seventies. As a professor of the University of Kiev, he came in contact with the various socialist parties of Russia and then in 1876, after the renewed ban on Ukrainian work, he emigrated to Switzerland where he could work more freely. Later he became a professor at the University of Sofia in Bulgaria, where he died in 1895. Drahomaniv continued the ideas of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius in his belief that there should be developed a federal union of all the Slavs, but he differed from the earlier group in emphasizing the necessity of adapting Slavonic life to the progressive European thought of the seventies and eighties and in emphasizing freedom of the individual, socialism, and rationalism. He realized also that in such a case it would be necessary to bring together all the natives of Ukraine and his active work was devoted to bringing this about. Thus he corresponded freely with friends in Galicia as well as in Eastern Ukraine. He collected money to aid in the publication of journals at Lviv which would be favorable to his ideas and at the same time he worked to establish contacts between the thought of Ukraine and that of the western world. His influence, exerted upon both Moscophiles and nationalists, did much to weaken the former, for he was able to show that they knew little and cared less about the accomplishments of Russian literature and that it was idle for them to think of inclusion in a Great Russia on the basis of their chimerical dreams.

His ideas were naturally opposed by the more conservative classes, who were still trying to support the artificial Church Slavonic language, and they repelled many because of their social hypotheses. Even the young Franko was arrested because it was supposed that he was in contact with Drahomaniv. Nevertheless, his position won adherents constantly and proved a strong ferment in the hitherto sterile controversies that had been going on.

Drahomaniv laid great stress upon the Ukrainian development in Galicia, for he realized that there was here the only possibility of obtaining some experience in political organization. Bad as the government of Austria-Hungary was, there were possibilities for the Ukrainians to make their influence felt along political lines. There was no possibility of this in Russia, where party activity was still entirely forbidden.

Under the various compromises that had been made in Austria-Hungary after the establishment of the Dual Monarchy, Galicia had passed entirely into the hands of the Poles, who furnished a large part of the higher officials of the province under Austrian rule. However, their power was not absolute, for it was the consistent policy of Vienna not to solve any of the main questions that confronted the Empire but to endeavor to maintain a balance between the various peoples in a given province, playing off one against another and thus preventing any definite lineup against the central authority.

This had been the method adopted in 1848, when it looked at one time as if Austria would concede many rights to the Ukrainians in the province and even allow the establishment of a Ukrainian university at Lviv. It was never done, for the swing of reaction had blocked all moves in this direction. Nevertheless, much could be accomplished, if the Ukrainian population were really awakened to demand their rights and throughout the eighties a larger and larger number of persons appeared qualified to take the post of leadership in the undertaking.

In many ways Ivan Franko played the leading role in this. As a journalist, novelist and poet, he worked steadily and effectively to arouse the people. He pointed out the economic needs of the province, he pictured the social defects of society, he translated into Ukrainian many of the masterpieces of European literature, and he worked energetically on all the progressive papers of the area.

As early as 1868 there had been established in Lviv a cultural society, the Prosvita, and a little later in 1873 there was set up the Shevchenko Society, with the idea of publishing serious books in Ukrainian. Progress was very slow and it was more than ten years before enough funds were available to undertake any important work. Then it commenced to prosper. It was renamed the Scientific Society in 1892, and in 1898 it was again reorganized as the Shevchenko Scientific Society. It attracted the attention of scholars everywhere for the excellence of its publications. This and many other activities made Galicia the real centre for Ukrainian work and it gave a vitality to the Ukrainian cause which was impossible in Russia, where the censorship tried to block everything that was done.

Early in the nineties there was made an attempt to unite the Poles and Ukrainians for political purposes but it came to nothing. By the beginning of the twentieth century, there had come a definite split between the two nationalities, and Polish and Ukrainian parties were set up.

In one sense this separation had a tendency to hold back the securing of high posts by the Ukrainians, for the Poles, with Viennese backing, still retained their control of the province. On the other hand it trained the Ukrainians to act together and to take a more active interest in politics. It forced them to engage in many educational activities and, as they had done so often in Austria, to lay the foundation for their own school system, to be supported by their own funds. It encouraged them to engage in various financial enterprises on their own behalf, and although their economic situation remained unfavorable, demands were made for the establishment of a Ukrainian University in Lviv. Even more ambitious plans were seriously presented to the Viennese government of definitely separating Western Galicia, where the Poles were in a majority, from Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainians were the dominant population. Such an act might have been of great importance for the future of Austria-Hungary, had the Emperor ever been willing to attempt a definite settlement of any of the problems before him.

Instead of that, the movement only sharpened the antagonism between the two groups, for it was becoming evident that the Poles were losing their absolute control of the province. In each election to the Galician Diet the Ukrainians won for themselves a larger number of seats and their leaders were slowly becoming trained in the intricacies of Austrian politics. They were gradually shaking off their old hesitation and their own acquiescence in the superiority of Polish ability and Polish culture. The results were often increased disturbances and led even to the assassination of the Polish governor of the province, Count Andrew Potocki, in 1902. Every step of progress was bitterly contested by the Poles, who persisted in their traditional policy and could not understand why any concessions should be made to those whom they regarded as their natural inferiors.

In this progress the Uniat Church played a great part. The technical head of the Church, Archbishop Count Andrey Sheptitsky, a member of a noble family which had furnished several archbishops to the Uniats, put himself at the head of all the various charitable and social movements. A distinguished figure and a devout and able leader, he was able to accomplish much for his people. He reorganized the spiritual life of the Church so as to bring it nearer to modern conditions and there was hardly a single feature of life in Galicia which promised well for the people in which he did not take a personal interest.

Thus by the early years of the twentieth century and the approach of the First World War, conditions in Galicia had been vitally changed. The Ukrainian masses were no longer satisfied with the mere appellation of Ruthenian. The province which had been the most lost to the Ukrainian cause had been made the most advanced and the most conscious of its inheritance. The forces that had been striving for the adaptation of Ukrainian culture and language to that of Russia had been definitely checked and the influence that was radiating from Lviv was in its turn impinging upon Kiev and the Ukraine that was still under Russia. At the same time, conditions were still such that the fight in the province between the Ukrainian and Polish populations remained undecided, but a few more years of peace would undoubtedly strengthen the Ukrainian position still further.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND WAR

The revolution of 1905 made many changes in the life of Russia and these affected very materially the situation in Ukraine. For the period of a few weeks it appeared as if the entire country were reverting to a state of chaos. There seemed little positive agreement upon any definite course of action. Change was in the air. Each nationality in the Russian Empire, each social class propounded its own program and there was no central authority to decide between them. The Imperial power seemed weakened after the disastrous Russo-Japanese War but the various malcontents were not prepared to harmonize their differences into a working whole. As a result the forces of the central government were ultimately able to resume control and gradually annul many of the promises that they had been forced to make at the height of the movement.

The agrarian disturbances in Eastern Ukraine were among the most bitter in the entire Empire but it was relatively easy to consider these as more agrarian than national, the more so as up to this time Russian authorities had refused to consider Ukraine as a separate entity within the Empire. That had been destroyed by Catherine and even though the conditions of landholding were far more favorable to the individual than elsewhere in Russia, it would have been exceedingly tactless for the autocracy and the liberals alike to stress any symptoms of dissatisfaction that came from a separatist source. For good or ill it was necessary for Russia, the Russia of the right or the left, to maintain the theory that Ukraine and Russia were one and inseparable or a fire would be kindled that would be difficult to extinguish.

The prohibition of the publication of books in the Ukrainian language for forty years now bore very definite fruits. The Ukrainian leaders were not in a position to distribute revolutionary material in their native language as well as were the Poles, the Baltic peoples and the groups of the Caucasus. The peasants (and they were the chief force in the disturbances in the country) were concerned about the land question and undoubtedly paid more attention to the economic situation than the national and cultural problems.

On the other hand, in the various cities of Ukraine where there had been an influx of Great Russians, largely workmen, the appeals of the radical parties that also denied the existence of Ukraine, led the strikers in the various factories to emphasize the demands that they made on the owners and on the government. Here again it was highly expedient to play down the feelings of any self-conscious Ukrainian groups and to label them as dreamers and as fantastic individuals who were romantically trying to recall a long vanished past.

It is significant in view of the frequent statements that only a handful of scholars and literary men were in favor of Ukrainian separate development that the new laws introduced by the government repealed all the prohibitions that had been made in 1863 and 1876. The censorship was lifted and without delay there began a flood of Ukrainian newspapers and journals in all the cities of Ukraine. Several were started in Kiev, in Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Poltava. In places where for over a century there had not been a word of Ukrainian spoken (according to the information of the government), now newspapers sprang up almost like magic to supply a need that was solemnly declared to be non-existent.

More than that, the Imperial Academy of Sciences re-studied the question of Little Russian and officially decided that Ukrainian formed an independent East Slavonic language and was not a mere dialect of Great Russian. This fact alone was a complete reversal of the position taken for a century by scholars, journalists, radicals and critics. It justified the position of the Ukrainian national party in Galicia and it also warmly supported the attitude of the Great Russian scholars who had so persistently and inconsistently emphasized the differences between the Muscovites and the people of Kiev in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It could not of course restore to the Ukrainian cause those millions of people who during the past centuries had become Russianized in order to acquire the civilized and highly cultured society which they had lost hope of finding at home.

Thus, following the Revolution of 1905, Ukrainian was restored, on paper at least, to its rightful place as a language in the Russian Empire. Yet for post-revolutionary Russia it was a dangerous thing. In the era of repression that followed the failure of the Revolution, attempts were made to censor the publications in Ukrainian more severely than those of other nationalities. It was also forbidden to open schools in Ukraine with instruction in Ukrainian. Many devices were tried to stem the spread of Ukrainian knowledge. Abroad the Russian government still continued to deny the existence of a separate Ukrainian people, and here it won its greatest success.

There was a Ukrainian bloc forming in the First Duma which met in 1906 but this was dissolved before it really could get to work. In the later Dumas the elections were better controlled and the Ukrainians were compelled to realize that they had a long way to go before they could secure even equal treatment with the other nationalities in the Russian Empire. It was too important for Russia at all costs to maintain the unity with the Ukraine, to control its Black Sea coast and its rich resources to allow too close examination of the forces that were spreading in the area.

Yet even those reliefs that were offered to the people showed again the vitality of the movement. In 1907 there was established at Kiev a Shevchenko Scientific Society which worked very closely with the older foundation in Lviv. The Literary and Scientific Review, of which Franko was one of the chief editors and contributors, started a second edition in Kiev. In every way it was becoming uncomfortably clear to both Russia and Austria-Hungary that the two Ukraines were coming to consider themselves one, but separated by a foreign border, exactly as was the case in Russian and Austrian Poland.

As a symbol of this new unification, Prof. Michael Hrushevsky moved from Lviv to Kiev. Prof Hrushevsky had made himself the outstanding authority on Ukrainian history. He was born in Russian Ukraine in 1866 and had been educated in the University of Kiev. Then in 1890, when there was established at the University of Lviv a chair of Ukrainian history, he had been offered it and there he remained for nearly twenty years, producing the early volumes of his massive history of his native country. He examined the early records and did more than any one else to disprove the traditional point of view that after the Tatar invasions Ukraine had become merely an empty land and that the Kozaks and the later inhabitants were really a group of immigrants from either Poland or Moscow.

His arrival in Kiev and his active part in the Shevchenko Scientific Society there was perhaps the outstanding event during this period. It meant that in Kiev and in Russian Ukraine, where the revival of the nation had actually started, there would now be established the real centre of Ukrainian historical scholarship. It meant that the bonds between Kiev and Lviv would be tightened and that it might not be impossible for the two sections to work together, in case there should be a conflagration in Europe which would involve the two Empires.

This could not fail to have an effect upon European politics and indirectly upon the future fate of the Ukrainians and their position in world opinion. Russia as the self-appointed protector of all the Slavs could not fail to look with dissatisfaction at the loss of influence of her friends in Austria-Hungary. As the self-appointed model of Orthodoxy, she could not but be displeased at the success of the Uniats and at their revival in Eastern Galicia. During the years before 1914, she made constant efforts to turn back the Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy, especially in Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungary. She exploited in every way possible any unrest or discontent in the mountain valleys and hoped in the coming struggle to be able to profit by these newfound friends. At the same time her own position and her own attitude insisted upon thinking of all Ukrainians as merely a form of Russians and she could not visualize any policy other than that of complete Russification.

On the other hand, Austria-Hungary and later Germany could not be blind to the potentialities of the Ukrainian movement. They had first used it as a tool against the dangers offered by Polish irredentism. Now as they saw it growing in Russia, they began to wonder if it might not be used also as a means of disintegrating that country also. Some of their leaders began to scheme how this could best be done and they were willing to make minor concessions in Eastern Galicia which might win over the loyalty of the Ukrainians and make them more willing to be loyal to the Dual Monarchy.

In this position there ensued a curious tug of war. With the two Empires still nominally at peace, each was doing its best to sponsor a movement that would redound to its advantage in case of war. Neither one was willing to take any action or embark upon a course that would benefit the Ukrainians themselves. Austria would not establish a separate Ukrainian province which could appear openly in the Parliament and speak freely for the Ukrainian citizens of the Dual Monarchy. Russia would not grant such privileges to the Ukrainians in her own land as would prevent them from looking across the border. She regularly repressed Ukrainian meetings held on the anniversary of the death of Shevchenko, even in St. Petersburg, and continued the monotonous list of arrests and annoying restrictions on all Ukrainian activities. Even such a man as Milyukov could not fail to see that the policy of the government was working to strengthen a movement for Ukrainian separatism, at the very moment when it was trying to Russianize the Ukrainians of Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina.

In this crisis the Ukrainians showed their lack of political maturity. They had been so absorbed in the struggle to lay the foundations for their survival and revival that they had had no opportunity to prepare their position before the outside world. Their great writers and thinkers were less well known abroad than were the leading figures of any other great people. They did not have the control of a single university which would make them known to the world of scholars. They did not have any outstanding figures, known abroad, to plead their cause before neutral opinion and they did not realize that their claims would be evaluated in foreign lands in accordance with the national prejudices of those countries toward the two great Empires which were quarreling over their possession.

Hence it was that when the crisis actually broke in 1914, Ukraine was a land of mystery to all except a very few scholars. There was no voice raised in her behalf as that of Paderewski for Poland or Masaryk for Czechoslovakia. Lying within the initial theatre of war and destined to be ravaged by armies on both sides, the Ukrainians had little to do except to trust to the justice of their cause and hope that somehow and in some way they would attract the attention to their problem that it deserved. For years the neighboring peoples had been waiting for the day to come. They had made preparations, often more as an intangible dream than as stark reality but they could, in the crucial moment, put these preparations into action. They could rely upon distinguished sons to win them a hearing everywhere. Rich emigrants could come to their assistance. The Ukrainians had nothing of this. Franko might look forward to the independence of his people with the downfall of the Empires, but even he could hardly think of the way to put his country’s cause before the world. Ukraine entered the First World War as the forgotten nation, but the century and a quarter since the new revival started had changed it from an inchoate mass of serfs, as it was at the time of the extinction of the old traditions, into a fairly well concentrated group of people with a strong core and a strong self-consciousness that could not be ignored and that would not perish without striking a blow in its own behalf.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war upon Russia and the First World War was on. The tensions and controversies that had been growing in bitterness beneath the surface all through the nineteenth century now exploded with unparalleled force. The future was to be anybody’s guess, for the increasing magnitude of the struggle soon overflowed the bounds that had been set for it in the thoughts of the leaders of the various countries, and the most fantastic dreamer could not have imagined the strange changes that were to take place in an area that seemed to the outside world fixed and determined for centuries.

In such a turmoil the Ukrainian problem was involved from almost the first day of the struggle. In Austria, without any delay, the government arrested and interned all the leaders of the Ukrainians who had been in any way sympathetic to Russia. Their institutions were closed, and their publications stopped, for Austria-Hungary had no intention of allowing them to be the focus of a movement on behalf of the enemy.

At the same time, in Russian Ukraine, the Russian government for its part at once suppressed all Ukrainian activity. The newspapers that had been published in Kiev and elsewhere with governmental permission were closed and the patriotic enthusiasm played into the hands of the Russian nationalists, who had long been displeased at the Ukrainian development. From 1914 until the Revolution there was steadily increasing agitation to eliminate everything Ukrainian from the Russian Empire, and leaders of all parties vied with one another in discovering new methods of upsetting and preventing Ukrainian work. The ostensible excuse was that the Ukrainians were really Russians and that it was German influence and money that was developing the Ukrainian culture, language and national consciousness. It would take too long to recite all the devices that were invoked. Authors desiring to publish in Ukrainian were ordered to give three copies of their manuscripts to the censors in advance of publication. Then these were examined and held up, changes were made, and the publication was prevented. The leaders of the Ukrainians were arrested and moved further into the country so that they could have no possibility of working and of corresponding with the enemy. Requirements were made that all Ukrainian articles should be published only in the Russian orthography. Ukrainian work in Eastern Ukraine was brought to as complete a halt as the Tsarist government could accomplish.

At the same time the Russian armies invaded Eastern Galicia and on September 3, 1914, within a month after the beginning of the war, they occupied the city of Lviv. It was now the turn of the pro-Russian faction. The Russian Governor General of Galicia, Count A. G. Bobrinsky, intended to wipe out the entire Ukrainian movement and willingly listened to the denunciations of the Ukrainians offered by the pro-Russian party. Ukrainian libraries and reading rooms were closed, Ukrainian co-operatives and other institutions were brought to an end, and everything was done to prove to the people that they were Russians and nothing else. Even Prof. Hrushevsky, who was seized at his summer home in the Carpathians, was sent to Nizhni Novgorod on the Volga under arrest, although the Russian Academy of Sciences later arranged to have him moved to Moscow where he could work in the libraries. He was followed into arrest and exile by thousands of the intellectual leaders of Galicia.

It was not only the secular institutions that were affected. The Russians decided to wipe out the Uniat Church. Many of the priests had fled before the approach of the Russian armies. Those who remained were forced to return to Orthodoxy, exactly as Russia had done in all of the territory which she had taken from Poland during the last century and a half. As a result, relations between the peasantry and the Russians became even worse than between the Russians and the Poles in the western part of Galicia. Archbishop Sheptitsky, the head of the Uniat Church, was arrested and sent into Russia and was not allowed to return to his home for years.

Finally the Tsar himself visited Lviv and other centres in the spring of 1915, and in well chosen words declared that Galicia was now an inherent part of Russia and would remain so. The Russians spread over the entire province up to Krakow. They occupied much of Carpatho-Ukraine and threatened to go through the passes of the mountains into the plains of Hungary.

This was the high watermark of the Russian advance into Austria-Hungary. At the end of April, 1915, the German armies of General Mackensen broke the Russian line on the Dunajec River and compelled a general retreat. This meant more misery for the inhabitants of Western Ukraine. Naturally the pro-Russian Ukrainians hurried to get out of the province. In addition to them, the Russian armies gathered up as much of the population as they could and started them, willingly or unwillingly, with their families and their cattle on a long march into Russia to a place of safety. Thousands of displaced Ukrainians were thus gathered in prisons and concentration camps in and around Kiev and countless thousands were moved by train to Kazan, to Perm and on into Siberia. The enforced migration was the largest of its kind in Ukrainian history, even exceeding the depopulation of the country during the Ruin of the seventeenth century.

When they reached their destination, the Russians continued to maintain the theory that they were only Russian and hence it was unnecessary for them to found Ukrainian schools for the children, to establish Ukrainian relief committees or to maintain any organizations in their new homes. They were given none of the privileges that were extended to the Poles or other nationalities uprooted in the same eastward retreat of the Russian armies, and it was intended that they should vanish without a trace into the Russian mass.

A later offensive by General Brusilov in 1916 recovered for Russia a small area in the southeast, but of course the advance of the armies on Ukrainian territory only revived the oppression of the population. Until the Russian revolution, there could be no talk of any Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire. Milyukov, it is true, once brought to the attention of the Duma the sad condition of these Western Ukrainians in Russian exile and prison camps but he aroused no enthusiasm, for liberals and reactionaries alike insisted that the Ukrainians were Russians and that there was no Ukrainian question at all.

On the other hand the return of the Austro-German armies to Galicia after the Russian retreat brought back the status quo in the province. The Ukrainian institutions were reopened, where they had not been completely destroyed by the Russian occupation. At the outbreak of the war there had been established at Vienna a Society for the Liberation of Ukraine by various refugees from Russia. This endeavored to keep the Ukrainian question before the eyes of the Austrian authorities in the hope that the Central Powers would create an independent Ukraine out of any territory that might be detached from Russia. This was broadened in 1915 to form a General Ukrainian Council to consider all phases of the Ukrainian question and to oppose the activities of the Poles of Galicia. Like the Polish Legions of Pilsudski, the Ukrainians established the Sichovi Striltsi (The Riflemen of the Sich) and organized two regiments, although the development of the Austro-German policy prevented these from playing any important part in the war.

On November 23, 1916, the Emperor Francis Joseph gave orders to prepare a decree establishing Galicia as a Polish state, with almost as much independence as had been planned for the Kingdom of Poland, to be set up by the Germans out of Polish territory taken from Russia. This was a severe blow to the Ukrainians, for they had hoped that Galicia would be divided and that the Ukrainian section would receive special recognition. It was not to be, but the Ukrainians protested sharply against the idea of adding the province of Kholm to the Polish lands. Yet they became bitterly disillusioned, for they realized that even during the strain of a War which was placing greater and greater burdens upon all the citizens of the Dual Monarchy, the blighting hand of the Hapsburgs was still working against them and preventing, as in the past, any final settlement of the position of the province. The activity of the Polish National Committee in the lands of the Entente seemed to the authorities a greater menace than the domestic feeling of the Ukrainian peasants and as these had been unable to get an effective hearing throughout the world and were the object of a vicious propaganda by Russia, it hardly seemed worthwhile to the government at Vienna to give much thought to the already devastated province.

Thus the weary years of war dragged along and still nothing was done to improve the condition of the Ukrainians or to satisfy in any degree their legitimate aspirations. They were still as they had been in the past—the forgotten members of the Hapsburg dominions. They could pay taxes and serve in the army, but whenever there came any talk of a readjustment of conditions in the Empire, they were overlooked. They had won what they had through profiting by the fears of the government as to Polish intentions but they were discarded as soon as a working agreement was made between the government and the Polish aristocrats.

The Hapsburg Empire was in this pursuing its usual policy, for it was a cardinal principle of the government of Francis Joseph to support in every way the noble classes against all other elements of the population, up to the point where they menaced the integrity of the Empire and the delicate balance that had existed since the settlement of 1867. The loss of the old Ukrainian aristocracy which had been Polonized centuries earlier was now keenly felt by the people, for they lacked those aristocratic spokesmen who could penetrate to the inner circles of the Viennese court and plead their cause in a way that would appeal to the Emperor. When Francis Joseph died and was succeeded by his nephew, the Emperor Karl, at the end of 1916, it was too late to do more than outline a new policy, but already the Empire was obviously collapsing and the Ukrainians were almost openly looking forward to the creation of their own independent state.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

In February 1917 the position of the Russian government became more difficult. Rasputin had been murdered and an atmosphere of gloomy foreboding spread over the entire nation. Unrest began to spread and before any one realized what was happening, there broke out in Petrograd the revolution.

This opened, by a strange coincidence, on February 25/March 10, the anniversary of the death of Shevchenko. Under the enthusiasm of the revolution, the ceremonies commemorating the great poet, which had always been an occasion for tsarist repressive measures, were held on a larger scale than ever before. On the next day, a regiment composed largely of Ukrainian soldiers was one of the first to go over to the Revolution as a mass and soon the glad tidings of the abdication of the Tsar swept over the country. Of course it was received joyfully in Ukraine but there was at first no clear idea of what this downfall of the Romanovs was actually going to mean in practice.

The early days of the Revolution were a period of steadily increasing confusion. Once the strong hand of the old regime had been removed, there came the task of putting something in its place. A Provisional Government was set up, first under the premiership of Prince Lvov and later of Alexander Kerensky. It was the fond dream of these men and their associates that they could maintain the unity of the country and they even hoped to continue the war more effectively now that the dark forces which were supposed to be working with the Germans had been removed.

This was not the dream of large sections of the population. The peasants saw in the Revolution the opportunity to divide the land and to improve their material well-being. This had been their dream in 1905 and now it seemed as if they would be able to carry it out. But there were in Russia also large numbers of minority races and these thought of securing their practical independence or at least of bettering their condition through some sort of a federalized Russia. Under the changed conditions it seemed very possible that all those schemes of federalization which had been put forward by the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius and later by such publicists as Drahomaniv might have some chance of success.

As soon as the Revolution broke out, Prof. Hrushevsky left Moscow and made his way to Kiev. There he got in touch with the Ukrainian Progressive Organization, which had been a secret organization in Russia working for Ukrainian independence, and with the various socialist parties in Ukraine. There was set up without delay the Ukrainian Central Council (Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada) which aimed to crystalize Ukrainian interests and take over the necessary administrative functions in Ukraine and Professor Hrushevsky was elected President. At this period the Rada, or at least its majority, were far more interested in forming themselves into a government which would become part of a federal Russian republic than in full independence.

In the meanwhile the chaos throughout Russia continued to increase and the Provisional Government showed itself unable to master the situation. The various Councils of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies were meeting throughout the country and passing resolutions which cut directly at the power of the Provisional Government. These Councils represented all the various radical parties and were by no means in the beginning under Bolshevik influence. Yet they reflected the various currents of popular thought which ranged from desires to secure the land for the peasants to definite local class aspirations. The prime necessity for the Provisional Government was the creation of an armed force that would be disciplined and obedient to it, but it was exactly this that was most neglected.

Another important problem which was never sincerely tackled was that of the various nationalities. All around the borders of the old Great Russian territory, from Finland in the north to Central Asia on the east, groups of earnest patriots, to whom the problem of nationality was even more important than were the economic problems connected with the land, were coming into existence. In the beginning they all stressed the fact that the future Russia would have to become a federal state and that the old idea of a monolithic Russia had passed with the fall of the tsar. This the Great Russians refused to accept and the Provisional Government was fighting a losing battle in its attempts to hold all of those groups in line. Yet it held on stubbornly and made no attempt to do more than interpose an ineffective veto on everything that was suggested.

Events moved rapidly in Ukraine. The Central Council called for a demonstration in Kiev on March 19/April 1 and declared that Ukrainian autonomy should be set up without waiting for the approval of the Provisional Government. Then followed another series of meetings during the next weeks. A teachers’ convention was held on Easter day and then on April 6–8 a Ukrainian National Convention was called for, in order to broaden the government and prepare for elections to determine the personnel of the new administration. It was attended by over nine hundred delegates and at once arranged to admit to its membership representatives of the various classes of the population: the army, the peasants, labor, professional organizations, etc.

So far, so good. The early groups which started the movement had represented all types of social thought and it seemed to some of the leaders that the national question was the predominant one. At the same time, the peasants were more interested in the changes that were coming in the agrarian situation. This was an unconscious movement that was growing by popular demand and it was not long before the leaders of the Rada became convinced that they would have to reckon with this new movement. In reality there were two great movements, each running its own course but impinging upon the other at every point.

At the same time the Ukrainian soldiers in the army began to demand that they be reorganized as Ukrainian regiments with their own commanders, their own flag, and their own units. To enforce their demands they held a military council in Kiev at which there were representatives of approximately one million men on April 5/18 and a month later there was held a still larger meeting at which appeared delegates of 1,736,000 Ukrainian soldiers from all over the Russian Empire. This was the more remarkable inasmuch as Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of War of the Provisional Government, definitely forbade its holding and gave orders that the delegates should not be allowed to go to Kiev. However, by this time the army was paying less and less attention to the Provisional Government, which could only threaten and bluster without accomplishing anything constructive for the country.

At the same time the task of organizing a Ukrainian press was overwhelming. There were almost no Ukrainian newspapers before the Revolution and under the disturbed conditions, the task of founding and developing them and of securing their circulation in the disordered rural areas was almost insoluble, the more so as there were scattered Russian groups and organizations throughout the entire country which were bitterly opposed to the new efforts.

All through the spring there went on this agitation with the Ukrainian army and the new regiments demanding that the Rada take more definite action, and the Russian authorities both in Petrograd and in Kiev complaining that already too much had been done. Yet at a Convention of the Ukrainian Soldiers and Peasants held on June 2–10 there were insistent demands that the Council arrange for a definite Ukrainian autonomy. On June 10/23 the Council acted and issued the First Universal which was read by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and concluded that “From this day on, we ourselves will create our own life.”

By this act the Rada had definitely set forth its claims to be the government of Ukraine and it created the Council of General Secretaries with Vynnychenko acting as Prime Minister. Yet it is noticeable that the great majority of the Council still thought in terms of Ukraine as a state in a Russian federation. The news created a bombshell in Petrograd and three of the socialist ministers, Kerensky, Tsereteli and Tereshchenko, came down to Kiev for a conference with the Ukrainian Council. This was on the eve of the last offensive of the old Russian army and Kerensky and his friends were desirous of smoothing out conditions in Ukraine before the offensive was launched. At the same time, the more conservative members of the Provisional Government objected even to these negotiations and as soon as word reached the capital, they definitely resigned from the cabinet.

In these conferences it was expected that Ukraine would take over the nine provinces that comprised the country and with this in view the Council drew up a Statute or Constitution for the governing of the country. They added to the Council representatives of the various minorities in Ukraine and then sent the document to the Provisional Government. Here it was badly received and when the conservative members returned to the cabinet, they sent a series of Instructions to the Council which cut Ukraine in half and worked to hamper its activities.

The continuation of these tactics brought no profit to either the Ukrainian Central Council or the Provisional Government. They served only to weaken and embarrass the former and brought no benefit to the latter, for during July the Provisional Government was faced by a revolt of the Bolsheviks under Lenin in Petrograd. Although this was suppressed, it had its own not inconsiderable part in the general breakdown of administration.

The six months between the Revolution and the accession to power of the Bolsheviks was a confused and confusing period. On the one hand the steadily weakening power of the Provisional Government was carrying down with it the old Russia, but the leaders declined to see this and loved to imagine that the new ideals of democracy would ultimately straighten out all the difficulties. The Central Council was endeavoring to go along with the Provisional Government and at the same time to secure the rights of Ukraine. Along with this, there was a vast majority of the peasants who were far more concerned with the solution of the agrarian problem than they were in matters of general policy and they envisaged freedom as meaning that there would be no government of any kind, no taxes, and no formal organization.

This dubious situation could not continue indefinitely. Sooner or later one side or the other would have to yield and the Council was only weakening its own position and dignity by continuing negotiations. Yet no one wanted to take the initiative in any decisive action.

The situation was not made any better by the actions of the foreign representatives in Petrograd. They too were unable to make up their own minds. On the one hand, they felt very strongly that they had an obligation to the Provisional Government because of the sacrifices that Russia had made in the common war. On the other, they were themselves sending representatives to be present in Kiev and the other national states but they refused to express themselves definitely as to what they desired to see set up on the ruins of the Empire. Under these circumstances it was difficult for the young governments to know on what diplomatic support they could rely or what policy would be most effective and practical.

The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks promised for a while to clear up conditions. No one believed that the Bolshevik party would be able to maintain itself long in power but at the same time it made all talk of a federal Russia purely theoretical and placed upon Ukraine and the Rada the task of maintaining law and order in its own territory, of solving the economic problems of the country, and of setting up a generally efficient government. This was an overpowering task, for the political revolution and the agrarian movement were moving along at a rapid pace. Disorder reigned in the country and there was no time to bring together the various conflicting points of view.

At the same time the curious political philosophy of the Bolsheviks was complicating the situation still further. The Soviets were perfectly willing to grant independence to Ukraine or to any of the other border territories, but they insisted that the power could only be turned over to true representatives of the workers and peasants, i.e. the Bolsheviks themselves, since all other elements of the population were clearly counter-revolutionary and not typical of the ideals of the workers and peasants. As most of their leaders in Ukraine were of non-Ukrainian origin, this meant that the Ukrainians as a people were to be governed by the Russians, who alone were able to speak for the Ukrainian population.

This novel philosophy forced the Rada to take definite action, and on November 7/20, it issued the Third Universal, which declared that “from this day on, Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian People’s Republic.” There is a definite ambiguity in this phrase, for in Ukrainian the word “Narodna” means both “People’s” and “National.” It expressed both the idea of a government of the Ukrainian people as a separate nation and also the idea of the government as one preeminently of the common people, i.e. those who were concerned with the vague but revolutionary agrarian program. As a matter of fact the term had become a slogan in all the area affected by the Russian Revolution and like all such slogans with an indefinite and unclear meaning, it created as much confusion as it did agreement.

Under the terms of this declaration the Council attempted to establish a definite government. It passed certain liberal regulations on land ownership for the benefit of the peasants, it instituted the eight hour day, granted amnesty to political prisoners, and also called for the holding of a Pan-Ukrainian Congress, to be composed of elective members, to found a constitutional government. This election was to be held on January 9, 1918 and the Constituent Assembly was to meet on January 22.

It stands to reason that the Bolsheviks had no intention of allowing such an Assembly to meet, for they well knew that the Council and the Ukrainian people were opposed to the excesses of the Bolsheviks and their system of massacring their opponents, and that any expression of the wishes of the people would establish some other form of government. As a result they continued their policy of trying to disintegrate the Council and of arousing discontent in all possible quarters. By sending Bolshevik bands, composed largely of non-Ukrainians, into the country, by spreading incendiary appeals to the people, by fomenting class hatred in every way, they succeeded in keeping the country stirred up and in preventing the stabilization of conditions.

Then they induced the Kiev Soviet, composed chiefly of non-Ukrainian workers in some of the factories, to demand the calling of an All-Ukrainian Council of Soviets on December 5/17. The Council saw to it that this was not a mere rump convention of the Bolsheviks, as Stalin had planned, but was widely representative of all the leftist elements of Ukraine which were grouped in Soviets or Councils. As a result, the Bolshevik resolutions were voted down and the following was adopted: “The meeting of the Ukrainian Councils emphasizes its definite decision that the Central Council in its further work stand solidly on guard over the achievement of the revolution, spreading and deepening without halt the revolutionary activity to safeguard the class interests of a laboring democracy and call together without delay the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which alone can reveal the true will of all democratic Ukraine. The meeting of the Councils of Peasants’, Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates of Ukraine in this manner expresses to the Ukrainian Central Council its full confidence and promises it its absolute support.” The resolution went on to say, “On paper the Soviet of People’s Commissars seemingly recognizes the right of a nation to self-determination and even to separation, but only in words. In fact, the government of Commissars brutally attempts to interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian government which executes the will of the legislative organ of the Central Council. What sort of self-determination is this? It is certain the Commissars will permit self-determination only to their own party; all other groups and peoples they, like the Tsarist regime, desire to keep under their domination by force of arms. But the Ukrainian people did not cast off the Tsarist yoke only to take upon themselves the yoke of the Commissars.”

This resolution, adopted in December, 1917, expresses with rare nicety the entire policy of Soviet thought on its relations with other peoples and groups and it would have been well for Ukraine, had the sober judgment of these Councils prevailed. It would have saved a great deal of anguish and bloodshed in the coming years.

When the Bolsheviks saw that they were unable to control the assembly which they had inspired, Stalin sent an ultimatum to it, demanding unconditional submission within forty-eight hours. At the same time, the Bolshevik members, some 150 out of about 2000, under the leadership of two Russians, Sergeyev of the Don basin and Ivanov of Kiev, and a Ukrainian Communist, Horowitz, moved to Kharkiv and there proclaimed a Ukrainian Soviet Republic and called themselves the Secretaries of the new government instead of Commissars. They at once received support from the Russian Bolsheviks and opened a civil war.

It is noticeable that throughout 1917 there had been far less disorder in Ukraine than there had been in Russia. There had been none of those revolts that had characterized the situation in Petrograd and adjacent areas since the very beginning of the revolution. During this year Ukraine alone of the territory of the former Empire had been relatively peaceful. The Council had been gradually assuming power and endeavoring to make the transition from the old to the new. It had seen the passage of large numbers of demoralized soldiers but it had escaped the main part of the violent scenes that had gone on elsewhere.

Now all this was changed. The Bolsheviks definitely began an invasion of the country and this added to the trials of the Council. The changing conditions on the Eastern front now brought Ukraine into the international scene. It was impossible to hold elections with the chaos in the country. Finally, to solve the situation, on January 9/22, the Council announced in a Fourth Universal the complete independence of Ukraine and declared that, “From to-day the Ukrainian People’s Republic becomes the Independent, Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People.”

It had taken almost a year to bring the council to this decision. As in the case of the United States, the vast majority of the people did not realize in the beginning the issues involved. For a century many of the best and most patriotic minds of Ukraine had dreamed of a great federation of the Slavs or of a reorganized Russia which would give equal rights and liberties to all classes of the population. They had sought this from each of the governments since the Revolution and had failed to obtain it from any. Federation had never appealed to any party in the Russian Revolution. The conservative Cadets, men like Milyukov and his friends, Socialists like Kerensky, Bolsheviks like Lenin and Stalin, all in their own way demanded that there should be a centralized state. Just as the Russian intelligentsia in the field of thought throughout the nineteenth century refused to admit the possibility of a cultural development in Ukraine apart from Russia, just as Peter the Great and Catherine could not admit that they had to deal with a situation different from that prevailing in Moscow and St. Petersburg, so the revolutionary leaders held fast to the same idea. The Council had wasted months in futile discussion and negotiations at a time when they could have been profitably employed in building up local institutions and restoring order. Now when it became clear that war and organized war was to be the order of the day, they finally acted and Ukraine appeared again as an independent state with its capital at Kiev.

CHAPTER TWENTY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

This struggle to win for Ukraine a position first as a federated state in a new Russia and secondly as a completely independent country was not proceeding in an atmosphere of peace and quiet. The First World War was still going on with the forces of the Triple Entente and the Central Powers locked in a terrific struggle.

England and France had welcomed the Russian Revolution, because they believed that Russia after the fall of the Tsar would carry on the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary more successfully. It took them only a few weeks to realize that the collapse of Russia had imposed on them a still heavier burden. They could not understand that the Russian Revolution had been a collapse because of excessive strain and war weariness and it is quite a question how far the Russian leaders realized this themselves. At all events Lenin and Trotsky called for immediate peace and this, as much as their program of social reforms, won them a sympathetic hearing in many quarters. It brought them into conflict with the representatives of England, France and the United States, which were working to keep Russia in the war against the Central Powers.

There were two other factors which were overlooked. The first was the question of supplies. With Turkey in the war, it was impossible to send supplies to the Russian or any other armies operating in what was the old Russian Empire except by way of Murmansk and Archangel on the north or Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean. For example, it was impossible for the Ukrainian army, which was confronted with the German forces in the south, to receive any supplies except across Bolshevik-held territory. They could secure only those supplies that were left on their own soil at the time of the beginning of the Revolution. The failure of the Russian offensive of Kerensky had reduced these, and the troops opposing the Bolshevik bands were relatively unarmed.

The second factor was the meaning of this war-weariness. It was opposed to fighting against the Central Powers. It was opposed to the preservation and maintenance of discipline. Yet with each advance in demoralization, the willingness to fight in scattered bands against a new enemy increased. The fanatic Bolsheviks, who refused to continue the war for any reason against the Central Powers, were only too ready in small bands to attack Ukraine. Part of this lay in the belief that there was still food in Ukraine and that this food was necessary for Moscow and Petrograd. Part of it lay in their equally fanatical belief that they were the real spokesmen of the laborers and peasants. At the same moment when they were opening negotiations to end the war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, they were commencing a war in Ukraine and in many other sections.

Allied diplomacy was singularly ineffective. After welcoming the Revolution, England, France and the United States were unable to induce the Provisional Government to continue the war effectively. They were opposed to a peace between Russia or any part of it with the Central Powers. They were willing to cooperate with the Ukrainian Council or any other government that would continue the war. They were willing to recognize the Council as the de facto government of Ukraine and threatened it, if it made peace. They were willing to oppose the Bolsheviks, when they talked peace. On the other hand, the military missions that appeared in Kiev did not have the power to guarantee that they would continue to recognize the Council after the war and they most assuredly had no plans for supplying the Ukrainian army and making it able to oppose the Bolsheviks successfully, much less the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, if they decided to resume the offensive. What might have been done in Archangel or Vladivostok was impossible in Kiev, with Ukraine barred from access to Allied supplies and assistance by the Central Powers on the west and the Bolsheviks on the north and east. Ukraine was fighting a war on two fronts, and relations between the Germans and the Bolsheviks were such that peace between Germany and the Bolsheviks might result in Germany turning over Ukraine to the Bolsheviks as the price of peace. Again this threat, the words of small military missions were little defence, especially when the Ukrainian leaders knew of the widespread propaganda that had been directed against them abroad by imperial Russia for nearly four years.

In the meanwhile conditions were becoming more critical in the country. The Council suffered from the same misconceptions that had ruined the Provisional Government. It was or felt itself unable to check barely concealed Bolshevik propaganda because of its interpretation of democracy. Its leaders, busied with negotiations with the Provisional Government, had not been able to use all their energies in building up a firm kernel of organization and in strengthening their own armed forces to a point where they could be sure of their unqualified support. Far too often resolutions that were adopted became dead letters almost as soon as they were passed. Regulations on the distribution of land, and others, were more honored in the breach than the observance. Despite the efforts of many of the members, it could hardly be said that many of the difficulties were being overcome.

As a result when the Germans and Austro-Hungarians met with the Bolshevik envoys at Brest Litovsk in December, 1917, it became clear that the only hope of the Council was also to make peace with the Central Powers and use the next months as a breathing space during which they could strengthen their internal order and prepare themselves for the next round with the Bolsheviks. They were aware that this might be an expensive move, but between that and the annihilation of Ukraine there was no real choice.

Accordingly, the Council decided to send three delegates to represent Ukraine at the Brest Litovsk meetings. The delegates selected were three young men, Levitsky, Lubinsky and Sevryuk, former students of Prof. Hrushevsky. They had had little training in international meetings. Their youth surprised the German representatives, General Hoffmann and his associates, and amused Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian representative. He could not imagine young men appearing in important posts and Ukrainians anywhere at all, for he represented those elements in his country which were most hostile to the progress of the Ukrainians in Galicia. To the especial annoyance of Czernin they put forth claims not only to independence but to the whole of Eastern Galicia, and also the province of Kholm.

These claims appeared preposterous to the delegates of the Central Powers but they also touched on the weak spot of both Germany and Austria-Hungary. The representatives of the two powers were not friendly. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary had their own ideas as to the future of eastern Europe and each wished to secure the lion’s share for his own country, although the Austrians were well aware of the fact that nothing was well at home, especially since the death of Francis Joseph, who had at least been able to put up a brilliant facade to cover his policy of avoiding a settlement of all questions. Besides that, the delegates had taken the trouble to pass through Lviv on their way to Brest Litovsk and were well aware of the situation in Eastern Galicia, probably better than Count Czernin himself.

On the other hand, Trotsky, as the leader of the Bolshevik delegation, argued bitterly that the Germans and Austrians should not receive the Ukrainian delegation at all. They denied that Ukraine existed and that the Council represented the will of the workers and peasants. Later he brought to the meeting representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from Kharkiv in an endeavor to strengthen his own case and kept reporting victories of the Bolsheviks over the troops of the Council.

It was a strange conference, for all parties knew the issues at stake and none dared to move toward the desired goal. The Germans wanted peace with the Bolsheviks in order to be able to move the bulk of their forces to the Western Front for the campaign of 1918. They also, and still more the Austrians, wanted to secure food from Ukraine. Trotsky and the Bolsheviks also wanted peace. They hoped thereby to create disorder in the German and Austrian armies and hoped for a revolution by the masses of the population of those countries. They also wanted the opportunity to master Ukraine and secure the food which they needed for their capitals. The Ukrainian delegates, supported later by Vsevolod Holubovich, the Prime Minister, were willing to turn over a certain amount of grain, provided they could secure a guarantee of the liberty of their country and means of self defence against the Bolshevik attacks.

Under these conditions a settlement was finally reached. Ukraine under the Council was recognized as a sovereign state and promised to send to the Central Powers at least a million tons of supplies. Trotsky, after receiving the German terms, announced that there was neither peace nor war between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks, for he took the attitude that there could be no peace between a territorial state and an international government of workers and peasants and really demanded civil war in Germany. The Austrians, having compelled the Ukrainians to give up their claim to Galicia and to Kholm, sided with the Germans but were far less willing to take any action to make the treaty effective. The conference ended on February 11.

In the meanwhile Bolshevik pressure on Kiev had increased and the Council was compelled to retreat from Kiev to Zhitomir to the west, and Trotsky could feel that he had more or less succeeded in his endeavors. When, however, the Germans, taking advantage of the situation that was left by the Bolsheviks, commenced to advance, a new wave of desire for war swept over the Bolsheviks and it took all of Lenin’s power to make them accept the terms that Trotsky had refused, for the passage of each day left more Bolshevik territory in the hands of the Germans.

By March 1, the German troops had advanced into Ukraine and had restored the Council to Kiev. They set up Field Marshal Eichhorn as the practical head of the occupation forces and also of the new state, along with Baron Mumm as representative of the German Foreign Office. They also sent General Groener to Kiev to secure supplies.

The Council was now put in another unpleasant situation. The presence of German troops created discontent. Order had been restored but the Council continued its policy of endless debate and found it difficult to agree on the legislation that was to be enacted. The old debates between the right and the left were intensified, although the Council decided that they would maintain the social reforms instituted by the Third and Fourth Universals and also proceed to the holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly which would meet on July 12, 1918.

The collection of supplies proceeded slowly. 1917 had been a disturbed year and the harvest had not been properly gathered. The peasants were not disposed to turn over their supplies to the Germans, even in return for money, and the high hopes with which the Germans and the Austrians had entered the country vanished with each day’s failure to secure the needed food. At the same time, the German military machine had no sympathy with and little understanding for the attempts of the Council to fumble toward a democratic constitution and improve the conditions of the people.

In an endeavor to create a more favorable situation, the Germans turned to the society of the Khliborody (the Agriculturists). This was a group of the former estate holders, Russian and Ukrainian alike, who had in their store-houses a certain amount of supplies. These conservatives were naturally opposed to the desires of the peasants to secure land and they were willing to see the Council removed.

Through them the Germans made an arrangement with General Pavel Skoropadsky, a general in the Russian army, but a descendant of that Skoropadsky who had been appointed Hetman by Peter after the revolt of Mazepa. It was apparently believed that Skoropadsky, by assuming the title of Hetman, could rally to his support the sentiments of at least the propertied classes and perhaps part of the peasants. The details were all set. Then, on April 28, German soldiers under the orders of Field Marshal Eichhorn invaded the meeting of the Council and summarily dispersed it. The next day they formally proclaimed Skoropadsky Hetman of the Ukraine and commenced to make the new order effective.

Skoropadsky went through the motions of ruling for about seven months and during this time Ukraine remained relatively peaceable. Kiev and the other cities were filled with Russian refugees from the Bolsheviks. These people appreciated the restoration of order and the freedom from massacre and pillage, but they had no use for the Ukrainian state and liked to believe that Skoropadsky was only waiting for the downfall of the Bolsheviks to bring Ukraine back again into Russia. Attempts were made to restore the former rights of the landowners and the old order as it had existed prior to 1917. As a result, dissatisfaction grew among the masses and more and more order had to be maintained by the Germans. This became less effective after the murder of Field Marshal Eichhorn on July 30, for his successor was far less able to handle both the Ukrainians and the representatives of the German Foreign Office.

At the same time Germany continued to work with the Bolsheviks, much to the annoyance of the Russians in Ukraine, the Ukrainians and Skoropadsky himself. The Hetman secured incontrovertible proof that the Bolshevik delegates at Kiev, Rakovsky and Dmitry Manuilsky, who were ostensibly drawing up peace terms between Ukraine and Moscow, were spending huge sums of money in Bolshevik propaganda, but he could not secure permission to curb their activities. Similarly when the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, was murdered, Germany took no steps to punish the Bolsheviks and continued to lay emphasis on the need of maintaining good relations with them.

During the same months the Germans were busy in helping the Don Cossacks and the Georgians in their struggles against the Bolsheviks and there was developed a long chain of anti-Bolshevik states and organizations along the entire shore of the Black Sea. This year also saw the emergence of General Denikin at the head of a White Russian Army, with the backing of England, France and the United States in an attempt to restore a united Russia.

The confused situation was brought to an abrupt end by the defeat of Germany on the Western Front. The Kaiser abdicated on November 9 and already Austria-Hungary had broken up into a number of independent states. Turkey left the war on October 30 and this at once opened the Dardanelles, so that military supplies could be sent into the area north of the Black Sea. Under such conditions, the only course open to the German armies was to retreat. Even this was not easy in the complicated circumstances of the day, for a large part of the German troops had come under Bolshevik influences and were not particularly interested in fighting or in doing anything except getting home, if they could. Under such circumstances Skoropadsky saw that his days were numbered. On December 14, he laid down his power, slipped out of Kiev and made his way to Berlin.

In the meanwhile, with the approaching downfall of Germany, the Ukrainians again aspired to independence. Volodymyr Vynnychenko tried to rally the forces of the Rada by appointing a Direktoria composed of members of the various Ukrainian Socialist parties. He wanted to continue the general policy of the government as it had been before the time of Skoropadsky. More important for the Ukrainian cause was, however, the work of Simon Petlyura, for at the first sign of the weakening of the forces of Skoropadsky, he went to Bila Tserkva and won over one of the crack regiments of Skoropadsky’s forces, the Rifles of the Zaporozhian Sich. With this as a nucleus, he started a revolt which ultimately carried him and the Direktoria into Kiev as Skoropadsky left for exile.

Petlyura was to be for the next years the dominant figure in the Ukrainian movement. A man of simple origin, he had secured an education and was making his living as a bookkeeper and writer when the Russian Revolution started. He had some military training and developed a considerable talent for leadership. Unlike most of the other leaders, he was more a man of action than a thinker and in the troublous times ahead, it was these qualities rather than thought and logic that were needed most for the new state.

Petlyura and Vynnychenko differed violently on many subjects, and with each week the struggle became more intense. Petlyura felt that Vynnychenko’s policies, while Ukrainian in essence, were blurring the line between Ukrainian nationalism and Bolshevism. He was suspicious of too radical reforms and sought support rather from those elements of the state that laid the main stress on independence. Furthermore he believed that it was necessary to secure as much of the German military equipment as possible from the retreating German armies, and he won the good will of the peasants who had been angered by the German requisitioning of supplies by encouraging them to attack the retreating forces. Thus the actions of his troops seriously upset the plans of the more or less Bolshevized German armies and became a real menace to the hopes of the Bolsheviks for the taking over of the country on the German retreat.

The victorious Allies now had the opportunity to intervene effectively in the general situation. They were able to send troops into Ukraine and South Russia through Romania. They were also able to land them at the Black Sea ports. For the first time since 1914, the southern gate of Russia and Ukraine was opened to the democratic nations. The future rested on their ability to formulate a program, make their own conditions, and see that they were carried out.

They were as ineffective in this as they had been in 1917, for there came again a flood of diplomatic missions, promising everything and doing nothing. English and French representatives appeared at Kiev to expedite the German departure. At the same time, as if Skoropadsky had been a legitimate ruler, they ordered the Germans strictly not to surrender their arms to any of the Ukrainian rebels or to turn Kiev over to them. It is still not clear whether this was done by orders from the home governments or at the advice of the Russians around Skoropadsky. The result was the same. The Ukrainian forces were unwilling to remain quiet and see the Germans depart with rich booty and copious military supplies. The Allies sent no troops to back up their representatives and the Bolsheviks paid no attention to any one and continued their work of spreading propaganda among the Germans.

Under such conditions, the forces of Petlyura increased rapidly and it soon became evident to the Germans that they would have to come to an understanding with him. This was done at Kasatin on December 11, when the Germans consented to turn over Kiev to the Direktoria and three days later Colonel Konovalets at the head of a Ukrainian detachment entered Kiev. Petlyura and the Direktoria arrived on December 19. The Germans had insisted that the Russian officers and men in the Hetman’s army should be allowed to leave with them. On the whole this was carried out, although there were some arrests and some murders, but by the end of December the bulk had been disposed of and were in Germany.

The Ukrainian Republic had been once more established. It had a last chance to solve its problems and to emerge as a strong and respected government but it was not an optimistic picture. The country was still more disorganized than the year before. There were still the same factions in the state. There was still the same lack of harmony among the Allied military missions and above all the people of the Allied countries were sure that the war was over and that there was nothing left to be done, for the new period of human history had started at the hour of the Armistice, 11 A. M., November 11, 1918.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE REPUBLIC OF WESTERN UKRAINE

The successful Russian occupation of Lviv within a month after the beginning of the War threw into sharp relief the military weakness of Austria-Hungary and the following events showed that the Dual Monarchy, despite all its pretensions and claims, was hardly fitted to stand the rigors of modern warfare. The various national groups included within its borders were restive. Regiments of Czechs had gone over in mass formation to the Russians. Discontent was rife in other sections and it was easy to see that whatever the outcome of the war, bad times were in store for the country.

On January 8, 1918, Woodrow Wilson laid down the Fourteen Points for a final settlement. These included phrases that called for self-determination of the various nations. It is immaterial how far he had intended to press this policy, for in Europe his words were taken in their full meaning and each and every group, large or small, prepared to take advantage of them. From this time on there could be no doubt that Austria-Hungary was going to disintegrate. The only questions were when and how and what would be the fate of the territory.

It was almost the same day that the Ukrainian delegates to the Brest Litovsk Conference passed through Lviv, to establish contact with the Ukrainian leaders there and to tell them of the intention of Ukraine to declare its full independence of Russia. This act alone served to increase tension in the Ukrainian lands in the Dual Monarchy and to arouse more energetic work during the summer, so that the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine would be ready when the moment for action arrived.

They were not alone in this, for the Poles also were planning to revive their state. The Polish National Committee working with the Allied nations elaborated plans for recovering the territory which they had held in 1772 at the time of the First Partition of the country. The Council of the Regency and the various groups around Joseph Pilsudski, which were more bitterly anti-Russian, looked for the establishment of some form of independent Poland in case of a German victory. The events of 1917 brought both groups together and there was a general agreement among Poles of all factions and trains of thought that there must emerge from the war a great Poland. In Galicia, they made ready to take over the country as soon as the Austrian grip showed signs of weakening.

In the same way the various Ukrainian groups determined not to be outdone through inaction. They organized a Ukrainian Council with members in Eastern Galicia, in Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bukovina and then on October 18, as the hour of decision was approaching, they held a large conference in Lviv and made plans to declare their independence when the time came. So weak and disintegrated was Austria-Hungary already that it was possible to hold such a meeting without too great danger to the participants.

It was already clearly realized that the dangers confronting Western Ukraine came not from the dying Empire but from the claims of the Poles and of the other succession states, each of which put forward demands to take over the same territory. Again Allied diplomacy was destined to be ineffective and the disagreements among the victorious nations prepared the way for a series of wars and disturbances that were to leave new causes of bitterness behind them. The disintegration of Austria-Hungary was not to be brought about under the control of the victorious powers but under the conflicting demands of local populations and improvised military forces.

On November 1, during the night, the Ukrainians judged that it was time to act and the Council took over the control of the city of Lviv with the tacit permission of the Austrian Governor of Galicia. The blue and yellow flag of Ukraine was hoisted over the city hall and the Republic of Western Ukraine was formally proclaimed. At the same time, in Western Galicia, the Poles raised their standard over the city of Krakow. The old regime was ended.

Soon the Ukrainians in other cities of Western Ukraine followed suit and the new Republic commenced the difficult and painful task of setting up an administration. Its resources were indeed scanty. There was no money and no trained corps of administrators, for the old government had kept most of the more responsible posts in Galicia in the hands of the Poles.

More important than that, the forces available to maintain order were equally non-existent or unsatisfactory. There were the remains of the Ukrainian legions in the Austrian army, the Riflemen of the Sich, and there were some disorganized reserve units in the neighborhood of the city, which were largely composed of Ukrainians, since officers and men from other sections of the Empire had left them to return home. There was a marked lack of officers, since the unfavorable conditions of Galicia had prevented many Ukrainians from rising in the Austro-Hungarian service. It was with this scanty support that the new government under Dr. Evhen Petrushevich set to work.

Any hopes of a peaceable period for organization were soon ended. As soon as the Poles realized that Lviv had been taken over by the Ukrainians, there began a revolt of the Polish population of the city. Many of the participants were mere schoolboys, but they seized the main post office and the Ukrainians were unable to dislodge them. Civil war broke out, but it was a civil war in which artillery and heavy weapons were absent from both sides. For three weeks the battle went on in the city as both sides tried to bring up what reinforcements were available. The Poles finally succeeded in moving from Krakow into the city by train a force of 140 officers and 1200 men. Even such a small body of more or less trained soldiers was enough to turn the scales in the favor of the Poles and two days after they arrived, the Ukrainian government left the city and retired to Stanislaviv and later to Ternopil.

This did not mean that the Republic had given up the struggle. It still held the largest part of Eastern Galicia, with the exception of the railroad line from Peremyshl to Lviv, which the Poles succeeded in keeping open. At the same time there was a practical siege of Lviv during the entire winter. The Poles, however, were able to gather forces elsewhere in the country and steadily new and better armed detachments pushed their way into Eastern Galicia.

As regards Bukovina, the Ukrainians occupied the capital Chernivtsy on November 3, but the Romanians with the nucleus of an army refused to concede this. Their troops on Armistice Day pressed into the city and overthrew the Ukrainian Regional Committee under Omelyan Popovich. Then they formally annexed the province.

In Carpatho-Ukraine, there was the same general confusion. Various adherents of the Republic of Western Ukraine held gatherings in Preshiv, Uzhorod and Hust and they failed to come to a definite agreement as to the future of the country. The Czechs claimed it on the basis of an understanding with the American Ruska Nationalna Rada at a meeting in Scranton, Pennsylvania. There was, however, more delay in taking the land over from Hungary than there was from some of the other sections and there was not the complete change that had occurred elsewhere. Nevertheless on January 21, 1919, a Council in Hust voted to join Ukraine; but conditions kept changing and finally on May 5 the various groups in the country voted to become autonomous within the Czechoslovak state.

It can be seen from all this that the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia were the heart and the determining factor of the Republic of Western Ukraine. The loss of Lviv, the most important city in the area, proved a tremendous handicap to the new state, which looked forward very definitely to an ultimate union with the Ukrainian Republic set up at Kiev.

The Allied military missions in Warsaw and in Lviv endeavored to make peace between the various factions and to throw the whole problem of Eastern Galicia into the hands of the Peace Conference which was to meet a few months later in Paris. They were completely helpless, for the Poles claimed control of the entire province on the ground that it had been under the Polish crown and formed part of the Polish Republic since the fourteenth century and the Polish leaders, both of the right and left, refused to listen to any pleas that would leave the territory even temporarily under Ukrainian control. At the same time, they were steadily increasing their armed forces and later they received several well-trained divisions which had fought under General Haller along with the French on the Western Front. Under such conditions the armies of Western Ukraine were steadily forced to retreat to the east in the hope of joining the forces of Eastern Ukraine, which were in little better condition.

There is little need to go into the various efforts that were made at the time to make peace between the Poles and Western Ukrainians. All of them failed. During the entire Peace Conference, there was continuous talk of the future fate of Galicia but nothing definite was decided, for the Poles, with French backing, refused to concede anything and the changing political situation in the East made decisions useless, often before they were announced.

In one sense the casual observer may see in the brief interlude of the Republic of Western Ukraine one of those numerous and transient organizations that appeared spontaneously everywhere in Europe during the troubled months of November and December, 1918, but it was more than that, for despite the speedy passing of the Republic, the population was left. The ill feelings generated long remained to fester in Poland and added abundant fuel to the fires that were waiting for 1939. The retreat to Stanislaviv and then to Ternopil did not end the movement, although it lessened its immediate importance in a world that was still at war, despite its efforts to prove that peace had come.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE FALL OF UKRAINE

Petlyura returned to Kiev with the Direktoria on December 19, 1918 and he at once set about to rebuild the shattered structure of the state. Conditions were more unfavorable than they had been the year before, for the interlude with Skoropadsky had hindered the stabilization of Ukraine, even while it had allowed a development of the Bolshevik regime and the formation of a strong White Russian movement under Denikin. When we add to this the outbreak of the war between the newly formed Republic of Western Ukraine and Poland, we can appreciate the task that faced the new leader.

The first constructive step was the formal union of the Republic of Western Ukraine with the rest of the country. On January 3, 1919, the Direktoria voted to accept the Western Ukraine into the state and on January 22, just one year after the formal independence of Ukraine had been declared by the Council, the representatives of Western Ukraine arrived to take their places in the government of the joint state. Dr. Longin E. Cehelsky of Western Ukraine read the formal decree of the Western Ukrainian Council and the decree of the Ukrainian Council was read by Prof. Shvets. It was then declared that, “From to-day until the end of time there will be One, Undivided, Independent Ukrainian People’s Republic.”

In one sense the measure was inopportune, for the Western Ukrainian Republic was already being driven from much of its territory by the Poles. As a result it added to the enemies of the state, for Ukraine with its almost shadowy armies was now confronting in arms Poland, the Soviets and the White forces of Denikin. It was an overpowering combination, even though each of the three enemies was fighting the other two.

Within two weeks after the declaration of national unity, the Bolsheviks compelled Petlyura to evacuate Kiev. They cut the connections between his army and a large part of the troops of Western Ukraine and forced the latter to retreat into Romania where they were disarmed and interned. Then Petlyura retired to Kaminets Podolsky and there, with a small nucleus of troops drawn from all sections of the country, he waited for some months while he was preparing a new offensive.

Again the Peace Conference and the military missions showed themselves at their worst. They were entirely unable to discover whom to fight or whom to support. At the moment there were really no organized armies in the field. There were merely bands larger or smaller, owing vague allegiance to some cause and led by commissars, generals or atamans, largely self-appointed and often in absolute disagreement with other bands fighting on the same side. Frequently military missions of the same countries were present at the front or behind the lines of groups that were fighting one another. They were giving contrary directives and interfering, doling out supplies and unable to control their use.

Under such conditions Ukraine reverted in large part to a condition similar to that in the days of the Ruin of the seventeenth century. The country was filled with independent atamans like Makhno, who refused to acknowledge any superior command but supported and attacked almost every one in turn. These leaders set up their control over small areas and proved unable to work out a plan of cooperation in conjunction with or in defiance of the Direktoria, but in large part their chaos in the beginning was no worse than the condition of their rivals.

In the meanwhile, in the south of Ukraine the international confusion was reaching a new high. On December 18, 1918, a French army of some 12,000 men had landed in Odesa to maintain order and assist the “healthy” portions of the population to obtain control. Their first action was to expel the Ukrainian forces from the city and appoint a White Russian as the governor. Then, with a miscellaneous force of all nationalities, the French endeavored to clear the neighborhood and finally invoked the aid of a German division which had been unable to leave because the followers of Petlyura were in control of the surrounding country. The farce and the tragedy continued until Ataman Gregoryev, who had formerly served with Petlyura, went over to the Bolsheviks and maintained himself in the neighborhood as a nuisance. Incidentally, he later broke again with them and fought as a Ukrainian. Disorders broke out in the French forces and they withdrew April 6, 1919. Odesa was entered by a Bolshevik army of less than 2,000 men and the large quantity of military stores there fell into their hands. Soon after, the other Black Sea ports were taken by the Bolsheviks with as small or smaller forces.

During the course of 1919, the situation continued confused. The army of Admiral Kolchak, advancing into European Russia from Siberia, had been broken but General Denikin was attempting to cut his way north and west from the Donets basin. The Allies by this time had convinced themselves that the one way of defeating Bolshevism was to arm and equip the White Russian armies, which stood for the absolute unity of Russia and the denial of all the accomplishments of the Revolution. Everywhere that Denikin and his men went, they restored the old system, banned the Ukrainian language, closed Ukrainian newspapers and bookstores and reverted to the Russian policy of the years before the War. The foreign missions had now given up any idea of utilizing the peasant opposition to Bolshevism and the national movements against Russia. They had fully accepted the thesis of a monolithic Russia in Ukraine. Instead of trying to coordinate the popular movements for independence and strengthen them, they turned a deaf ear to all the petitions that were presented to them and made it fully evident that they were not interested in the attempts of Ukraine and various other sections of the old Empire to secure independence.

During this period the Peace Conference was in session in Paris and to the annoyance of the delegates, there appeared there representatives of the Direktoria to plead for recognition as the government of Ukraine along with representatives of many other states. The Allied position was singularly unrealistic and even unclear not only to the petitioners but to the official delegates themselves.

No one could decide what was to be the position taken toward Russia. The high hopes which had been placed upon the Russian Revolution and the Provisional Government had been dissipated. The delegates at Paris were well aware that this had failed and had fallen definitely before the Bolsheviks. They were well aware also that every section of the old Empire which was not inhabited by Great Russians was in a state of more or less open revolt. All around the borders of the country there had been set up governments running from Finland in the north to the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, which had been subjugated by Russian arms scarcely half a century before. All this rendered it a practical policy to accept the disintegration of Russia as they had that of Austria-Hungary and create a new federation or a series of independent and allied states.

On the other hand, the victorious Allies could not forget the sacrifices that had been made by the Russian Empire during the early years of the War and they persisted in believing that once Bolshevism was overthrown, all of these new nations would be only too willing to join in a new, free, and democratic Russia. They hated to do anything that would create a permanent situation. They were equally opposed to the efforts of the White Russian armies to form a definite conservative government which might be denounced as reactionary and aiming to restore the old Russian monarchy. Thus the policy of the Allies toward Russia remained in a dangerous position which could only in the long run strengthen the power of the Bolsheviks, the only group which was not affected by the desires of the Allies and which understood the general weakness of the entire Allied policy.

As a result there was made almost no mention of Russia in any of the treaties that came out of the Paris Peace Conference, for it was intended that the matter should be reconsidered, when, as, and if Russia expelled the Bolsheviks and proceeded to hold democratic and free elections. This brought about the impossible situation that the Congress could seriously consider regulations as to the position of Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine) toward Poland, since the area had been under Austria-Hungary, but could not and would not take action in regard to that part of Ukraine which had been under Russian rule prior to 1914.

The Poles utilized the situation to extend their claims over Western Ukraine and they obstinately refused to consider any settlement which would establish a political boundary between Poland and Western Ukraine, no matter how the case was put forward. Step by step the Allies moderated their demands, especially since France insisted stubbornly on backing almost all of the Polish claims. Thus on June 25, the Allied Supreme Council allowed Poland to occupy the territory up to the Zbruch River with a proviso that the Poles should guarantee local autonomy and freedom of religion to the non-Polish population. A little later they again offered to give Poland a twenty-five-year mandate over Eastern Galicia and to grant a plebiscite at the end of that time. Then, later in the year, they developed the idea of the Curzon line to mark the eastern boundary of the country, but there was also the supplementary idea that if Poland occupied land beyond this, she might receive it when the future of Russia was settled. In view of the weak Polish organization, which was only struggling to its feet and was short of all supplies, this idea that the Poles should organize a section of Russia by their own efforts could only increase the Polish claims. It is therefore not surprising in view of the entire tangle that the Peace Treaties provided no definite eastern boundary for Poland and in fact do not mention one in the official texts of the documents.

Everyone seemed unaware of the fact that Eastern Europe was in a turmoil with many forces competing for the mastery. The statesmen and still more the masses of the population of the Allied countries knew little or nothing about these forces. They saw only problems where they desired to find peace, and public sentiment turned against attempts to find a difficult but relatively permanent solution to the entire problem. The world was sick of this continuing struggle but it could find no way of ending it.

It was against this background that Petlyura and the forces of Ukraine carried on the struggle during the entire summer of 1919. Yet despite all of the hardships of the population and the lack of supplies, Petlyura was able to recover the control of Kiev on August 31. Again he was unable to hold it, because the Russian army of Denikin moving up from the south compelled him to evacuate a few days later. On the other hand, hostile as the Poles were to the Ukrainian national committee, they were little better pleased at the advance of the White Russian armies, even though definite hostilities did not break out between the Poles and the Russian armies.

During these months there were four forces competing in the same general area. There were the steadily improving Polish forces supported by the Allies, especially the French, and constantly gaining in numbers and equipment. There were the White Russian armies with the backing of all the Allies striving to restore a unified non-Communist Russia. There were the Red armies pressing down from the north, fighting to spread Communism and to conquer territory. There were finally the Ukrainians organized under Petlyura and isolated leaders struggling to maintain their political independence. All four were hostile to one another but it was easy to see that the position of the Ukrainians fighting on their own territory, with no organized base of supplies outside of the disputed area, was really the most desperate, for they had no way of recruiting and unifying their forces or of securing adequate supplies.

Then there broke out an epidemic of typhus. Under this and the growing pressure of the hostile armies, the Ukrainian forces began to disintegrate. The government of the Western Ukraine was the first that was forced into exile, for the Polish hold on Lviv was growing stronger with every week and the arrival of new and trained Polish troops allowed them to take over the entire province. The leaders retired into Romania and then moved to Vienna, where they continued to function as a government in exile.

At this moment the growing hostility in the rear of Denikin’s White Russian Army came to a head and this as much as the power of the Soviets forced him to retreat and retire from the scene. Soon there was only the Crimea left in the hands of the White Russians. Yet the damage had already been done. Petlyura and the Ukrainians were not in a position to take over and organize the territory which Denikin had evacuated and it passed back into the hands of the Red forces, so that by the spring of 1920 nearly all of Great Ukraine was in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Petlyura and the remains of his organized forces were pushed on to Polish soil and the general cause seemed lost.

Just then Petlyura made an important decision. He signed a treaty of peace with the Polish government which recognized the Direktoria as the government of an independent Ukrainian National Republic. This was the first recognition of Ukraine that had been officially granted since the Conference of Brest-Litovsk and there were high hopes that something might be saved from the wreckage of the last years.

The treaty was signed on April 21, 1920 and four days later the Polish army, with what was left of Petlyura’s forces, marched on Kiev. There was little effective opposition and on May 6 a division of the Ukrainian Army and its Polish allies entered the city, almost without a battle. They even occupied a bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnyeper, and it seemed as if it would be possible to begin the work of rebuilding the shattered country.

Again there came disappointment. The Polish forces far outnumbered those actually under Ukrainian command. The sight of the Poles in Kiev annoyed and angered many of the more ardent Ukrainians and they blamed Petlyura for his alliance and for his abandonment of Western Ukraine. Memories of the century-long hostility with the Poles were stirred up and the actions of some of the Poles increased the tension. The result was that Petlyura was not able to secure rapidly the support that he had hoped for among the Ukrainian population, especially as Kiev was still filled with Russian refugees and sympathizers, many of whom preferred the Bolsheviks as a government in Moscow to the Ukrainians.

At the same time the Polish military situation was none too brilliant. Under the influence of the military tactics of the World War and its elaborate trench systems, little attention was paid to the service of supply behind the lines and the armies at the front were poorly supplied. Liaison between the various armies and divisions was bad and there was a possibility that an energetic attack by the Bolsheviks might jeopardize the situation.

This did happen early in June, just one month after Petlyura resumed the attempt to organize the government and the Ukrainian army. The cavalry force of General Budenny succeeded in crossing the Dnyeper and placing itself in the Polish rear. The Poles were immediately forced to retreat and they abandoned Ukraine. Petlyura and his men had to retire with them and Kiev passed back into Bolshevik hands.

The results were worse than at any time before, for while the Poles held well within the province of Eastern Galicia or Western Ukraine and Lviv was not seriously menaced, another Soviet attack from the north swept to the very outskirts of Warsaw. Here the Bolsheviks were definitely stopped in a great battle on the Vistula, between August 13 and 20, and they were thrown back in a disastrous rout. The Poles followed them almost as rapidly as they retreated and by October 12 had recovered nearly all the territory that they had held before the advance on Kiev. Then an armistice was signed, and this was followed by the Treaty of Riga which determined the frontiers between Poland and the Soviets until 1939.

In this agreement Ukraine was entirely forgotten. Poland held on to Western Ukraine substantially in the form in which it had existed under Austro-Hungarian rule and it acquired a considerable stretch of Ukrainian land to the east. In return the government dissociated itself from the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure independence and Great Ukraine was again deprived of any possibility of foreign assistance. Petlyura was forced into exile with the whole of the Directoria, and only unorganized and scattered bands continued to carry on a futile and hopeless struggle against the Red armies.

Thus, after more than three years of diplomacy and of fighting, the hopes of the Ukrainians to be masters in their own house were dashed to the ground. Their endeavors to create a democratic republic had ended only in disaster. Their leaders were dead or in exile and the population were helpless in the hands of their new masters. It was a sad and discouraging ending to a gallant attempt to profit by the collapse of the two great Empires that had long held them in subjection and had attempted to eliminate them from political life.

It is easy to criticize the actions of the Ukrainian people and their governments during this troublous time and to point out that all too often they paralleled some of the more unsatisfactory aspects of the behavior of the Kozak Host in the seventeenth century. Yet this is hardly fair, for the dilemma of Ukraine standing alone was exactly that of all the other states in the area. A large part of the peasant population were far more interested in the solution of agrarian problems, of land reform, etc. than they were in the purely national revolution. They did not realize that the two had to be carried on simultaneously and they could not visualize all the changes that were being introduced into the country.

Their dilemma was only increased by the long period of hesitation on the part of the Great Powers at Paris and elsewhere. These wavered so continuously between support of Russian unification and aid to the various separatist groups that they were unable to exert their full power to bring about any satisfactory settlement. Step by step they had allowed the Russian Bolsheviks to infiltrate into the various national republics that had been set up, and finally only Finland and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had direct access to the sea, survived. At the same time their policy had failed to gain support for the White Russians even in purely Russian territory and had only succeeded in producing exactly the opposite results of what they wished.

It might seem that the Ukrainian problem had thus been settled in a way that was to be permanent. Yet it had become more serious than before and it had been definitely pushed on to the international arena, whether they wished it or not. Exactly as the Kozak wars had removed Ukraine from a purely Polish problem, so now the Ukrainian ghost was to be present at all international gatherings, whether it was mentioned or not. It is not too much to say that the final collapse of the Ukrainian national government awoke far larger masses of the population to the reality of the question than had even the Ukrainian declaration of independence, and for that reason the name of Ukraine began to play an even more important role on the map of Europe than it had done before.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

WESTERN UKRAINE

By the summer of 1919 Polish military control had been extended over the whole of Western Ukraine and the alliance between Petlyura and the Polish government early in 1920 ratified the dismemberment of the joint state which had been so enthusiastically proclaimed a year before. Finally the Treaty of Riga between Poland and the Soviets secured from the latter the recognition of Polish control.

There remained only one hope for the exiled government of Western Ukraine, and that was the Council of Ambassadors of the victorious Allies. They held out as did the Peace Conference against Polish control of the country but their opposition steadily diminished. France was strongly backing Poland and the Conference as a whole had no definite ideas as to the future. It definitely awarded Western Galicia to Poland, but on November 20, 1919 there was adopted a resolution providing that Poland should hold Eastern Galicia for twenty-five years under a mandate from the League of Nations, that there should be an Eastern Galician Diet with a representative in the Polish cabinet, that there should be broad autonomy for the province, and that at the end of the period there should be a plebiscite. Poland naturally refused to accept this solution and there was no one of the Allied Powers that was willing and able to enforce its decision.

The attitude of Poland was unfortunate. The national spirit which had survived the dismemberment of the country and had even under desperate conditions been able to rouse the country to the recovery of its liberty was firmly imbued with the spirit of the past. During the centuries of Polish greatness, the Poles had been unwilling to concede any rights to the Ukrainians. They had never been able to solve the problems of the Kozak Host and they had been bitterly opposed to the Orthodox Church. Just as the failure to create a working agreement with the Ukrainians during the seventeenth century had precipitated the disastrous Kozak wars which had broken the state, so there was still an unwillingness to recognize that conditions in 1919 were also fundamentally different from those in 1600. The spirit of continuity was so strong that no Polish statesman could remain in power for a single instant if he cast any reflection on the policy of the old Poland in regard to its neighbors. The Polish control of Galicia during the Austrian regime merely confirmed them in the consciousness of their own rectitude.

The proclamation of the Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918 and the resulting struggle between the Poles and the Western Ukrainians only increased the bitterness which had been developed by history. At the same time, the brief taste of independence on the part of Western Ukraine had also given the Ukrainians an increased sense of their own dignity, their own unity and their national identity. The ambiguous position adopted by the Peace Conference served only to convince both parties that they were well within their rights and served to make any reconciliation still more difficult.

It is not at all impossible that the history of Europe would have been very different, if in 1919 there had been on the scene and in control men of the breath of vision of Hadiach, whereby Rus’ was recognized as a third component part of a Great Poland, on a par with Poland and Lithuania. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Ukraine was really leaving Western Ukraine to itself; with its bitter opposition to Communism and proper diplomacy it might have joined a great federation which would have solved the problem of eastern Europe. No one of any prominence put forward or even tried to secure a hearing for any such plan, and it is hard to see what would have been the position of Western Ukraine, had the proposal to grant it a plebiscite twenty-five years in the future been carried out. It could only have meant a continued unsettlement in policy and can become intelligible only if it is assumed that the Conference at Paris believed that within that time the entire Ukrainian problem would have been settled and that Eastern Galicia or Western Ukraine would then vote itself into union with the rest of the country. If that is true, then there is the further question as to why the Conference bound itself so strictly to its furtherance of the White Russian armies and the unity of Russia that it refused to send supplies to the Ukrainian forces who were still struggling against the overwhelming power of the Reds.

Whatever may have been the motives back of the actions at Paris, the Poles determined to produce a unified state in which the power would be entirely in Polish hands. They realized that a considerable portion of the Ukrainians living in Eastern Galicia had already been Polonized, that, for example, the brother of Archbishop Sheptitsky was the Chief of Staff in the Polish army, and they still believed that in a relatively few years the restored Poland could so accelerate the process that the province would be thoroughly absorbed into a unified state.

As a result, during the formative years, the Constituent Diet of Poland was elected at a time when Western Ukraine was still in arms in support of its own government and hence there was no reason why the Ukrainians should vote in the Polish elections. Thus in the formation of the Polish Constitution they had no vote and the power rested entirely in the hands of the Polish nationalists who were the strong supporters of a centralized state. Even later, in 1922 since under the decree of the Peace Conference, Eastern Galicia was supposed to have its own independent Diet, the Ukrainians again declined to vote for delegates to the Polish Diet, contrary to the decrees of the Peace Conference and the Council of Ambassadors that continued its work. There was thus produced an impasse between the Polish and Ukrainian points of view which could only add to the general bitterness and this required the most careful handling on the Polish part.

In the fall of 1922, the Polish Diet did go so far as to pass a law providing for the creation of a special regime in the provinces of Lviv, Ternopil and Stanislaviv. Under this there was to be in each province a Polish and a Ukrainian diet which was to have certain powers dealing with local conditions and the ability to act separately on matters pertaining to one nationality. It was also provided that there should be founded a Ukrainian university. All these reforms were to be inaugurated within two years. It would have been an improvement on conditions as they then were, but it was far from the regime visualized by the Peace Conference and certainly was not an answer to the Ukrainian demands.

These reforms, however, were never carried into practice, for on March 14, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors yielded completely, and formally granted Eastern Galicia to Poland with the statement that Poland recognized that autonomy was needed in the area and that by signing the treaty providing for the rights of minorities, she had bound herself to do all that was needed. To all intents and purposes, this decision gave Poland a free hand. The exiled government of Western Ukraine formally protested and there were enormous demonstrations in Lviv and elsewhere against it, but there was nothing to be done. Once the unification had been achieved, Poland felt herself free to proceed as if nothing had happened. There was henceforth no talk in Warsaw of any autonomy for Eastern Galicia.

Even before this, the Polish government had interfered with all Ukrainian cultural and financial institutions. It had even placed in custody Archbishop Sheptitsky when he returned from a trip to America in 1921, despite the influence that he exerted on the Ukrainians to maintain public order. It had carried out its claims that the Ukrainian movement was essentially a subversive movement, even though at the time there was a certain recognition of the privileged status of Eastern Galicia by the same international organs that were responsible for the creation of Poland itself.

The recognition of Eastern Galicia as part of Poland in 1923 presented the Western Ukrainians with a new situation. They had henceforth to decide whether to accept their position as a definite part of Poland or to continue to struggle for independence. The latter position was taken by the Ukrainian Military Organization, headed by Col. Evhen Konovalets, a former regimental commander. This body carried out various acts of terrorism against individual members of the Polish government who were prominent in the suppression of Ukrainian activities. Another group, composed largely of intellectuals, like Professor Hrushevsky, accepted the invitation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to transfer the centre of their activities to Kiev. Professor Hrushevsky left Vienna, where much of the Ukrainian organized activity had been concentrated. The vast majority, however, began to tend toward such activity in the Polish state as they were permitted, without for a moment giving up the right of Ukraine to its independence in the future. Thus in 1923 the Ukrainians took part in the Polish elections and a considerable number took their seats in the Diet, while their leader, Dmytro Levitsky, declared publicly that they had not renounced their ideals of independence and that they considered all treaties denying the rights of the Ukrainian people to national independence to be without any legal basis.

From year to year the struggle changed its form as various measures were put into effect by the Polish government to break down the solid block of Ukrainians living in Eastern Galicia and to introduce Poles into the area. Thus the Poles in their laws for breaking up large estates settled on these estates groups of Polish veterans in the hope that they might destroy the Ukrainian voting majority. They banned the use of Ukrainian in other than the three provinces in which the Ukrainians were a majority. They refused any steps toward the organization of a Ukrainian university and they did their best to limit the number of schools in which Ukrainian was used as the language of instruction. Again and again they initiated movements to close Ukrainian cultural, economic and even athletic organizations by arguing that they were merely being used for subversive activities.

During the early years after the War, the relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland were badly strained. The Czechs accused the Poles of inciting the Slovaks and in return they opened their own institutions to offer refuge to the Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia. There was established at Prague a Ukrainian Free University, a Ukrainian Historical and Philological Society, a Union of Ukrainian Physicians of Czechoslovakia, a Museum of Ukraine’s Struggle for Liberation, and a Ukrainian Agricultural School at Podebrady. While these were ostensibly open to Ukrainians of all regions, they were for all intents and purposes largely catering to people from Eastern Galicia who had fled from Polish rule.

The Ukrainian cause was kept alive before the League of Nations and other international bodies by a continuous stream of protests against Polish atrocities against the Ukrainians. These reached their height in 1930, when the Polish army was sent into the Ukrainian areas to pacify the population and the acts of repression and cruelties practiced upon the village populations increased. Ukrainian institutions of every kind were closed, concentration camps were established, and the country was on the verge of a real revolt. Again an appeal was taken to the League of Nations, and in 1931 the League decided after some hearings that there was no direct persecution but that many of the Polish officials were undoubtedly showing excessive zeal in carrying out their orders. It was the kind of decision that could not settle the situation and restore peace to the area, for the Poles still insisted that the Ukrainians were and of right ought to be loyal Polish subjects, even though they were refused any positions of authority in the Ukrainian areas and very few were admitted to the Polish University of Lviv.

Yet it must be remembered that all Ukrainian life was not stopped and controlled by the Polish government. Thus in 1929 they allowed the organization of a Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw in the hope that it would outshine the Shevchenko Scientific Society of Lviv, and that it would not develop the national and political consciousness that there would be in an organization in Lviv, where the entire historical tradition was permeated with the old struggle between the Ukrainians and Poles.

There was no open attempt to destroy the various Ukrainian political parties which were able to elect members of the Diet. These parties represented all points of view, from conservatives to socialists, and their members had the same general treatment as members of the Polish parties. Yet their growth and functioning were hampered rather by administrative restrictions than by downright and open dissolution. There was no attempt to deny the Ukrainian character or traditions except in so far as the Poles argued that they were Polish citizens and therefore should develop Polish culture rather than their own national usages.

The Poles were obsessed with the idea that there might develop a strong movement for joining their brothers in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It is true that during the period of Ukrainization there did spring up a certain amount of reciprocity but this remained purely on an intellectual plane. Bad as conditions were in Poland, the Ukrainians showed no desire, except in the case of isolated Communists, to join their brothers and become their companions in misery. Communists were conspicuously absent in the Ukrainian organizations, for the iron veil which grew up around the boundaries of the Soviet Union had separated families and villages, and the few refugees who succeeded in crossing into Poland did not give encouraging pictures of life under the Soviets.

The Poles were even more suspicious of the Ukrainian Orthodox than they were of the Greek Catholics. They endeavored to form a Polish Orthodox Church but this remained either Russian or Ukrainian speaking and never was coordinated into an efficient whole, for it reflected the differences of the Orthodox in the different provinces. However, in 1938, in a tactless move the Poles seized over a hundred Orthodox Churches and closed them on the pretext that they had once been Uniat and that therefore they were not properly in Orthodox hands. Such an act, which drew the protest of Metropolitan Sheptitsky, only succeeded in antagonizing both the Uniats and the Orthodox against the Poles and in bringing the two religious groups closer together. It was another of the many mistakes that were made in the handling of the problem.

It goes without saying that the policy of avoiding a clearcut settlement of the Ukrainian question reacted badly on the general position of Poland, for it created the tendency among the Ukrainians to seek for foreign support. At first they found this in Czechoslovakia, which gave refuge to the anti-Polish forces among the Ukrainians. Later some factions tended to look toward Germany for refuge and help.

In 1934 some of the conservative Ukrainians made an attempt to “normalize” their relations with the Poles and to take a more active part in the life of the country. Again these attempts really came to nothing, for the Polish government used them as a sign of Ukrainian weakening and felt that they did not require mutual concession. As a result the Ukrainians received little actual relief and this in turn only called out renewed terrorist attacks, renewed attempts at pacification and the closing of Ukrainian institutions.

Despite all of these bitter political feuds, the Ukrainian population, even during the years of depression, continued to solidify its position in the state. Its co-operative organizations increased in numbers, in capital and in membership. They became steadily more important and that progress that had been noted during the last years of Austro-Hungarian rule proceeded at an even more rapid tempo. The self-consciousness that had come to the Ukrainians through their attempt at independence made them more aware of their role and influence in the country and especially in their special areas than they had been before the War. Attempts to divide them into Ukrainians and Ruthenians on the ground of religious and economic differences fell upon sterile soil. By 1939 the Ukrainians of the West were in a much better position than they had been at any time in the past.

The situation in Western Ukraine aroused grave anxiety on the part of many sincere friends of Poland as the hour for the Second World War drew near, It presented many elements of danger to the Polish state and this danger was magnified by the policy that was adopted by every political party among the Poles. It seemed impossible for them to realize that conditions had changed with the abolition of serfdom. That same controversy which had broken out in the days when Galicia was still subject to Austria-Hungary continued as a mutual feud, especially in such areas as Lviv, where there was a large Polish as well as a Ukrainian population.

The Poles fanned the flame of discord by their policy of antagonism and by their inability to see the justice of any of the Ukrainian demands. The restored Polish republic continued on the fatal path of the seventeenth century by overemphasizing on the one hand a supposed desire of the Ukrainians to join the Soviet Union as they had joined Russia earlier, and on the other, by underestimating the strength of the entire Ukrainian movement. They turned their attention and gave their confidence only to those people who had been completely Polonized and they ignored the long and unbroken struggle for equal rights which the Ukrainians had been carrying on for centuries in the old Poland, under the rule of the conquerors and later. An isolated and non-Communist Western Ukraine might have been brought into a Poland constructed on federal lines, but it could not feel happy as part of a unified state in which it was treated as inferior in every way and which was openly working for its complete absorption. After the failure of the Ukrainian Republic, the Poles regarded the question as closed, and their very insistence upon this only intensified that opposition which they fought constantly and affected to ignore. As a result Western Ukraine remained as a sore in the body politic of Poland, instead of becoming an element of strength and just as in the past, so in the present, the feud worked out to the marked disadvantage of both sides.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

CARPATHO-UKRAINE

The fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was quite different. It was represented in the negotiations that led up to the formation of the Republic of Western Ukraine, but when the Western Ukrainian armies were forced eastward by the Poles, the district was left isolated and the various groups came together and decided upon union with Czechoslovakia.

The ideas of the population on this point were somewhat hazy. They envisaged a situation where they would form a state within a state, possessing practically complete autonomy, very similar to the position of Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In this connection they were also influenced by the Slovaks, who had dreams of holding a similar status. On the other hand, the Czechs certainly thought of a unified state of the same general type as France and it was the Czech ideas that were carried out in practice.

On the whole the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was far more undeveloped politically and nationally than were the other sections. There were practically no schools in the area and what schools there were conducted instruction in Hungarian. The Hungarian government also had been extremely effective in imbuing the educated classes of its minorities with the idea that their future depended upon merging their own interests with those of the dominant Magyars. As a result there were few, outside of the clergy, who had any vital understanding of the cause of the people.

Besides that, the Ukrainian revival in these northern Hungarian counties had not progressed as far since 1848 as it had among the other sections of the Ukrainian people. While there was an active Ukrainian group in the area, there were also many people who insisted, contrary to all philological and cultural facts, that their language was an archaic dialect of Russian and they looked to Russia for all improvement in their status. This was particularly true of the Orthodox in the area, even though their bishops were still nominally dependent upon the Patriarch of Constantinople who retained the same vague powers of control that he had in mediaeval Kiev. Many of these people, even when they desired to be free of Hungarian control, still treasured some sort of belief that they should be attached to Russia and refused to consider merging their lot with that of the other Ukrainians.

Economic conditions were very bad and the mountainous nature of the country was responsible for difficulties in communication between the various mountain valleys, which formed the headwaters of the rivers flowing down into the Hungarian plains to the south. Many of the younger men and women emigrated or at least went down to Hungary as seasonal laborers and the relations with the northern slopes of the Carpathians were rather weak.

With such a background, effective organization was very difficult and the Czechs, although they signed a definite agreement with the representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainians to grant the country as much autonomy as was consistent with the unity of the state, did not hurry themselves to apply this. On the contrary, they took the attitude that the people would fall of necessity under the control of the Hungarians and the Jews if they were allowed to handle their own affairs, and they sent large numbers of Czechs into the area to carry on the essential government services. There was at times a Carpatho-Ukrainian governor but his powers were severely limited by the Czech officials who surrounded him.

At the same time the Czechs opened large numbers of schools in the area and they did much to spread literacy among the population. It is certain that during the first ten years of Czech control, the people of the area were far better off than at any time under Hungary. Yet the improving conditions could not fail to increase the national consciousness of the people. It was the Czech hope that when a new generation, educated in Prague, came into the important offices of the region, they would be completely satisfied with their position in Czechoslovakia and that any separatist feelings would be assuaged.

The increase of literacy had another effect upon the people. In the past many had been content to talk their own dialect without any thought of grammatical accuracy. Village differed from village and there were the same differences that had appeared earlier throughout Ukraine when the first writers were adopting and working out literary Ukrainian. It became evident that the old ambiguous situation would pass away. The children in school read Shevchenko and Franko and the other Ukrainian authors and the general trend was to develop Carpatho-Ukraine along the same general lines. This displeased many of those people who had a sentimental attachment to Russian. They tended to gravitate toward the use of true Great Russian and many of them fell under Communist influence.

Thus, the period between the Wars was one largely of intensifying the national feeling in the country and one of considerable material and intellectual improvement and development. On the whole there were relatively few of those disorders which had marked the liquidation of the Republic of Western Ukraine by Poland. Yet tensions continued to increase, especially after 1925 when the reforms in Hungary by Jeremiah Smith, acting as financial representative of the League of Nations, forced the return to the area of many of the former Hungarian-sympathizing Carpatho-Ukrainians who had been able to establish themselves in white collar jobs in Hungary. They tried to recover their old position in the community but were prevented by the Czech authorities, and so they began an underground campaign to win the country over to its former rulers.

In 1928 the Czechoslovak government reorganized the whole section as the province of Podkarpatska Rus, but it still hesitated to grant local autonomy and the diet that had been promised to the population and had been persistently withheld. As a result there grew up a marked coolness between the population and the central government in Prague, which continued to waver between a definite support of those groups which were conscious of their Ukrainian character and those which believed themselves some kind of Russians. In all this the relations between the Czechs and the Russians played a considerable part. After the signing of a treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in 1933, the Czechs gradually lessened any support of the Ukrainophile party and at the same time they dropped some of their more ardent support of the Ukrainians in Prague.

Ill feeling was also generated in the province by the results of the depression. This had struck hardest in the Sudeten German areas, where the glass trade was especially affected. It coincided with the rise of the Henlein party under the influence of the Nazi seizure of power in Germany and with the strengthening of the followers of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka in Slovakia, with their demand for full autonomy there. Naturally all this was carried over into the province of Podkarpatska Rus and some of those groups which had formerly leaned upon Hungary now looked toward Germany for support.

The situation came to a head after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. The immediate result was the setting up of the so-called Second Republic, which was greatly decentralized. As a result, for the first time Carpatho-Ukraine received the local diet which had been promised and refused time after time during the preceding twenty years.

This marked a new period of hope not only for the Ukrainians of Carpatho-Ukraine but also for Ukrainians throughout the world. Satisfaction in this was however mitigated by the fact that the Germans, to please Hungary, had turned over to that country large sections of the land, including the two chief cities of Uzhorod and Mukachevo, in which the leading educational and governmental institutions were located. The government was then compelled to meet in Hust, a small provincial town which contained almost no facilities. Yet despite all the hardships and the difficulties in setting up a government, the Ukrainians were enthusiastic, for now, at last, there was again a centre where Ukrainian life could develop freely without undue foreign interference. The Czech officials were recalled and the increasing autonomy of Slovakia completely isolated Carpatho-Ukraine from Czech influence. Ukrainians from all sections of the dismembered country flocked to Hust and were able to offer great help and assistance to the local population. Steps were taken to organize a small army and as in 1918 they took the name of the Riflemen of the Zaporozhian Sich. They unfurled the blue and yellow standard of Ukraine and it became clear to all that Carpatho-Ukraine was on the way to becoming a free and independent state.

Under the conditions that prevailed, it was necessary for the young state to remain on friendly terms with Nazi Germany and to seek its protection against Hungary which was claiming the whole of its territory. The first Prime Minister, Andrew Brody, was soon removed by the Czechoslovak government in one of its last acts outside the borders of Bohemia and Moravia. The power then passed to Monsignor Andrew Voloshyn, who worked hard and steadily to make the new state successful.

Throughout the winter of 1938–9 progress went on. There were repeated difficulties with Poland, which wished Hungary to annex the territory so as to remove the sympathy and support which the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia felt for this new centre of Ukrainian freedom. Hungary continued to press demands upon the new state. Yet President Voloshyn had definite promises from Germany that its independence would be safeguarded and that peace would be maintained.

Then came another of those inscrutable changes on the part of Hitler that had so much to do with the downfall of Nazi Germany. It was commonly believed that Hitler, in his hatred of both Communism and Poland, would use the little state of Carpatho-Ukraine as a centre of Ukrainian propaganda. It was thought that he would foment discontent in Eastern Galicia, arouse a revolt there and allow the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine to unite. Then optimists believed that ultimately the pressure of Germany would result in the liberation of Eastern Ukraine and that Ukraine would again be free, even if it was compelled to remain within the German sphere of influence. Some Ukrainian leaders, even if they were democratic and opposed to the principles of Nazism, saw in this the same situation that had occurred at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk when Ukraine could find no support in any other quarter.

It was not to be. The German policy can only be understood on the assumption that friendly relations had already been established between the Nazis and the Communists. On March 13, at the urging of Hitler, Slovakia declared its complete independence and this completely separated Carpatho-Ukraine from the rest of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, the German troops moved into Prague and on the same day Carpatho-Ukraine formally declared its independence.

It was almost the last act of the tragedy. The day before, Hungary, more powerful and willingly a satellite of the Nazis, sent an ultimatum to the new government. Voloshyn appealed to Hitler to stand by his promises to maintain the independence of the country and was rudely rebuffed on the ground that the situation had entirely changed. Without any delay the Hungarian troops, which had been well-armed by the Germans, crossed the boundary of Carpatho-Ukraine and attacked Hust. The Riflemen of the Sich fought bravely under the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the head of which was Colonel Andrew Melnyk, but their light weapons were useless before the heavier guns of the Hungarians. The government with President Voloshyn, was forced to flee to Romania and there offered to place itself under Romanian control. The offer was refused.

The Hungarians met with severe opposition from the little army of Carpatho-Ukraine and from the armed peasants whose knowledge of the country served them in good stead. By the beginning of May, the country had been pacified and brought under full Hungarian control. Its constitution and name were wiped out, the Hungarian language was introduced, and the Hungarian government did everything in its power to bring conditions back to what they had been in 1918. Schools were closed or Magyarized. Ukrainian institutions were liquidated and a new era of oppression opened for those people who had been but a few days before jubilant over their newly won independence.

Apparently the change of policy was connected with the plans of Hitler to come to terms with Stalin for the division of Eastern Europe, and the weakening of anti-Communist Ukrainian movements was part of the larger design. Yet it had a very important result. It completely destroyed the unnatural alliance between the democratic Ukrainians and the Nazi Germans. It ended any lingering dreams that there might be a real friendship between the Germans and the Ukrainians. The result was that during the next months and years there were no further attempts to secure German support. When in the fall of 1939 Germany attacked Poland, there did not come any revolt in Eastern Galicia against the Poles, despite the increasingly severe measures taken by the Polish government, and when Germany finally attacked the Soviet Union, she secured more aid from the dissatisfied Russians than she did from the Ukrainians whom she had so flagrantly abandoned.

The development of Carpatho-Ukraine was then only another one of the unsuccessful Ukrainian attempts to win liberty for at least one part of the divided country, but it showed the growing feeling of unity that existed amid the overwhelming tragedies of the past years. It played a disproportionate role in the fateful year of 1939 and it emphasized anew the important strategic position of Carpatho-Ukraine and indeed of Ukraine as a whole in the coming struggles.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE.

THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

The seizure of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks gave them the opportunity to carry out their theories of government, which were in marked variance to all previous political thought. Hitherto, everywhere in the world there had been attempts to set up national or dynastic governments located in definite areas of the earth’s surface. The Soviets now cast all this into the wastebasket and in their zeal for an international and worldwide revolution, they planned to build a government based upon the worldwide community of interests of the workers and peasants. In theory at least this was to be an international government and they had high hopes that the laboring classes of the world would rally to their standard.

It happened that Lenin, Trotsky, and also the vast majority of the other leaders were Russian and that the seat of the government was in Moscow, but in theory they cared very little about Russia as such. In the first heat of their enthusiasm, they even went so far as to recognize the equality of all the nationalities in the old Russian Empire and allow them full self-determination and even the right of secession. The old organization was completely wiped out and a new structure, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, was established.

At this moment the Ukrainian National Republic was struggling to its feet and the demand was growing for a declaration of complete independence which was finally adopted on January 9/22, 1918, as we have seen. It might have been assumed that this coincided with the decrees adopted by the Bolsheviks and that the way was now cleared for the development of an independent Ukraine. Yet this explanation was too simple, for the Bolsheviks had another string to their bow and they had already commenced to play it.

The Ukrainian Council was an organization working along democratic lines. The Bolsheviks therefore declared that it did not represent the workers and peasants. After their discomfiture in Kiev in December, 1917 they retired to Kharkiv and there, on December 13, proclaimed the existence of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic which would satisfy the conditions for a real workers’ and peasants’ government. It made no difference to them that the leaders of this movement were not primarily Ukrainian, that its organization had been pushed by various Russian bands which had penetrated into Ukraine, and that its first military support was furnished by Russian Communists.

This group appointed a Committee which became the executive body under the name of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee on January 3, 1918. This consisted of Manuilsky, a Ukrainian who had long lived in Russia, Rakovsky, a Bulgarian or Romanian Jew, Hrynko, and two Ukrainian politicians, Zatonsky and Skrypnyk. They proceeded to carry out the regular Soviet plan of organization and on February 14, announced a federation with the Russian Soviet Republic. The Soviets introduced members of this group at the Conference in Brest Litovsk with the Germans and insisted that it was the true representative government of Ukraine, but they were compelled to recognize the regularly constituted Ukrainian government.

The question was more or less academic during the years of civil war, when the Ukrainian government was struggling against overwhelming odds to maintain its new-won independence. Yet in theory it was fighting against the adherents of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, although it was generally recognized that this was but a puppet of the Russian Soviets and that the vast majority of the troops at its command were Russian.

However, when the Ukrainian government was finally overwhelmed, the Ukrainian Soviet Government was definitely installed at Kharkiv as the capital of Ukraine and for a short time went through the motions of being an independent state. It sent its own representatives to foreign governments, there was a Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and on paper all seemed well. At the same time, when there came too open evidence of interference from Moscow with the sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Republic, steps were taken to end such interference.

Yet the Communists had absolute control over the new state, not through the Russian Soviet government but through the Communist Party, which boasted of being an international organization and which could discipline the various national Communist parties if they did not obey the decrees issued by the central authority in Moscow. Any deviation from these orders was interpreted as a counter-revolutionary act, contrary to the wishes of the workers and peasants whose mouthpiece was the Communist Party.

During 1921 and 1922 there came one of those periods of drought which are not unknown in Ukraine. The grain crop was an utter failure, all kinds of transportation had broken down as a result of the Civil Wars, and the country was plunged into misery. It is estimated that several million people died in Ukraine and the country was brought to the deepest depths, far worse than during the earlier years of war. Typhus added to the misery and carried away still more of the population. Outside aid was sought and the American Relief Administration did wonderful work in securing food from abroad and in distributing it to the starving population.

The Ukrainians in their misery did their best to reject all communization. In the Ukrainian districts there had never been the communal ownership of land which was so typical of the Great Russians, and the peasants fought hard and steadily to maintain possession of their own land and that which they had secured from the landlords during the period of the Ukrainian Republic. This naturally antagonized the Soviets, and made them realize that they were going to have a hard task to bring the country around to their mode of life.

They attacked the problem in two ways. On the governmental side, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic authorized the Russian Soviet government to represent it in foreign negotiations at a conference in Genoa. From that time on it became customary for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to follow the Russian line, although for a while there was always a Ukrainian representative in the Soviet Embassy in all those countries where Ukraine had been formerly recognized.

Then, at the end of 1922, there was signed a declaration for the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This was ratified in 1923 and came into effect in 1924. Under this new system, the various Soviet Republics, including Ukraine, transferred all their foreign and most of their domestic affairs to the government of the Soviet Union, which was, as before, almost identical with the government of the old Russian Soviet Republic. In the All Union Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’ Delegates, the Russian Republic had an overwhelming majority, if there was to be any voting, and between the control of the Communist Party by the Russians and the control of the Soviet Union by the same people, it was abundantly evident that any autonomy in Ukraine was a mere shadow which could be stopped at any time.

Yet while the central authority was being extended over the country, the Soviets gave a wide scope to cultural Ukrainization. The New Economic Policy was very popular in the land, since it gave a certain liberty to the individual peasants and there were many people who believed that the worst extremes of Militant Communism were over.

There was great attention paid to the founding of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Ukrainian Soviet government sent out the most cordial invitations to the old leaders of the Ukrainian Republic to return and take their places in the new order and in the rebuilding of the country. Many accepted. Professor Hrushevsky returned from Vienna and was made head of the Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences. Holubovich, who had been President of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic, followed and many of the other leaders moved to Kharkiv and Kiev. The Academy of Sciences flourished and intellectual work was liberally supported. It elected to membership the outstanding scholars of Western Ukraine, who welcomed this opportunity to have free and open communication with their friends and kindred of Great Ukraine. At the same time, steps were taken to introduce Ukrainian into all the offices of the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. A Ukrainian army was established, with the official language Ukrainian, and while it formed part of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, it was national enough to win much sympathy and support from all classes of the population.

It was only the hardened and incorrigible opponents of Communism who refused to be appeased by these actions and who persisted in refusing to credit the new regime with good intentions. It is true that there remained on the statute books the old Communist regulations in regard to the Academy of Sciences but there were relatively few attempts to enforce them, and while there was some hampering of the work of the scholars by zealous advocates of Marxism, it hardly seemed important for the average person. The same was true in almost all walks of life. Ukraine began to recover from the devastations of the civil wars.

Yet during these years, Communism made very little advance among the Ukrainian people, and by 1925 the non-Ukrainian members of the party far outnumbered the Ukrainian, as they had from the beginning. This was very satisfactory to all those who were eager for the well-being of the Ukrainians, but it was not good news to the representatives of the ruling group in the Kremlin, who were hoping for the spread of their doctrines throughout the country. For a while there was little that they felt able to do and even when Kaganovich appeared in Ukraine, he had only kind words for the progress that Ukrainian culture was making throughout the land.

The problem before the Communists was to find the most convenient and easy way to assert the control of the Moscow standardizing policy without arousing too much discontent among the people. The return of agricultural prosperity under individual farming was supplying the rest of the Soviet Union with food and at the moment the leaders were not desirous of upsetting conditions too strongly. It was true, of course, that Ukraine was being laid under heavier and heavier contributions until it seemed even to some of the Communists that the entire land was being ruined.

Then came the problem of extending Communism to the country. The First Five Year Plan was started in 1928 and this gave a good opportunity for changing conditions. Enormous factories and power plants were projected for Ukraine, such as the Dnyeprostroy near the site where the old Sich had been located. There was needed a large mass of workmen and the government saw to it that these were recruited from the Great Russians and from non-Ukrainian elements. The first step in the change of character of Ukraine had been taken.

At about the same time, the first steps were taken to handle the cultural problem which had been intensified by the success of the preceding program of Ukrainization. Under the guise of promoting the solidarity of the Soviet Union, it was ordered that Russian be taught as a second language in all schools. Arrangements were made so that possibility for personal advancement was only opened to those persons who knew Russian. Army officers who desired a career were sent to Russian All-Union schools, and then for the most part were assigned to units from other Soviet Republics. Along with such tendencies, which removed from the state organization many of the outstanding young men even among the Communists, there came a shift of emphasis, so that Stalin could declare that the culture of the various Soviet Republics would be varied in language but socialist in essence. In other words, exactly the same thoughts were to be expressed in all the various Soviet Republics, which were to be at liberty to repeat in their native tongue the ideas of the Kremlin and nothing else.

There was strong opposition to this stand in Ukraine and the old and more or less disused talk of Ukrainian counter-revolution and nationalism was again brought out of the discard. Mykola Skrypnyk, an old Ukrainian Communist, but an ardent advocate of Ukrainian culture, undertook to bring Communism into the Academy of Sciences. The various Communist organizations were invited to propose candidates for its membership, for party prominence and familiarity with the slogans and practice of Communism were henceforth to be the determining features of the membership, rather than eminence in any field of learning.

To counter-balance the influence of the leading scholars and writers of the last few years, Kaganovich and Postyshev, who had been appointed Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, began to discover that the leaders of Ukraine were in close touch with the nationalist and counter-revolutionary elements abroad, especially in Eastern Galicia. It was hardly a secret, for the Soviet authorities had encouraged such communication in the hope that discontent with Poland would bring the Western Ukrainians to declare their desire for union with their brothers to the east. The attempt had not been successful, and now the Soviet authorities were ready to turn this to account. They arrested many of the intellectual leaders, such as Yefremiv, the Vice President of the Academy of Sciences. Claiming that they belonged to a society for the liberation of Ukraine, they sentenced them to long terms in prison. Soon after they involved Professor Hrushevsky, deposed him from his place in the Academy of Sciences and deported him to a place near Moscow, where he was deprived of all possibilities of study. When his health was completely broken, he was allowed to go to a resthouse in the Caucasus to die.

In 1931, the authorities discovered a new liberation centre. In connection with this they arrested Holubovich and many political leaders who had returned to Ukraine during the era of Ukrainization and after the usual trial condemned them to death. In 1933 it was discovered that more Ukrainian leaders were acting with the Ukrainian Military Organization abroad and these too were liquidated. Even Skrypnyk, who had been one of the most zealous partisans of Communism in Ukraine, was brought under suspicion and committed suicide. So did the writer Mykola Khvylovy, who was accused of counter-revolutionary work because he desired to strengthen the cultural connections between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and Western Europe, something which was regarded as opposed to the growing unification of the Soviet Union and its increasing isolation from the rest of the world. Step by step the independence that had characterized the Ukrainian writers, even the Ukrainian Communists, during the twenties was taken away and those who survived accepted the necessity of producing a culture that was purely socialist and Kremlinesque in essence and Ukrainian only in language, and not always that, for the new tendencies aimed to assimilate into Ukrainian as many Russian words as possible.

The continued trials and arrests can be explained in only two ways. Either the Ukrainian national movement had gained prodigiously during the years of Soviet rule and had swung to itself not only the remains of those people who had fought for the Ukrainian National Republic but also the founders of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic itself. If so, it would have required little help from outside to have won the independence of the country. Or the government of Stalin had decided to eliminate as counter-revolutionary all men of any capacity for independent thinking and the accusations against them were devoid of factual foundation. One after another such Communists as Postyshev, who had carried on the first trials, were themselves accused of Ukrainian nationalism and liquidated or deported.

While this was going on in intellectual circles, Stalin announced his plans for the socialization of agriculture. It was ordered that this be carried through with the greatest speed and the peasants were forced to give up their lands and to enter the newly established collective farms, which were established throughout Ukraine as well as throughout the entire Soviet Union. Here the government encountered and proceeded to deal with the other aspect of Ukrainian life that had embarrassed the Ukrainian National Government. That had attempted to satisfy the peasant hunger for land by taking it away from the great landlords and giving it to the peasants. It was the opposition of these Russianized classes that had been used by the Germans in supporting the hetmanate of Skoropadsky against the Republic, and by the Russians with Denikin, when it came their turn.

Now by a clever extension of the use of the term “kulak,” all the peasants who had been prospering on their own land and on that which they had acquired, were declared enemies of the Soviet Union and were driven into the collective farms. Armed detachments commandeered all the grain of the individual landowners. These retaliated by killing their cattle when they were ordered to turn them over to the collective farms, and the situation became steadily more serious.

The result was the political famine of 1932–33. The collective farms failed to function efficiently and to secure food for the cities, the government confiscated all the grain in the villages and allowed the peasants to go hungry until they were ready to work for the government on its own terms. The area was closed to the outside world and for a long while there were no definite reports of what was going on. Even now many details are not known, but it seems clear that at least ten percent of the population of Ukraine starved to death and this time the government did not allow outside relief as it had in the famine of 1921–22. Naturally the loss of life was greater in the purely Ukrainian villages than it was in the cities which had been filled with the new people brought into Ukraine for the sake of the industrial development. As a result of this, it is certain that the proportion of non-Ukrainians in the country has increased not only by the continued process of immigration but also by the tremendous destruction of the native population. The same results were achieved also by the enforced deportation of millions more of the Ukrainians, who were sent to remote areas of the Soviet Union where enormous numbers more perished because of the conditions under which they were compelled to live.

While the Soviet government was thus remodelling Ukrainian life in the country, it was exerting every effort to create a non-Ukrainian population in the cities. The enormous coal and iron resources of the eastern part of Ukraine were developed at a rapid rate. The Soviet Union hired American engineers to construct the enormous power plant of the Dnyeprostroy and they built huge factories in Kiev and Kharkiv. As a result Ukraine rapidly became one of the foremost industrialized areas in the Soviet Union and the only one about which any information was allowed to pass to the outside world, for it was impossible to keep the development in Ukraine as secret as the building of factories in the Urals and further east in Siberia. The majority of the workmen in these factories were brought in from other parts of the Union and the Soviets carried out a definite policy of transportation of population in order to crush once and for all the growth of a national or even a local spirit in any of the subsidiary republics.

The extent of this is well shown in the writings of those Ukrainian authors who accepted the new regime and became ardent citizens of the Union. The poems of Tychyna, for example, a distinguished poet who early accepted the full ideology of the Communists, boast that the factories of Kiev are far more important than the Cathedral of St. Sophia and all that represented the past culture. The writers sing loudly the praise of Stalin, who with unerring judgment has pointed out the path on which Ukraine must go in connection with the older brother, Moscow, and all the nations of the Soviet Union.

Under such conditions support was withdrawn very ostentatiously from all those movements which aimed to create brotherhood on the basis of Ukrainian tradition with the population of Eastern Galicia and Western Ukraine. Step by step the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences dropped direct connections even with those foreign scholars whom it had elected to membership. Later still its organization was changed, and instead of being an institution founded by and responsible to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, it became merely a branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences and represented those activities which were carried on within the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Most of its special and localized activities were abolished and it became merely one part of a great organization spreading throughout the entire country and devoted to the study of the general interests of the whole.

All these tendencies were written into law by the All-Union constitution of 1936, which definitely conferred upon the central authority all possible control over the various Soviet Republics. This marked the end of the illusory independence that had characterized the position of Ukraine since the organization of the Soviet Union. The power of the Kremlin was not in fact increased, but it rendered possible the use of this power through the official agencies of the government and not through the machinery of the Communist Party, which was in effect a duplication of the channels of command. The change was really one of name only, for the power of Stalin was as absolute before as after, the same men filled the leading positions in the central government and in the Party, and the constitution merely affirmed publicly what every one knew privately to be true.

The following years witnessed the continued development of industry and the renewal of attempts to bind Ukrainian manufacturing and mining even more closely into the whole of the Soviet Union. There was a continuation of the purges of every one who might be remotely charged with holding a distinctively Ukrainian opinion on the ground that he was cooperating with the Ukrainian nationalist agitation, but the purges now came to include not only the possible suspects but almost all of the men who had been zealous both in Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic in organizing the regime. The old Bolsheviks were nearly all liquidated and year by year fewer of the more convinced young Communists of Ukraine found their way to the higher places in the Soviet Union. Those positions were more and more confined to Russians and even very few of the Ukrainians who had gone to other parts of the country for their careers were rewarded.

At the same time, agriculture did revive as the collective farms became a little more efficient. Yet even there a new danger developed, for the plots of land which the individual households were allowed to cultivate for their own use tended to increase and to be better cared for. The peasants grasped at the slightest straw that would allow them to retain a vestige of their old independence. The government was obliged to act again to prevent these local family plots from taking up the best lands of the communal farms and to limit them at most to an acre or so. There were more decrees issued on this subject, there were more arrests and deportations and more attempts to destroy the Ukrainian character of the villages. The opposition could not be as strong as in the earlier periods when the peasants were better organized but events made it clear that the Soviet Union intended to leave no stone unturned to wipe out the slightest survival of any of the old traditional feelings.

At the same time the rise of Nazism in Germany and the growing power of that country created a certain alarm in Moscow. Many of Hitler’s speeches called for the separation of Ukraine as the granary of Europe from the Soviet Union. The Communists could not fail to know that there were at least some of the Ukrainian nationalist leaders who were living in Berlin and presumably receiving some support from the German government. Yet it is noticeable that despite the many Nazi attacks upon the Communists, relations continued at least formally between the Nazis and the Communists through most of the thirties. It was obvious that Germany was trying to win Western support against the Soviet Union at the same time that the Communists were doing their best to stir up discontent throughout the world, whether directly or through the Communist International.

This situation increased the Soviet desire to stifle anything that savored of Ukrainian nationalism and it added a certain reason for the Communist desire to incorporate fully the Ukraine in the national life of the Soviet Union. The idea of winning Ukrainian confidence by proper treatment did not occur to the authorities, for it was basically opposed to their fundamental belief that the Communist Party as developed in the Soviet Union was the only legitimate spokesman for the laboring masses of the world. It was this belief that had won them their position in the Soviet Union and it was to that belief that they were going to cling to the end of their stay in power.

Thus the Soviet Union pressed on its policy of remodeling Ukrainian life to eliminate from it everything that had separated it from Great Russia in the past. Harder and harder measures were devised, the number of victims increased, and the new Ukrainian culture that developed under the Soviet Union contained less and less of those elements of freedom and democracy that had inspired Ukrainian thought during the preceding century. The Soviets not only aimed to conquer the present but they also attacked the past. They searched every means of changing the attitude of the people toward their heroes of the past They strove to emphasize every document that might reflect the revolutionary feelings of Shevchenko and Franko, they indulged in diatribes against Kulish and others as bourgeois, and they painted a picture of the past which in its opposition to the definite aspirations of the Ukrainian people came to sound very much like the decrees of the various rulers of Russia of the past. The only difference was that they paid at least lip service to the Ukrainian language in token of their theory that the culture of Ukraine as of the other republics was to be socialist in essence and only Ukrainian in language.

It is difficult to draw up a balance sheet in detail and to weigh the gains of industrialization and the losses of the old life. It seems certain that there was no more real happiness in Ukraine during these years than during the long night of suppression that had preceded the Revolution. Every step was taken to break the national spirit and to train the new generation in an alien path. The only result was the building up of a sullen and defiant mood which might bode ill for the Communists, if it were properly exploited.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II.

By the middle of 1939 it became clear that divided Ukraine was in an unfortunate situation. For a brief moment the promise of a free and independent Carpatho-Ukraine seemed to indicate where the interest of the country lay. The growing autonomy of the province during the winter of 1938–9 had gathered to it many of those Ukrainians to whom national independence was the chief and only goal. Democratic as they were, they believed that they could use Carpatho-Ukraine as a base, even with German blessing. They had expected to profit by the German-Polish dispute to win Western Ukraine in case of trouble and they had visualized then a clash between Germany and the Soviet Union which would allow them to win the independence of Great Ukraine. Then a united Ukraine could be set up and this would be able to play an independent role in the world as a nation of over forty million people.

It was a nice dream of the old world but it failed to take into account the new practices of totalitarianism which discounted human dignity and human rights and regarded men and women as but the tools of the machine or the inanimate members of a caste. The easy way in which the Nazi government turned over Carpatho-Ukraine, despite its promises, to the Hungarians and the ruthless murder of many of its leaders showed to all clearsighted Ukrainians that the future was not so simple as that. Even those Western Ukrainians who were most hostile to Poland realized that they had nothing to gain by the overwhelming of the Polish state as it was in 1939 and despite the growing oppressive measures of the Poles, any plans for a Ukrainian revolt in Eastern Galicia were laid aside.

The suddenly revealed conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in August, 1939, made this even more evident. Little or nothing has been made public of the negotiations preceding this pact. The sacrifice of Carpatho-Ukraine was apparently connected with it but no details are known. Yet it made still clearer the fact that Ukraine was again in the position of 1914. Then it was clear to the wiser political leaders that Ukraine could only profit by the complete elimination of both Austria-Hungary and Russia. In 1939, it was certain that Ukraine could profit only by the complete elimination of both Germany and the Soviet Union, and this meant that the country would suffer heavily even under the most favorable circumstances.

The German attack on Poland started on September 1, and as expected, the German army pushed rapidly into Eastern Galicia and soon entered Lviv. They seized practically all of the area but they were not to hold it long. On September 17, the Soviet army invaded from the east despite various treaties, on the ground that the Polish Republic had ceased to exist as an organized state. On September 23, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed another pact for the division of Poland. Again the exact line has not been disclosed throughout its full course. Yet under it on September 28, the Soviet army pushed into Lviv and occupied the whole of Western Ukraine. This second act of treachery to Ukraine completely broke any Ukrainian confidence in the Nazis, and showed them that any further relations could only be fatal.

This was the first time that the Red Army had penetrated as far as Lviv and they at once began to reorganize the country on the familiar pattern. The landowners were dispossessed and the initial steps were taken to collectivize the country. A large number of professors, journalists, clergy and other intellectual and popular leaders were removed. They were arrested by the NKVD and executed or deported to other portions of the Soviet Union. Many were killed by so-called outbreaks of the population led by Soviet agents. In fact all of the methods tested by twenty years of Soviet work in Ukraine were concentrated on the helpless province, in preparation for a “free” election.

This election was held on October 22 and 91 percent of the population voted for the formation of a Popular Council of Western Ukraine. It was openly said that any one who refused to vote for the single list of candidates, which included almost no known Ukrainian leaders of Western Ukraine, would be treated as a counter-revolutionary and there was no need to amplify this statement. At its first meeting on October 27, the new Council formally begged to be included in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. There were more meetings of the picked groups at Kiev and at Moscow and on November 1, representatives of the Council were invited to Moscow where they presented their petition and were duly accepted into the bosom of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. From then on Western Ukraine was regarded as an inalienable part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

It was the same act that had been symbolically performed in 1919, when the delegates of the Republic of Western Ukraine had appeared at Kiev and the united Ukrainian Republic had been proclaimed. But what a difference! Then representatives had appeared; there was joint discussion of the problems that had to be solved; there were attempts to resolve them on democratic lines. Now the appeal was to the Council of Commissars and the Supreme Soviet at Moscow. The delegates were handpicked and there had been already a long list of arrests and executions before the conscious portion of the population adequately reflected the will of the Communist Party, which had won few adherents during the preceding twenty years.

The farce continued with new demonstrations of love and affection for Stalin and the Soviet Union. On December 24, after more preparation, the proper candidates were elected to the local soviets and on March 24, 1940, Western Ukraine elected delegates to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The next year and a half were spent in remodelling the country and in stopping any manifestations of the popular spirit which were not socialist in essence and only Ukrainian in language. Only the personal reputation of Archbishop Sheptitsky saved him from sharing the fate of the vast majority of the intellectuals and clergy of the country.

All this had barely been started when on June 27, 1940, the Soviet Union intimated to Romania that it would be extremely appreciative, if it would hand over Bukovina and Bessarabia. The Nazi-Soviet accord was still working smoothly and Romania graciously consented. The next day the Red Army moved in and awarded to the Ukrainian Republic northern Bukovina and northern Bessarabia. The rest of the territory so graciously ceded was added to the Moldavian Soviet Republic. Again there were the same speeches of gratitude, the same elections, the same choosing of delegates to the various Soviet Republics and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the same introduction of the ideals and practices of the Communist Party.

Then on June 21, 1941 there came the lightning attack of the Germans upon the Soviet Union. In a few weeks the German armies smashed across the Soviet borders, occupied Kiev and Kharkiv and approached Moscow. Once again Ukraine had changed masters.

There was little reason for the population to rejoice. The Germans came not as liberators but as conquerors. They made no attempt to remedy any of the abuses of the Soviet authorities but they added to them by insisting that all of the property confiscated by the Soviets was the property of a hostile government and therefore entitled to confiscation. They made no effort to consult the wishes of the Ukrainians or to establish a self-respecting Ukrainian government. They sought only for a few leaders who would consent to act as German representatives to push the people into a definitely subordinate position as a subject race. They did allow some of the churches to reopen and they gave a grudging support to the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which had been banned as soon as the National Republic had been suppressed.

Yet they prevented any considerable mass movement from developing by seizing several million Ukrainians, both men and women, and sending them to Germany as slave labor. There is no need to recount the hardships of these unfortunate people, who were compelled to work for almost no wages and on starvation diets for the benefit of the master-race. Their fate was additional proof, if such were needed, that Ukraine could expect even less from the Germans than it could in 1918, and it speedily served to disillusion even the most inveterate enemies of the Communists.

On the other hand, the fate of another large section of the population was little better, for the Soviets endeavored to move as large a part of the population as possible to the east and millions more found themselves forcibly deported from their homes on the pretext that they would thus escape the scourge of war. The Academy of Sciences and much of the Universities of both Kiev and Kharkiv were thus moved and the Academy of Sciences celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of its foundation in Ufa in western Siberia.

Partisan warfare broke out on a large scale both among Ukrainian patriots and Soviet sympathizers. Bands of men, sometimes numbering thousands, with equipment taken from both sides, ravaged the country, while the Soviets announced that those who fought the Germans were patriots and those who attacked the Red Army were fascists and bandits. The names of such leaders as Taras Bulba and Bandera who were distinctively Ukrainian nationalists and fought both sides are known but again there is little detailed knowledge of their activities. The worst aspects of 1918 were repeated for these leaders, although struggling only for an independent Ukraine, came into frequent clashes. Some of them seem to have been the survivors of the older nationalist bands that had fought even after the formal ending of the Civil Wars, others were communistically inclined and fought for the Soviets, and undoubtedly some were able to profit by more or less temporary alliances with various German units which controlled the main centres of population and the lines of communication but which were unable to occupy the broad expanses of the country.

Soviet propaganda during the war emphasized the fact that the purges of the thirties had completely destroyed any fifth-column activities in the Soviet Union and glorified all the partisans, but despatches since the close of hostilities indicate that in some areas the great swarms of bandits and deserters from the Red Army could hardly have appeared in the course of a few weeks. Apparently in some districts there was almost as much anti-Soviet as anti-Nazi activity going on in the no man’s land between the two armies.

At the same time, there can be no doubt that this partisan activity played an enormous role in hemming in the German forces and in rendering it impossible for them to secure supplies even from land which seemed to be safely under their control. It is indeed possible to wonder what would have been the outcome in many areas, especially in Ukraine, had the Germans seriously undertaken the task of liberating the community and of dealing honestly with the people who had experienced so many years of starvation and confiscation. Yet these ideas were entirely foreign to the Nazi temperament, which sought to displace the native population by settling German colonists on the soil and to reduce the original inhabitants to still greater misery or to carry them off and destroy them by forced labor.

After reaching Stalingrad and the northern Caucasus, the German tide began to ebb and soon flowed back into Ukraine and White Ruthenia. Slowly but surely the retreat continued and its speed increased as the Germans made their way back to the land from which they had set out so gaily three years before. After the wave of battle had swept again over Ukraine, the Soviet armies were reorganized into Ukrainian and White Ruthenian armies to bring these Soviet republics into prominence. It does not seem likely that these armies under Soviet Russian generals can be regarded as armies either of Ukrainian or White Ruthenian citizens. If we accept this version, we must assume that few members of the Russian Soviet Republic took part in the war, for at no time was there mention of any Russian armies and this conflicts with the stories of general mobilization that have been so often told. Apparently the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian armies were armies that were formed or based on the territory of the two Soviet Republics but they served as the basis of the claim that both Ukraine and White Ruthenia were entitled to enter the United Nations.

To facilitate this, the Soviet constitution was changed in autumn of 1944 to provide special Commissars for Foreign Affairs for the various Soviet Republics and to allow them to send diplomatic representatives to foreign countries. In one sense this is a return to the conditions prevailing in Ukraine before the organization of the Soviet Union, when the bond of connection was the iron control of the Communist Party over all the Communists in the various Soviet Republics. It bears a superficial resemblance to the decentralization of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but this is only superficial, for so far as we know, there has been no change in the provision of the Constitution that provides that the All-Union Soviet can cancel any measure that is adopted by the individual Soviet Republic, if it wishes to do so.

It is interesting, to say the least, that the Ukrainian representative at San Francisco was the same Manuilsky who had come down from Moscow to act as the Muscovite representative at the formation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He was born in Ukraine but he spent most of his life in the service of the Russian Soviet Federated Republic and later the All-Union Soviet, and his relations with Ukraine have been rather as a Russian or Soviet delegate than as a spokesman for the Ukrainians. The Chairman of the Council of Commissars, Khrushchev, seems to be definitely a Russian. In fact there is little to suggest that there is any Ukrainian of prominence on the Ukrainian scene in a major role. It seems abundantly clear that Ukraine is now being considered merely as a definite tract of territory with no special connection with its own past, for it must have a culture socialist in essence and only Ukrainian in language, and there is some doubt as to whether the language is not being remodelled on the Russian pattern.

As the German troops retreated further and further, Ukraine was again thoroughly ravaged. The cities were largely in ruins, the population had been murdered or deported either to east or west, and the material progress that had been accomplished during the twenty years between the wars was largely wiped out. It was necessary to begin to rebuild the country after a desolation which exceeded that of 1918–20. Yet there have been few consistent stories of what has happened. Side by side with accounts of starvation as a result of the German seizure of foodstuffs, there have been equal stories of gifts by the joyful and liberated population to the victorious Red Army and these gifts have been reported on a scale that would indicate abundance in the areas which were the most hotly contested. There is no way to harmonize the various accounts that have been put out officially and it is probably wiser not to attempt it at the present time.

Then as the Red Army swept on into Western Ukraine, the same procedure was repeated. In every city there were held gatherings greeting Stalin as the liberator of the land with the glorious Red Army. There were the usual resolutions of gratitude, the usual concerts at which Russian music formed the bulk of the program, the usual glorification of all those Ukrainian heroes who worked for the union of Ukraine and Russia and the usual condemnation of every event or person who did not fit into the Russian or the Russian Soviet program.

Then came the turn of Carpatho-Ukraine. At the time when the Soviet Union recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile during the War, it recognized the old boundaries of the country and this included Carpatho-Ukraine. When the Red Army crossed into the area, there came the usual demonstrations, the usual resolutions, the usual appointment of temporary Soviets, and then the usual request that the country be allowed to join the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and of course the petition was accepted.

Yet when it came to a question of carrying on negotiations with the “independent” Polish government set up after the Allied powers had withdrawn recognition from the Polish government-in-exile, the negotiations were carried on in Moscow. The district of Kholm, which was an old part of Ukraine, was freely handed over to Poland without any consultation with the wishes of the population, a consultation that would have been unnecessary, for the entire population of the Soviet Union desires only what has been put forward by the Kremlin, and the same process was followed in Lemkivshchina.

With the occupation of the whole of Ukraine by the Red Army there has descended an even more impenetrable veil over the country. The silence that reigned during the war has become even more intense and the information that comes out is hardly credible, unless the entire past for centuries has been one long nightmare.

It was to be expected that all traces of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church would disappear as soon as the Soviet government was back in control, especially since it has allowed the restoration of the Patriarchate of Moscow to carry out its plans among the other Slavs. It was to be expected that punishment would be visited upon the leaders of the Uniat Church, for they had proved themselves in Western Ukraine to be the guardians of the Ukrainian national spirit. Throughout the nineteenth century they had worked for the spiritual and material welfare of their people and in the past the Russian Empire had dealt harshly with them in all areas under its control. Archbishop Sheptitsky, the patriarch and leader of the Church, died. His successor, Joseph Slipy, was arrested and apparently deported. The other bishops vanished from the scene either by exile, imprisonment or death, and an uncanonical synod of a few priests was convoked. Again that body did the usual thing. It officially requested to be received back into the Orthodox Church and to come under the Patriarchate of Moscow and of course the wish was granted in March, 1946. The Cathedral at Lviv was turned over to the Russian Church and so were many other Church buildings. Priests who do not conform are being imprisoned or tried as fascists. The Uniat and Ukrainian Orthodox bishops abroad have protested and have pointed out the typically uncanonical nature of the whole proceedings. The Pope has protested against the persecution of the faithful in these areas, at the violation of concordats with former governments in the area. All in vain. Resolutions and requests continue to pour out to justify and glorify the Red Army and their leader and the fate of the individuals involved grows ever more obscure.

Yet on the other hand two phenomena stand out in clear relief. The one is the problem of banditry. Again and again we read that in Ukraine, in Poland, in Carpatho-Ukraine and along all the borders of the friendly states large bodies of men, largely in Red Army uniforms, are plundering the country, and persecuting the communists and that part of the population which is cooperating with the Red Army. We are told these men in Red Army uniforms are a mixture of Nazis, traitors who fought in the Nazi armies from the Slavonic lands and the general riff-raff that always follows in the path of war. Among them are Ukrainian nationalists of various groups, especially those who form the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army. They are said to present a formidable problem for the forces that are interested in preserving Soviet “democracy.”

All this sounds strange when we compare it with the general tone of the communiques reflecting the jubilation of the people in being liberated from the Nazi yoke. It fits in well with the stories or perhaps the legends that patriots and nationalists saw their opportunity to strike a blow in their own behalf against both masters and that they have not been so wholeheartedly on the side of the Red Army as we were led to believe earlier.

Side by side with them we have the amazing and distressing picture of the displaced persons. At the Yalta Conference it was provided that the persons who had been moved from an area by the Nazis should be allowed to return and that the governments should assist in this task. It sounded a reasonable measure and so it turned out in the west. There were few French who wished to remain in Germany or in Holland. There were few Dutch who were not ready to go back to their homes and country, even if they were to find their families dead or scattered and their homes burned.

Yet there are millions of people who have been transported against their will from those portions of the Soviet Union that were occupied by the Germans, who refuse to go back to certain death. They have experienced for years the cruelty of German prison camps and the abuses of forced labor and even so they do not wish to go back. The methods that have been employed to force them to do so have become a scandal to the Western and civilized powers. Men and women of all walks of life have been ready to commit suicide rather than to face again life within the Soviet paradise. It is idle to call them fascists and to say that they fear just punishment.

The suspicion cannot be put down that these are people who have once been within the veil and are now willing to face even death rather than return. There can be but one reason, that life there was so hard and desperate that their present fate, such as it is and has been during the War, seems far better and more hopeful, even when hope is lacking, and when their future is dark and unsettled. We cannot help thinking that their stories and still more their actions throw into lurid relief and confirm the tales of the deportations, the famines, the concentration camps in the wastes of Siberia and of Central Asia, that have drifted across the sealed borders of the Soviet Union and which have never been accepted at face value.

Behind the veil that the Soviet Union has cast around it, Ukraine has been united. Ravaged by war, plundered and destroyed by the marching and countermarching of two armies, drained of its population by death and by deportations, it remains a tragic spot in the wreckage of a great war. Impartial observers have told us of the devastation and the suffering in other lands, but Ukraine remains in the shadows. Her spokesmen at home are mute and there are only the official representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic speaking, as is their wont, the words of the Soviet Union to assure us that all is well. The world would like to believe it, it is resting its hopes of a better future upon it and yet the doubts are not dispelled, when it would be so easy, if the Soviet Union wished to do it.

But not only that. With the triumph of the Soviet “democracy” in Ukraine, the Soviet Union is hastening to assure the world that it has discovered new examples of the revival of Ukrainian nationalism. It has found new cases on a large scale of the evil influences of the work of Professor Hrushevsky. It has found reasons for new purges of the Ukrainian Communist leaders who are unworthy of their great task of promoting the new “democracy.” There are new rumors of a drought in Ukraine. The world has heard all this several times and realizes now that it is the story of the last twenty-five years since the fall of an independent Ukraine.

To-day Ukraine is one. For the first time in centuries it has been united under one government. Not since the days of ancient Kiev has this been so fully true, but it is a far cry from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to that free and independent government which was formed so hopefully in 1918, in the heat and confusion of the First World War. It is a far cry from the dream of a free and independent republic organized on the democratic principles of the West to the present Soviet Republic, from the wild and tumultuous Kozak Host with its elected officers to the present organization with the chiefs appointed by Moscow. It is a sad story and the present chapter is by no means the most hopeful.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE

At the end of the First World War, Ukraine won a shortlived independence and then it was torn apart and divided among its neighbors. For a while it seemed to have reverted to the conditions in the seventeenth century when Russia and Poland struggled for its ownership. At the end of World War Two it was reunited within the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and found its place as such in the number of the United Nations. What does the future hold in store for it?

What is to be the future development of Ukraine? This depends on the future of the democratic ideals which have long been held by England, the United States and the whole of Western Christian civilization and which are now challenged by the new ideas of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps never in recorded human history has the future of the world been so uncertain. The ending of the greatest war in history has not brought a feeling of peace to mankind. The power of the atom bomb, the enormous advances in science and in methods of destruction, the annihilation of space by the improvement of transportation and the increased range of rockets and other weapons, all have brought humanity to realize that in the material sphere there must be an end of war and of conflict or civilization will be irretrievably destroyed.

On the other hand, the dissension in the ideals of man has reached a new high. Earlier wars between Christians and pagans, between Catholics and Protestants, have concerned a certain range of ideas but the opposing contestants have recognized many human qualities as common to both sides. For centuries there has been a slow but steady increase in recognition of the rights of the individual, of his innate right to choose his own place of residence, to think his own thoughts, to sing his own songs, and to rear his family as he would. The great despotisms and empires of the past ruthlessly eliminated large masses of the population, but they were content to demand only outer loyalty and not to interfere with the inner life of their subjects. Even the slaves could have an area of thought which they could call their own.

It has remained for the twentieth century to undertake the task of subjugating the inner life of man. We may smile at the crudities of the Japanese thought police who carefully interrogated the subjects of the Emperor to see if they had any dangerous thoughts, but in more subtle ways the whole power of the Soviet Union is devoted to the creation of a culture that shall be socialist in essence and only differ in the language. Around the area which it controls there has been drawn an iron veil of silence and of secrecy. Its admirers abroad willingly accept the same restrictions and when the word filters through from Moscow, they willingly change their position, perform a complete revolution in their mode of thinking and follow the new line without criticism or debate.

On the other hand, the United States and Western Europe are trying to maintain an appreciation of the old values. They are concerned with problems of liberty and human rights. They may fall short of their ideals and of their goals. There may be and often are actions which can only be condemned by all thinking men. Yet with it all there is the same hope and confidence that the human being can find his way to a better, happier and free future.

The struggle between these two conceptions of life is destined to form the essence of the history of the coming years. It is truly a battle for the human spirit that is coming to the foreground of the world stage at the end of the great struggle that has thrown the whole of Europe and large parts of Asia and the Pacific Islands into the abyss. To-day it appears in the councils of the United Nations, for that body has been formed with the greatest care as to methods of organization, but with surprisingly little attention to the contents of the spirit of that organization. The founders did not venture to write into it the spirit of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, the ideals of self-determination of Woodrow Wilson, or the principles on which American and Western Christian life has been based since the days of ancient Judaism and Hellenism, lest the clash between the two ways of life be brought into the open and doom in advance the hopes of men for a peaceful world.

What is to be the outcome? The human mind is staggered at the potentialities for good and ill in the present situation. As we look at the human misery, the ruined cities, the scorched earth, and the destructive power of man, we can only wonder at what is going to happen, and perhaps soon.

Where does Ukraine stand in all this? The Ukrainian spirit has survived for over a thousand years. The Ukrainians on two occasions have lost their upper and more cultured classes, when these were Polonized and Russianized. The peasant life kept on, close to the soil and has sent forth new shoots as soon as conditions became ripe. Every great shift of the European balance, every great movement that has given a new outlet to the human spirit has sooner or later had its effect upon the people.

To-day as never before the Ukrainian population is scattered. The Soviet government has worked unflinchingly to liquidate or break every leader who has refused to bow to its all-embracing rule. The Ukrainian literature of the present is indistinguishable from the literature of the Russian Soviet Republic, of the Georgian Soviet Republic and of the Kazak Soviet Republic. Millions of Ukrainians have been torn from their native soil and scattered alone or with their families throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. Their places have been taken by other similarly uprooted individuals, in the hope that there may be formed a conglomerate mass of rootless people attached to the traditions of the Communist Party.

Can such an ambitious plan succeed? There can be no doubt that under the rule of Stalin and his associates, the Soviet Union has grown into a powerful force which is apparently able to retain the iron control that is necessary for its existence. There has been a terrible cost and this is shown by the refusal of the displaced persons to return. It is shown by the desperate struggle of the Ukrainians during the past decades to maintain their homes and their identity. How long can they endure? No one knows the ultimate power of resistance of the human spirit. No one knows how long devoted fathers and mothers will continue at the risk of their lives to nourish in their children those old traditions which can be handed down secretly and then spring to life with renewed vigor. No one knows how long the ruling group can maintain that iron unity which alone can enable it to continue its herculean task.

The world cannot continue half free and half Communist. Sooner or later there will be an open clash or the ideals of one side will penetrate and destroy the other. The final struggle may not take the form of armed hostilities in the sense of a clash between the nations representing the two ideals, but it will inevitably spread ruin and devastation within one or both of the groups. The lurid tales of deportations when the Red Army entered Western Ukraine will be but a portent, a token of what will ultimately happen if the regime falls or extends its power throughout the world.

It is chimerical to speak now of a relaxation of the methods of control in the Soviet Union. For a quarter of a century, the world has been waiting for a clear sign that this was already taking place and it has been disappointed. The power of the Communist Party is stronger than ever and it is able to profit immediately by all signs of weakness and of confusion among the free nations. It is able to reach out beyond its borders and it brooks no interference with its ideals or its desires.

It is no time for optimism or for pessimism. Neither is it the time for false and wishful thinking or for easy platitudes. The fundamental issue is clear and however it may be glossed over, it cannot be avoided.

The traditional Ukrainian culture can now flourish only outside the borders of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic, under the control of its Communist leaders, is becoming a part of the great and unified Soviet Union. Step by step the dreams of many sincere Ukrainian Communists that they could adapt Communism to the Ukrainian spirit have been blasted and those who held them have paid the price of their beliefs. The struggle now is to adapt the Ukrainian spirit to Communism by ruthless actions and by careful training. A democratic people is being remodelled to serve the purposes of a strictly regimented regime. Its past is being rewritten for it. Its present is being controlled. Its future is being planned.

It is idle to deny that it may succeed, but we can be sure of only one thing. It cannot succeed until the sway of Communism over the whole world has been made absolute. So long as there is a fortress of democracy anywhere in the world, there will remain a centre from which the ideas of freedom and of humanity will emanate and which will continually menace any system which denies them and their validity and existence.

The problem of Ukraine lies to-day as one of the great problems of the world. Here is a nation of forty million people that is sealed off from its natural contacts and deprived of its natural rights and desires. The tragic events of the last half century have shown that alone it cannot throw off the yoke that is upon its neck. Yet that does not mean that it must forever suffer.

Once the free nations awake to the situation and bend their efforts to establish that freedom and dignity that is the right of every man, they will realize that they will have no more devoted friends and allies than the Ukrainians and then it will be possible to reestablish a free and independent Ukraine as one of the free nations of the world.

INDEX

- Aeneid, 155.

- Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, 162, 165.

- Alexander II, Emperor of Russia, 184, 185.

- Alexander III, Emperor of Russia, 193.

- Alexis, Tsar of Moscow, 27, 95, 109, 112, 113, 163, 167.

- All-Ukrainian Council of Soviets, 223, 224.

- All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, 274.

- All-Union Academy of Soviets, 284.

- All-Union Soviet, 276, 295.

- Allies (World War I) 236, 246–249, 250, 253, 255.

- Missions to Ukraine, 242.

- Allied Supreme Council, 248.

- American Civil War, 188.

- American Constitution, 146.

- America, 13, 14, 15, 45, 59, 87, 140, 145, 259, 303.

- See United States.

- American engineers, 283.

- American pioneers, 60.

- American Relief Administration, 275.

- American Revolution, 14, 128, 145.

- American Ruska Nationalna Rada, 241.

- Andrusivo, Treaty of, 93, 121, 123, 172.

- Anna, Empress of Russia, 126, 127, 136, 138.

- Antae, tribe, 32.

- Antiquities of Kiev, 192.

- Antioch, 54.

- Antonovich, V., Prof., 190.

- Apostol, D., Kozak Hetman, 134, 135.

- Archangel, 227, 229.

- Armenia, 40.

- Armistice, World War I, 237.

- Asia, 25, 303.

- Asia Minor, 26.

- Asiatic invaders, 11, 20.

- Athos, Mount, 51, 56.

- Atlantic Charter, 303.

- August II, King of Poland, 126.

- August III, King of Poland, 126, 127.

- Austria, 163, 174–233, 256.

- See Austria-Hungary, Hapsburgs.

- Austria-Hungary, 15, 28–30, 172, 183, 195–202, 210, 212.

- Avvakum, Russian religious leader, 108.

- Aztecs, 12, 59.

- Bachinsky, A., Uniat Bishop, 175.

- Balaban, Gedeon, Bishop, 55.

- Balkans, 33, 150, 152, 153.

- Baltic Sea, 20, 24–25, 73,

- peoples, 204, 253.

- Bandera, S., Ukrainian leader, World War II, 293.

- Batu Khan, 42.

- Baturyn, 100.

- Bazarov, character of Turgenev, 186.

- Belgrade, 152.

- Belinsky, V. G., 160, 169.

- Berinda, P., Kievan scholar, 111.

- Berestechko, battle of, 81.

- Berlin, 235, 285.

- Bessarabia, 291.

- Bibikov, D. G., Russian Governor-General of Ukraine, 162.

- Bible, 50.

- Bila Tserkva, 94, 235.

- Treaty of, 81.

- Bilozersky, V. I., Ukrainian writer, 169, 185.

- Black Sea, 19, 20, 24, 26, 33, 66, 194, 206, 234, 235, 246.

- Bobrinsky, Count A. G., Russian Administrator, 211.

- Bogdanovich, I., Russian writer, 156.

- Bogolyubsky, Prince Andrey, Prince of Suzdal, 26, 41.

- Bohemia, 28, 36, 54, 154, 269.

- Estates of, 161.

- See also Czech, Czechoslovakia.

- Boileau, N., French critic, 156.

- Bolsheviks, 217, 221–253, 273, 274, 285.

- See also Soviets, Soviet Union, Communists.

- Bosphorus, 10.

- Boston, Mass, 145.

- Braslav, 81, 126.

- Brest-Litovsk, 55, 123, 229, 238, 251, 270, 274.

- See also Union of Brest.

- British, 145.

- British Commonwealth of Nations, 295.

- Brody, 269.

- Brotherhoods, 53, 57, 69, 107, 120, 122–124, 176, 179.

- Brusilov, A. A., Russian general, 213.

- Budenny, S., Soviet general, 252.

- Bukovina, 172, 181–196, 208, 239, 241, 291.

- See also Austria-Hungary, Romania.

- Bunker Hill, 145.

- Bulavin, K., Don Cossack ataman, 110.

- Bulgarians, 152.

- Buturlin, V. V., Russian boyar, 82.

- Byliny, 35.

- Byron, Lord G. G., 94.

- Byzantine Empire, 21, 24, 33, 34, 40, 45, 46, 52, 69.

- See also Constantinople, Turkey.

- Cadets, Russian political party, 226.

- Capet, Hugh, King of France, 10.

- Carbonari, Italian secret societies, 164.

- Carpathian Mountains, 19, 25, 36, 43, 172, 211, 266.

- Carpatho-Ukraine, 174, 182, 195–196, 207–212, 239, 241, 265–272, 288–289, 296, 298.

- See also Austria, Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

- Caspian Sea, 40.

- Catherine I, Empress of Russia, 135.

- Catherine II, the Great, Empress of Russia, 14, 128, 137–178, 203, 226.

- Caucasus, 204, 280, 294.

- Cehelsky, L., Western Ukrainian leader, 246.

- Central Administration of Press, Russia, 191.

- Central Asia, 171, 193, 218, 247, 299.

- Central Powers (World War I), 227–231.

- See also Germany, Austria-Hungary.

- Charlemagne, 36.

- Charles XII, King of Sweden, 97–102, 131, 134.

- Chernihiv, 36, 39, 42, 81, 152, 165, 185, 204.

- Chernivtsy, 241.

- Chertomlyk, vase, 32.

- Chetniks, 125.

- Chetyi Minei, 115.

- China, 21.

- Chronicles of Kievan Rus’, 26, 31, 32, 115, 150.

- Church Schism, 35.

- Church Slavonic, 34, 43–51, 108–112, 149–176, 180–199.

- Ciceronian Latinists, 150.

- College of St. Athanasius, Rome, 116.

- Columbus, Christopher, 12.

- Communism, 262–292.

- Communist Party, 276, 284, 291, 295, 304, 305.

- Russian Communists, 274, 306.

- Ukrainian Communists, 279–285.

- See also Bolsheviks, Soviets.

- Communist International, 286.

- Concord Bridge, Mass., 14.

- Confederation of Bar, 127, 128.

- Congress of Ruthenian Scholars, 181, 183.

- Constantine, Russian Grand Duke, 165.

- Constantinople, 9, 12, 21, 27, 33, 35, 37–52, 66, 90, 94, 107, 108, 117, 122, 152.

- Patriarch of, 33, 54, 93, 122, 266.

- Church of St. Sophia, 33.

- New Church, 38.

- Convention of Ukrainian Soldiers and Peasants, 220.

- Cortez, H., Spanish leader, 12.

- Council of Ambassadors, 255, 258.

- Council of Florence, 45, 52.

- Council of General Secretaries, Ukraine, 220.

- Council of the Regency, Polish, 239.

- Councils of Workers’ and Soldiers’, Deputies, 217.

- Crimea, 64, 66, 76, 91, 93, 250.

- Cromwell, Oliver, 13.

- Crusades, 45, 47.

- Curzon Line, 249.

- Cyrillic script, 192.

- Cyril Loukaris, 49.

- Czaplinski, Polish officer, 74, 77.

- Czartoryski family, Polish, 140.

- Prince Adam, 162.

- Czech, 153–167, 186, 238, 241, 265–269.

- See also Czechoslovakia.

- Czechoslovakia, 208, 242, 260–270, 296.

- See also Carpatho-Ukraine.

- Czernin, Count O., Austro-Hungarian diplomat, 230, 231.

- Danube River, 142.

- Danzig, 127.

- Dardanelles, 20, 235.

- Decembrists, Russian revolutionary movement, 165, 167, 186.

- Denikin, A. I., Russian general, 234, 244–250, 282.

- Direktoria, 235–252.

- Dnyeper River, 9, 20, 24, 25, 29, 34, 36, 43, 58–77, 88, 91, 93, 101, 121, 144, 198, 251, 252.

- Dnyeprostroy, 278, 283.

- Dnyester River, 20.

- Dobrovsky, J., Czech scholar, 153, 156.

- Dobryansky, A., Carpatho-Ukrainian leader, 182, 196.

- Dobrynya Nikitich, bylina hero, 35.

- Dolgoruky, V. V., Russian minister, 135.

- Don Cossacks, 61, 110, 234.

- Don River, 19, 20, 25, 40, 61.

- Donets River, 194, 246.

- Doroshenko, Peter, Kozak ataman, 92, 93.

- Dostoyevsky, F. M., Russian writer, 188.

- Drahomaniv, Mykhaylo, Ukrainian publicist, 190, 198, 199, 217.

- Drake, Sir Francis, 12.

- Druzhina, 33, 38, 40.

- Dukhnovich, O., Carpatho-Ukrainian leader, 196.

- Duma, 205, 213.

- Dunajec River, 212.

- Dutch, 118.

- Eastern Galicia, 201, 207, 211, 230, 239–260, 270, 272, 280, 283, 289.

- See also Galicia, Western Ukraine.

- Eastern Ukraine, 196–206, 242.

- See also Ukraine.

- Educational Society, Galicia, 182.

- Eichhorn, German general, 232–233.

- Elizabeth, English Queen, 12.

- Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, 136, 138.

- Eneida, work of Kotlyaresky, 155, 158.

- Engelhardt, Pavel, owner of the Shevchenko family, 147, 166.

- England, 10, 29, 46, 59, 73, 87, 117, 169, 227, 234, 301.

- Enlightenment, 156.

- Entente (World War I), 214, 227.

- Estonia, 253.

- Europe, 1–45, 52, 59, 60, 65, 73, 84–89, 105, 106, 113–121, 146, 155.

- See also Western Europe.

- Finland, 218, 247, 253.

- Finnic tribes, 25, 36, 40.

- Five Years Plan, 278.

- Fort Kodak, 75, 76.

- Four Freedoms, 17, 303.

- Fourteen Points, 15, 238.

- Francis II, Emperor of Austria, 178.

- Francis Joseph II, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, 195, 214, 215, 230.

- Franko, Ivan, Ukrainian writer, 172, 182, 199, 200, 206, 209, 267, 286.

- France, 25, 35, 73, 117, 118, 140, 156, 227, 234, 250, 255, 265, 299.

- French language, 147, 150.

- French Revolution, 14, 146, 157, 178.

- Galicia, 29, 39, 129, 130, 167–214, 230–264.

- Princes of, 26, 39, 41.

- Galician Diet, 201.

- Genghis Khan, 42.

- Gennady, Archbishop of Novgorod, 50.

- Genoa, 276.

- Georgia, 40, 96 234.

- Georgian Soviet Republic, 303.

- Germany, 10, 13, 116, 117, 164, 207–234, 263, 269–299.

- See also Nazis.

- German language, 153, 154, 178, 179.

- Godunov, Boris, Tsar of Moscow, 67, 109.

- Gogol, N. V., Russian writer, 159, 190.

- Golden Horde, 42, 46, 60, 88.

- Golden Horn, 45.

- Golitsyn, Prince V., Russian minister, 93, 94, 95.

- Gonta, Ivan, Haydamak leader, 128.

- Great Russian, 19, 112, 139, 160, 194, 199, 204, 218, 276, 278, 286.

- See also Moscow, Muscovite, Russian.

- Great Russian Language, 111, 117, 151, 169, 181, 188, 191, 192, 205, 267.

- Greek, 26, 49, 50, 107–109.

- Greek monks, 34–37.

- Language, 108.

- Greek Catholics, 207, 262.

- See also Uniat Church.

- Gregory VII, Pope, 10.

- Gregoryev, ataman, 246.

- Grigoryev, A. A., Russian critic, 160.

- Groener, German general, 232.

- Halich, 29, 43.

- Haller, Joseph, Polish general, 242.

- Hanseatic League, 108.

- Hapsburgs, 28, 29, 146, 197, 214, 215.

- See also Austria, Austria-Hungary.

- Haydamaks, 125–128.

- Helen, wife of B. Khmelnitsky, 74, 77 82

- Hellenism, 202.

- Henlein, K. Sudeten leader, 268.

- Herder, J. G., German writer, 157, 160.

- Hetman (title), 13, 63–145, 235.

- Hetman’s Council, 133, 137, 138, 140.

- Hetman State, 133–162, 184.

- See also Kozaks, Ukraine.

- Hitler, A., German Fuhrer, 270, 271, 285.

- Hlinka, Mgr. A., Slovak leader, 268.

- Hlukhiv, 100, 131, 138.

- Hoffman, German general, 230.

- Holland, 299.

- Holovatsky, Y., Ukrainian scholar, 180.

- Holovaty, A., Kozak officer, 142.

- Holovna Rada (Galicia), 181.

- Holubovich, V., Ukrainian minister, 231, 277, 280.

- Holy Roman Empire, 10, 36.

- Holy Synod, Russia, 116, 119 133

- Homonai, Hungarian magnate, 173.

- Horowitz, Ukrainian Communist leader, 225.

- Hrinchenko, B., Ukrainian author, 193.

- Hromada, 190, 191.

- Hrushevsky, M., Ukrainian president, 206, 211, 217, 230, 259, 277, 280, 300.

- Hrynko, Ukrainian Communist leader, 274.

- Hungary, 35, 36, 43, 125, 172–179, 195, 197, 207, 212, 265–271, 288.

- Hust, 241, 242, 269, 271.

- Ilya of Murom, hero of Rus’, 35.

- Incas, 12, 59.

- Iranian, 25.

- Islam, 88, 93.

- See also Mohammedanism, Tatars, Turkey.

- Istoria Rusov, 149, 153, 159.

- Italy, 26, 46, 106, 164, 195.

- Italian Language, 150.

- Ivan III, Tsar of Moscow, 46, 106.

- Ivan IV (the Terrible), Tsar of Moscow, 108.

- Ivan VI, Tsar of Moscow, 136.

- Ivanov, Russian Communist leader, 225.

- Izmaylov, Russian Minister, 131.

- Jadwiga, Queen of Poland, 47.

- Jan Kazimierz, King of Poland, 78.

- Japan, 302.

- Jena, German University, 166.

- Jeremias, Patriarch of Constantinople, 53, 54.

- Jerusalem, 78.

- Jesuits, 49, 52, 54, 65, 74, 117.

- Jews, 125, 266.

- Joachim, Patriarch of Antioch, 54.

- Joachim, Patriarch of Moscow, 115.

- Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, 174, 177, 178, 179.

- Judaism, 33, 303.

- Judaizers, Russian religious sect, 50.

- Jungmann, J., Czech writer, 161.

- Kaffa, 66.

- Kaganovich, Soviet minister, 279.

- Kalinowski, Polish hetman, 75, 76.

- Kalka River, 42.

- Kalnyshevsky, P., Kozak koshovy, 141, 142.

- Kaminets Podolsky, 245.

- Karamzin, N. M., Russian historian, 159.

- Karl, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, 215.

- Kasatin, 237.

- Kazak Soviet Republic, 304.

- Kazan, 43, 212.

- Kentucky, 60.

- Kerensky, A. F., Russian politician, 216, 219, 220, 226, 228.

- Khan of the Crimean Tatars, 60, 61, 66, 75, 80, 81.

- Kharkiv, 71, 104, 204, 225, 274–291.

- University of, 162, 292.

- Khliborody, 233.

- Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, Kozak hetman, 13, 14, 72–97, 103, 104, 110, 116, 121, 125, 126, 133, 160, 163, 168.

- Khmelnitsky, Timosh, son of Bohdan, 81, 83.

- Khmelnitsky, Yury, son of Bohdan, 84, 92.

- Kholm, 214, 230, 232, 296.

- Khortytsya, 62.

- Khozars, 33.

- Khrushchev, Soviet Ukrainian President, 295.

- Khvylovy, M., 280.

- Kiev, 9–14, 21, 25–42, 47–59, 69, 78–85, 93, 106–119, 121, 127, 129, 144, 151–170, 174, 180, 191–194, 202–212, 217–237, 242–259, 266, 274, 277, 283, 290, 291, 300.

- Academy of, 51, 71, 82, 92, 106, 111–190.

- Archaeological Commission, 161, 168.

- Cathedral of St. Nicholas, 95.

- Church of St. Sophia, 38, 95, 283.

- Church of the Epiphany, 95.

- Church of the Tithe (Desyatinnaya), 34.

- Grand Princes of, 10, 11, 107.

- Metropolitan of, 37, 41, 79, 93, 110, 122, 123, 136, 175.

- Monastery of the Caves, 37, 51, 58, 68, 95.

- University of, 162, 167, 190, 198, 206, 292.

- See Rus’, Ukraine.

- Kochubey, Kozak general judge, 97.

- Kolchak, Admiral, Russian leader, 246.

- Kolii, 127, 148, 172, 174.

- Kollar, J. Slovak writer, 161, 166, 167.

- Koniecpolski, Polish general, 70.

- Konovalets, E., Ukrainian officer, 237, 259.

- Kopistinsky, Bishop of Peremyshl, 55.

- Koretsky, Prince, 76.

- Korsun, 76, 77.

- Kosciuszko, T. Polish leader, 178.

- Kossuth, L., Hungarian leader, 182.

- Kostomarov, N., Historian, 149, 168, 170, 185, 186, 191.

- Kotlyarevsky, I., Ukrainian author, 118, 146, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 167, 176, 179, 180, 184.

- Kotsyubinsky, M., Ukrainian author, 193.

- Kozaks, 11–15, 29, 58–104, 110, 121–154, 156–168, 206.

- Host, 12–14, 59–105, 119–125, 132–138, 154, 163, 253, 256, 300.

- Officers, 89, 100, 131–138, 141, 147.

- Organization, 83, 86, 125, 133, 141, 146.

- See also Zaporozhian Kozaks.

- Kozaks of the Black Sea, 142.

- Krakow, 26, 212, 240, 241.

- University of, 92.

- Kremlin, Moscow, 87, 106, 108, 278, 284, 297.

- Krivonos, Maksym, Kozak leader, 76.

- Kuban, 142, 162.

- Kulish, P., Ukrainian author, 149, 169, 170, 184, 185, 187, 189, 192, 197, 286.

- Kulak, 282.

- Kurbsky, Prince A., Russian boyar, 50.

- Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, H., 160.

- Ladoga Canal, 132.

- LaFontaine, J. de, French fable writer, 156.

- Latin, 28, 48, 50, 51, 111, 112, 130, 150, 153, 154, 176.

- Latvia, 253.

- League of Nations, 260, 261, 267.

- Lemikivshchina, 297.

- Lenin, V. I., Communist leader, 221, 226, 227, 232, 273.

- Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, 178.

- Lesya Ukrainka, Ukrainian poetess, 193.

- Leszczynski, Stanislaw, King of Poland, 97, 98, 100, 126, 127.

- Levitsky, Dmytro, Ukrainian politician, 259.

- Levitsky, Ukrainian diplomat, 230.

- Lexington, Mass., 145.

- Literary and Scientific Review, 206.

- Lithuania, 43–47, 61, 64, 79, 92, 99, 107, 109, 121, 162, 253, 256.

- Lithuanian Charter, 139.

- Little Russia, 131, 133, 138, 154, 160–183, 191.

- Language, 188, 191, 192, 205.

- See also Ukraine.

- Little Russian Board, 132, 133, 136, 140, 145.

- Livonia, 99.

- Loewenhaupt, Swedish general, 99.

- Lomonosov, M., Russian poet, 111, 114, 156.

- Lubinsky, Ukrainian diplomat, 230.

- Lubny, battle of, 67.

- Lubomirski, Prince, Polish landlord, 126.

- Lupul, Vasyl, ruler of Moldavia, 81, 83.

- Lviv, 50–57, 78, 122, 130, 189, 195–212, 230, 238, 264, 289, 297.

- Cathedral, 297.

- University, 177–182, 200, 201, 206, 261.

- Staropegian Brotherhood of, 50, 54, 55, 124, 130, 172.

- Lvov, Prince G., Russian politician, 216.

- Mackensen, German general, 212.

- Magdeburg Law, 138.

- Magna Charta, 29.

- Magyars, 265.

- See also Hungary.

- Makhno, Ukrainian leader, 245.

- Maksimovich, M., Ukrainian scholar, 161, 169.

- Mala Rus’, 26.

- See also Little Russia, Ukraine.

- Manuilsky, D. Z., Ukrainian Soviet politician, 234, 274, 295.

- Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, 174, 175, 176, 177.

- Marko Vovchok (Maria Markovich), Ukrainian writer, 185, 196.

- Marxism, 277.

- Masaryk, T. G., Czechoslovak president, 208.

- Maxim the Greek, 107.

- Mazepa, I., Kozak hetman, 13, 94–110, 116, 121, 122, 131, 159, 233.

- Mazepintsy, 103.

- Mediterranean Sea, 20.

- Melnyk, A., Colonel, Ukrainian leader, 271.

- Menshikov, A., Russian minister, 133, 135.

- Mexico, 59.

- Mickiewicz, A., Polish poet, 160.

- Miloradovich, Kozak officer, 134.

- Militant Communism, 277.

- See also Communism, Soviets.

- Milyukov, P., Russian politician, 208, 213, 226.

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 133–137.

- Mirbach, Count, German minister, 234.

- Mliiv, 127.

- Mnohohrishny, D., Kozak hetman, 92, 93.

- Mohammedanism, 33, 62.

- See also Islam.

- Mohyla, P., Kiev metropolitan, 51, 71, 115.

- Moldavia, 51, 66, 78, 81, 83, 125, 172.

- See also Romania.

- Moldavian Soviet Republic, 291.

- Molotov, V. G., Soviet statesman, 289.

- Mongols, 42, 43, 46.

- Moravia, 269.

- See also Czechoslovakia.

- Moscow, 16, 25–28, 40–130, 144, 151, 153, 158, 159, 169, 190, 206, 217, 226, 228, 234, 251, 273–300, 302.

- Patriarch of, 53, 107, 109, 116, 123, 133, 297.

- See also Muscovite, Russia, Great Russia.

- Moscophile party, 181, 196, 197, 199.

- Moskals, 157.

- Motronin Monastery, 127.

- Mstislav, Kiev Grand Prince, 42.

- Mukachevo, 173, 175, 269.

- Mumm, Baron, German diplomat, 232.

- Munich, 268.

- Murmansk, 227.

- Muscovite, 29, 60–121, 190, 205.

- See also Moscow, Russia, Great Russia.

- Nalyvaykans, 58.

- Nalyvayko, Kozak leader, 68, 159.

- Napoleon, French emperor, 164.

- Narodniki, Russian movement, 189.

- Narva, battle of, 97.

- Nazis, 271, 272, 285, 288, 289, 291, 294, 298.

- See also Germany.

- Neolithic period, 31.

- New Economic Policy, 276.

- New England, 13.

- New York, 188.

- Nicephorus, Vicar of Constantinople Patriarch, 55.

- Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, 165, 170, 184, 196.

- Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, 193.

- Nikon, Patriarch of Moscow, 78, 82, 109, 110, 112.

- Nizhni Novgorod, 211.

- NKVD, Soviet secret police, 290.

- Normans, 10, 25.

- Northern War, 97.

- Novgorod, 25, 26, 33, 38, 40, 108, 116.

- Obradovich, D., Serb scholar, 156, 161.

- Ochakiv, 66, 142.

- Odesa, 194, 246.

- Old Believers, Russian religious sect, 110.

- Oleh, Grand Prince of Kiev, 31.

- Olha, Princess of Kiev, 33.

- Omelchenko, Kozak colonel, 98.

- Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 271.

- Orient, 21, 46.

- Orlyk, Philip, Kozak hetman, 102, 104, 132.

- Orthodox Church, 11, 26, 28, 33, 52–130, 172, 175, 256, 262.

- Polish, 262.

- Russian, 41, 106–120, 212, 297.

- Ukrainian, 93, 143, 292, 297.

- Osnova, 185, 186, 197.

- Ostrih, 49, 50.

- Ostrozky, Prince Vasyl Konstantin, 50, 55, 57, 67.

- Otto I, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 10.

- Ottoman Empire, 53, 125.

- See also Turkey.

- Pacific Islands, 303.

- Paderewski, I. J., Polish statesman, 208.

- Paganism, 33, 36, 107.

- Paisius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 78.

- Palacky, F., Czech historian, 161.

- Paleolithic period, 31.

- Paleolog, Sophia, princess of Constantinople, 46, 106.

- Paly, 94, 98, 121.

- Pan-Slavic Society, 167.

- Parliament, Austria, 208.

- Paris, 242, 247, 248, 253, 257.

- Peace Conference, Versailles, 242, 245, 247, 248, 255, 256, 257, 258.

- Peace treaties after World War I, 249.

- Pechenegs, 33, 39.

- Peremyshl, 55, 57, 173, 241.

- Pereyaslav, 82, 87, 88, 91.

- Treaty of, 103, 131.

- Perm, 212.

- Peru, 59.

- Perun, pagan god, 33.

- Pestel, Russian army officer, 165.

- Peter I (the Great), Emperor of Russia, 14, 27, 28, 95–118, 131–137, 152, 153, 167, 171, 226, 233.

- Peter II, Emperor of Russia, 135.

- Peter III, Emperor of Russia, 137, 139.

- Petlyura S., Ukrainian leader, 235–255.

- Petrograd, 220, 221, 225, 228.

- See also St. Petersburg.

- Petrovsky-Sitnyanovich, S. E., 113.

- See also Simeon Polotsky.

- Petrov, O., 170.

- Petryk, Zaporozhian leader, 97.

- Petrushevich, Dr. E., head of Ukrainian National Council in Western Ukraine, 240.

- Pilsudski, J., Polish military leader, 214, 239.

- Pizarro, F., Spanish leader, 12.

- Podebrady, 260.

- Podkarpatska Rus, 268.

- See also Carpatho-Ukraine, Austria-Hungary, Hungary.

- Podolia, 43.

- Poland, 26, 28, 35, 36, 43, 45–143, 153, 162, 164, 172–187, 206–208, 212, 239–298, 301.

- Constituent diet, 257.

- Constitution, 257.

- Diet, 258, 259, 261.

- Poletika, H., Ukrainian writer, 149.

- Polish language and culture, 51, 111, 112, 153.

- Polish legions, 214.

- Polish National Committee, 28, 214, 239.

- Polish revolt of 1831, 162, 166, 167.

- Polonization, 139, 147, 150.

- Polotsk, 114.

- Polotsky, Simeon, Ukrainian writer, 113, 114.

- See also Petrovsky Sitnyanovich.

- Polovtsy, 29, 39.

- Poltava, 101, 155, 204.

- Battle of, 103, 116, 131.

- Polubotok, Kozak, acting hetman, 133, 134, 135.

- Poniatowski, Stanislas August, King of Poland, 128, 140.

- Popovich, O., Bukovina Ukrainian leader, 241.

- Postyshev, P. P., Ukrainian Communist leader, 279, 281.

- Potapov, Russian police official, 191.

- Potemkin, Prince G., Russian imperial commissioner, 142.

- Potocki family, Polish landlords, 67, 70, 128.

- Potocki, N., Polish Crown hetman, 75, 76.

- Potocki, S., son of preceding, 76.

- Potocki, A., governor of Galicia, 202.

- Poty, Uniat bishop, 55, 56.

- Prague, 28, 260, 267, 268, 270.

- Preshiv, 241.

- Prokopovich, Teofan, Archbishop of Novgorod, 115, 116.

- Prosvita, 200.

- Protestantism, 54, 59, 73, 116, 301.

- Prussia, 140, 178, 195.

- See also Germany.

- Pruth river, 102.

- Ptitsky, D., Kievan scholar, 110.

- Pulaski, Casimir, Polish leader, 128.

- Puritans, 13.

- Pushkin, A. S., Russian poet, 159, 160, 167, 169.

- Pylyava, battle of, 78.

- Rakovsky, communist leader, 234, 274.

- Raleigh, Sir Walter, 12.

- Rasputin, G., Russian “monk”, 216.

- Razin, Stenka, Don Cossack leader, 110.

- Red Armies, 16, 250, 253, 277, 289, 291, 293, 296, 297, 298, 304.

- Renaissance, 11, 113, 116, 150.

- Repnin, Prince N., Russian governor-general, 162.

- Revolution of 1848, 160, 168.

- Revolution of 1905, 189.

- Ribbentrop, Nazi minister, 289.

- Richelieu, Cardinal, 73.

- Rifles of the Sich, 235, 240, 269, 271.

- Rohoza, M., Metropolitan of Kiev, 56.

- Romania, 236, 241, 245, 250, 291.

- See also Moldavia.

- Roman Catholic Church, 10, 28, 47–57, 65, 67, 73–82, 100, 107, 108, 124, 129, 147, 150.

- Romanov family, Russian sovereigns, 216.

- Romanov, Michael, Tsar of Moscow, 67, 73.

- Romanticism, 158, 159, 160, 186.

- Rome, 27, 45, 55, 112, 116, 152.

- Rostov, 115, 119.

- Rousseau, J. J., French writer, 157.

- Rozumovsky, Alexis, Ukrainian count, 137.

- Rozumovsky, Cyril, hetman of Ukraine, 137, 138, 139, 140, 162.

- Ruin, 91, 213, 245.

- Rumyantsev, P. A., Russian administrator, 141.

- Rurik, 25, 31.

- Rus’, 11, 24–46, 61, 65, 69, 79, 92, 256.

- See also Ukraine, Russia.

- Rus’ska Pravda, 35.

- Russia, 15, 21, 28, 30, 95–103, 117, 126, 129, 133, 140, 152–249, 250, 264, 266, 268, 272, 273, 286, 289, 296, 301.

- See also Great Russians, Moscow, Muscovite, Soviets.

- Russian Academy of Sciences, 137, 205.

- Russian Archaeological Service, 180, 205.

- Russian army, 12, 99–101, 122, 126–135, 140, 164, 196, 247.

- Russian imperialism, 167.

- Russian language, 266, 267, 278, 281.

- See also Great Russian.

- Russian Provisional Government, 216–229, 247.

- Russian revolution, 30, 210–247, 287.

- Russian Soviet Republic, 273–284, 294, 295, 303.

- Russification, 139, 147, 151, 162, 193, 207, 208.

- Russo-Japanese War, 203.

- Russophile party in Galicia, 181, 182.

- See also Moscophile.

- Ruthenia, 28, 29, 64, 175, 177, 183, 197, 202, 263.

- See also Carpatho-Ukraine, Galicia, Eastern Galicia, Western Ukraine.

- Ryazan, 115.

- Ryleyev, K. F., Russian poet, 159.

- Sadowa, battle of, 195.

- Safarik, P. J., Czech scholar, 161, 167.

- Sahaydachny, P., Hetman of Ukraine, 69.

- Saints Cyril and Methodius, 34.

- Saint Dmitry of Rostov, 119.

- See also Dmytro Tuptalenko.

- St. Petersburg, 28, 118, 119, 132, 137, 138, 139, 155, 158, 165, 169, 170, 185, 189, 190, 193, 208, 226.

- University of, 170.

- Fortress of Saints Peter and Paul, 134.

- See also Petrograd.

- Samoylovich, Ivan, Hetman of Ukraine, 93, 94.

- San Francisco, 295.

- Saray, 43.

- Satanovsky, Arseny, Kievan scholar, 110.

- Saxons, 35.

- Scandinavians, 21, 24, 32, 33, 59.

- See also Sweden.

- Scientific Society, Lviv, 200.

- Scranton, Pa., 241.

- Scythians, 32.

- Serbs, 151, 152, 156, 161, 167.

- Sergeyev, Russian communist leader, 225.

- Seven Years War, 140.

- Seventh Occumenical Council, 47, 107.

- Sevryuk, Ukrainian diplomat, 230.

- Shakhovskoy, Prince A., Russian administrator, 136.

- Shashkevich, M., 180.

- Sheptitsky, Andrew, Uniat Metropolitan of Kiev, 202, 257, 259, 262, 291, 297.

- Shevchenko, T., 15, 29, 127, 147, 148, 159, 160, 161, 166, 168, 170, 171, 180, 182, 184, 185, 187, 196, 198, 208, 216, 267, 286.

- Shevchenko Society, 200.

- Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, 200, 206, 261.

- In Kiev, 206.

- Shvets, Prof., Ukrainian statesman, 244.

- Shumlyansky, J., Metropolitan of Lviv, 123, 124, 130.

- Siberia, 183, 189, 193, 212, 246, 283, 292, 299.

- Sich, Zaporozhian. See Zaporozhian Sich.

- Sichovi Striltsy, 214.

- See also Rifles of the Sich.

- Sicily, 26.

- Sigismund Vasa, III, King of Poland, 56.

- Sinope, 66.

- Skarga, Peter, Polish Jesuit, 49.

- Skoropadsky, Ivan, hetman of Ukraine, 100, 131, 132, 133, 137, 233.

- Skoropadsky, Pavel, hetman of Ukraine, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 244, 282.

- Skovoroda, H., Ukrainian scholar, 149, 155.

- Skrypnyk, M., Ukrainian communist, 274, 279, 280.

- Slavinetsky, Epifany, Kievan scholar, 110, 111, 112.

- Slavs, 29, 32, 35, 66, 152, 158, 160, 166, 207, 226, 297.

- Slavonic brotherhood, 167, 168, 186, 198.

- Slipy, J., Metropolitan of Lviv, 297.

- Slobidshchina, 71, 81, 141.

- Slovakia, 153, 265, 268, 269, 270.

- See also Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

- Smith, Jeremiah, American diplomat, 267.

- Smolensk, 99.

- Smotritsky, Melety, Kievan scholar, 111, 152, 191.

- Sochava, siege of, 83.

- Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 168, 182, 184, 185, 186, 198, 217.

- Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, 213.

- Sofia, 152, 198.

- University of, 198.

- Solferino, battle of, 195.

- Solovetsky Monastery, 142.

- Song of the Armament of Igor, 39.

- Sophia, Tsarevna of Russia, 95.

- South America, 59.

- South Russia, 185, 189, 236.

- See also Little Russia, Ukraine.

- Southern Branch of the Geographical Society, 189.

- Southern Slavs, 111, 167.

- Southern Society, 164.

- Soviet Army, 209, 294.

- See also Red Army.

- Soviet Constitution of 1936, 284.

- Soviets, 222, 244–300.

- Soviet Union, 16, 17, 22, 30, 264–300, 302, 304, 305.

- Spain, 12, 46, 59.

- Stadion, Count, viceroy of Galicia, 181.

- Stalin, J. V., Soviet leader, 224, 226, 271, 279, 281, 283, 291, 296, 304.

- Stalingrad, siege of, 294.

- Stanislaviv, 241, 243, 258.

- Streltsy, guards of the Tsar, 110, 134.

- Subotiv, 74, 84.

- Sudeten Germans, 268.

- Suzdal, 40, 41, 42.

- Svyatoslav, Grand Prince of Kiev, 32, 33.

- Sweden, 56, 73, 83, 84, 87, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 122, 124.

- Switzerland, 198.

- Taras Bulba, Ukrainian military leader, 293.

- Tatars, 12, 27–29, 39–46, 60–83, 96, 101, 106, 134, 172, 206.

- Of the Crimea, 64, 78, 80, 91.

- Teplov V. N., Russian official, 140.

- Tereshchenko, Russian politician, 220.

- Terletsky, Uniat bishop, 55.

- Ternopil, 241, 243, 258.

- Theophanes, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 69.

- Third Rome, 27, 46, 47, 53, 106, 108.

- See also Moscow.

- Thirty Years War, 13, 73, 97.

- Timashev, Russian minister, 191.

- Tokolyi, Russian general, 142.

- Tolstoy, Count A. K., Russian writer, 190.

- Tolstoy, P., Russian minister, 191.

- Transylvania, 78.

- Treaty of Riga, 252, 255.

- Trotsky, L., Communist leader, 227, 231, 232, 273.

- Troublous Times of Moscow, 67, 109.

- Tsereteli, Russian politician, 220.

- Tsertelev, N., Ukrainian scholar, 161.

- Tsimiskes, John, Emperor of Constantinople, 33.

- Tugai Khan, Khan of the Crimea, 76.

- Tugendbund, German revolutionary society, 164.

- Tuptalenko, Dmytro, 115, 119.

- See also St. Dmitry of Rostov.

- Turgenev, I. S., Russian author, 186.

- Turkey, 11, 12, 29, 45, 60–77, 88–96, 102, 126, 128, 142, 172, 229, 234.

- See also Ottoman Empire.

- Tychyna, P., Ukrainian poet, 283.

- Ufa, 292.

- Ukraine, economic advantages, 21, 22.

- Geographical position, 19, 20, 21.

- Name, 24–30.

- Revival, 155ff.

- Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 277, 279, 280, 283, 292.

- Ukrainian Baroque architecture, 95.

- Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, 223, 224, 232.

- Ukrainian Central Council, 217–233, 244, 274.

- See also Ukrainian Rada.

- Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 275.

- Ukrainian Council in Western Ukraine, 239.

- Ukrainian literary language, 146, 169, 188.

- Ukrainian Military Organization, 259, 280.

- Ukrainian National Convention, 218.

- Ukrainian Progressive Organization, 217.

- Ukrainian People’s Republic, 15, 16, 30, 86, 87, 222, 225, 237–281.

- Union with Republic of Western Ukraine, 244.

- Ukrainian Rada, 220, 222, 235.

- See also Ukrainian Central Council.

- Ukrainian regional committees, 241.

- Ukrainian Revolutionary Army, 298.

- Ukrainian Scientific Institute, Warsaw, 261.

- Ukrainian socialists, 235.

- Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 9, 16, 225, 231, 259, 262, 274–296, 300, 301, 305.

- Ukrainophile party, 268.

- Uman, 128.

- Uniat Church, 56, 57, 68, 69, 116, 127–129, 151, 174–183, 195, 202, 207, 212, 267, 297.

- Union of Brest, 28, 55–57, 74–79, 109, 116, 123, 124, 129, 130, 174.

- Union of Hadiach, 92, 121, 256.

- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union.

- Union of Uzhorod, 173.

- United Nations Organization, 9, 16, 30, 294, 301, 303.

- United States of America, 15, 146, 164, 169, 188, 226, 227, 234, 301, 302.

- See also America.

- Universals, 220, 222, 225, 232.

- Urals, 283.

- Uzhorod, 174, 241, 269.

- Vahilevich, I., Western Ukrainian scholar, 180.

- Valuyev, Count P. A., Russian minister, 188.

- Vasily III, Tsar of Moscow, 107.

- Varangian Road, 24, 25.

- Veche, 38.

- Velyaminov, S., Russian officer, 132, 133.

- Veneti, 32.

- Verlan, Haydamak leader, 126.

- Vienna, 88, 123, 164, 178, 196, 200, 201, 213, 214, 215, 250, 259, 277.

- Virgil, Roman poet, 155.

- Vistula River, 252.

- Vladimir, Saint. See Volodymyr.

- Vladimir, city, 40.

- Vladivostok, 227, 229.

- Volga River, 40, 43, 61, 211.

- Volkhov River, 25.

- Volodymyr, Saint, Grand Prince of Kiev, 10, 33, 34, 37, 39, 41, 69, 116, 144.

- Volodymyr Monomakh, Grand Prince of Kiev, 37, 69.

- Voloshyn, Mgr. A., Carpatho-Ukrainian leader, 269, 270, 271.

- Volynia, 43, 67.

- Voynarovsky, A., nephew of Mazepa, 159.

- Vulgate, 50.

- Vyhovsky, I., Kozak hetman, 84, 92, 121.

- Vynnychenko, V., Ukrainian statesman, 220, 235, 236,.

- Vyshensky, I., Ukrainian author, 56.

- Vyshnevetsky, Prince Dmytro, Kozak hetman, 62, 64, 77.

- Wallachia, 66, 78, 83, 127.

- Warsaw, 77, 81, 92, 242, 252, 258, 261.

- Washington, George, 145.

- Western Front, World War I, 231, 234, 242.

- Western Galicia, 201, 212, 240, 255.

- Western Ukraine, 174–183, 197–198, 212, 238–252, 255–264, 265, 267, 277, 280, 283, 288–297, 304.

- Republic of, 238–243, 244, 256, 290.

- See also Eastern Galicia.

- Western Ukrainian Council, 244.

- Western Ukrainian Popular Council, 290.

- White Russian armies, 234, 244–257.

- White Ruthenia, 43, 47, 64, 67, 113, 294.

- Wilno, 49, 57, 162, 166.

- University of, 92.

- Wilson, Woodrow, 15, 238, 303.

- Wisniowiecki, Prince Jarema, Polish leader, 77, 80, 81, 87.

- Wladyslaw IV, King of Poland, 67, 75, 77.

- World War I, 15, 28, 30, 209, 227, 238, 251, 301.

- World War II, 16, 263, 301.

- Yagello, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, 47.

- Yalta Conference, 298.

- Yaroslav Jesuit College, 74.

- Yaroslav the Wise, Grand Prince of Kiev, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41.

- Yavorsky, Stefan, acting Patriarch of Moscow, 115, 133.

- Yefremiv, S., Ukrainian scholar, 280.

- Yuzefovich, M., Russian official, 170, 191.

- Zalyznyak, M., Haydamak leader, 128.

- Zaporozhe, 62, 76.

- Zaporozhian Sich, 12, 14, 62–104, 125–127, 130, 141–146, 162, 278.

- Host, 68, 81.

- Kozaks, 61, 70, 128, 141–145.

- See also Kozaks.

- Zatonsky, Ukrainian Communist, 274.

- Zbarazh, battle of, 80.

- Zboriv, 80.

- Treaty of, 80, 81.

- Zbruch River, 248.

- Zhitomir, 232.

- Zhovty Vody, battle of, 75.

- Zizany, Lavrenty, Kievan scholar, 111.

- Zolkiewski, S., Polish hetman, 67.

- Zora Halitska, 181.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, W. E. D., The Ukraine. Cambridge, 1940.

Chamberlin, W. H., The Ukraine, A Submerged Nation. New York, 1944.

Doroshenko, D., History of the Ukraine, Edmonton, 1940.

Hrushevsky, M., A History of Ukraine, New Haven, 1941.

Manning, C. A., Ukrainian Literature, Studies of the Leading Authors, Jersey City, 1944.

Manning, C. A., Taras Shevchenko, Selected Poems, Jersey City, 1945.

Margolin, A. D., From a Political Diary, Russia, the Ukraine, and America, New York, 1946.

Vernadsky, G., Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine, New Haven, 1941.

Snowyd, D., Spirit of Ukraine; Ukrainian Contributions to World Culture, 1935.

Gambal, M. S., Ukraine, Rus and Moscovy and Russia, 1937.

Ukrainian Quarterly, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York.

Transcriber’s Notes:

1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been corrected silently.

2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have been retained as in the original.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STORY OF THE UKRAINE ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE

PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project Gutenberg License available with this file or online at www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg electronic works

1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the United States and you are located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project Gutenberg License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works provided that:

- • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”

- • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.

- • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of receipt of the work.

- • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work, and (c) any Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg

Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516, Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg electronic works

Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg, including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.

Table of Contents

The Story of The Ukraine

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE UKRAINE

CHAPTER TWO RUS’ AND UKRAINE

CHAPTER THREE KIEVAN RUS’

CHAPTER FOUR THE CULTURAL REVIVAL

CHAPTER FIVE THE KOZAKS

CHAPTER SIX BOHDAN KHMELNITSKY

CHAPTER SEVEN THE REVOLT OF MAZEPA

CHAPTER EIGHT THE SPREAD OF KIEVAN CULTURE IN MOSCOW

CHAPTER NINE THE LAST ACTS IN POLAND

CHAPTER TEN THE END OF KOZAK LIBERTIES

CHAPTER ELEVEN UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER TWELVE THE AWAKENING IN EASTERN UKRAINE

CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE SOCIETY OF SAINTS CYRIL AND METHODIUS

CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE REVIVAL IN GALICIA

CHAPTER FIFTEEN PROGRESS IN RUSSIA

CHAPTER SIXTEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND WAR

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

CHAPTER NINETEEN UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER TWENTY FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE THE REPUBLIC OF WESTERN UKRAINE

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO THE FALL OF UKRAINE

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE WESTERN UKRAINE

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR CARPATHO-UKRAINE

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE. THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE

INDEX

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE